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The language of political death is, of course, metaphorical—and, like 
all metaphors, the vehicle does not perfectly fit the tenor.  An 
impeached, convicted, and disqualified officeholder can still hold state 
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office. . . .  Indeed, an impeached, convicted, and disqualified 
officeholder can be elected to Congress. . . .  Still, it is the central 
contention of this Article that the vehicle (assassination, death) can 
shed significant light on the tenor (impeachment).  
 
—Josh Chafetz’s Impeachment and Assassination (2010)1 
I.  THE METAPHOR IS THE MESSAGE2  
In an article in another journal, Professor Josh Chafetz wrote: “[I]mpeachment 
maintains the link between removal and death, but attenuates it. . . .  Impeachment 
is . . . a political death—a President who is impeached and convicted is deprived of 
his continued existence as a political officeholder.  And, like death, impeachment 
and conviction may be permanent.”3  In this response, it is my purpose to show that 
Chafetz’s proposed metaphor does not work and, indeed, that inferences drawn from 
this metaphor lead Chafetz far afield from the Constitution’s original public 
meaning.  But before doing so, I think it might be helpful to focus on the mechanics 
of House impeachment and Senate trial proceedings as settled by the Constitution’s 
text and long-standing practice.4  
                                                           
 1 Josh Chafetz, Impeachment and Assassination, 95 MINN. L. REV. 347, 351 n.23 (2010); 
see also Jay S. Bybee, Who Executes the Executioner? Impeachment, Indictment and Other 
Alternatives to Assassination, 2 NEXUS 53 passim (1997); Clifford J. Durr, Hugo L. Black: A 
Personal Appraisal, 6 GA. L. REV. 1, 11 (1971) (“[T]he objective now was impeachment [of 
Black]; the viciousness of some of the attacks seemed a clear incitement to assassination.”); 
Frederick B. Karl & Marguerite Davis, Impeachment in Florida, 6 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 2, 2 
(1978) (explaining that “[i]mpeachment is the civilized alternative to assassination . . . .”); cf. 
Steven G. Calabresi, Response, The Political Question of Presidential Succession, 48 STAN. L. 
REV. 155, 155 (1995) (“[Presidential succession] rules should minimize any incentive to cause 
a double vacancy by assassination, impeachment, or other illegitimate means.”); James M. 
Shellow, Comment, The Limits of Cross-Examination, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 317, 388 
(2003) (“The examples illustrate the consequences of drawing so narrow a circle that 
meaningful challenges to methodology are impossible and impeachment devolves into 
character assassination.” (emphasis added)).  This Article is largely a response to Professor 
Chafetz’s Minnesota Law Review publication.  See Chafetz, supra passim.  But it also 
responds to several recent publications by Professors Steven G. Calabresi and Saikrishna B. 
Prakash, and to a student note by David J. Shaw.  See, e.g., infra notes 10 (citing Calabresi’s 
publication in PENNumbra), 45 (citing Prakash’s publication in the Duke Journal of 
Constitutional Law and Public Policy), 102 (citing Shaw’s student note in the Georgetown 
Law Journal). 
 2 Cf. MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN 7 (1964) 
(opining that “[t]he medium is the message”). 
 3 Chafetz, supra note 1, at 351.  
 4 Here and elsewhere I report the consensus (but by no means universal) view.  This 
simply means that there is no settled Supreme Court or other federal jurisprudence on-point, 
and I instead report the consensus arising from actual practice, or in the absence of practice, 
within academia.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 372 n.* (Alexander Hamilton) (J.R. 
Pole ed., 2005) (“[I]t is always justifiable to reason from the practice of government till its 
propriety has been constitutionally questioned.”).  Any colloquy between Professor Chafetz 
and me requires our taking some (if not most) areas of doctrine as noncontroverted: in each 
such case, as far as I know, Professor Chafetz’s views fall within the consensus. 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol61/iss2/4
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In analyzing impeachment, there are four constitutional provisions that are of 
primary interest.  
The House Impeachment Clause.  The House of Representatives shall 
ch[oo]se their Speaker and other Officers; and shall have the sole 
Power of Impeachment.5  
The Senate Trial Clause.  The Senate shall have the sole Power to try 
all Impeachments.  When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath 
or Affirmation.  When the President of the United States is tried, the 
Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without 
the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present.6  
The Removal and Disqualification Clause.  Judgment in Cases of 
Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and 
disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit 
under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be 
liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, 
according to Law.7  
The Impeachment Clause.  The President, Vice President and all civil 
Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on 
Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high 
Crimes and Misdemeanors.8 
The consensus view9 of the Impeachment Clause is that it imposes a textual limit 
on impeachment; that is, only Presidents, Vice Presidents, and civil Officers of the 
                                                           
 5 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5. 
 6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
 7 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.  I call the disqualification component of this clause the 
Disqualification Clause. 
 8 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.  Other impeachment related provisions include: U.S. CONST. 
art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President . . . shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for 
Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.”); U.S. CONST. art. III, 
§ 2, cl. 3 (“The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury . . . .”). 
 9 See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 202 (2005) 
(affirming that in “America only federal ‘Officers’ would be subject to impeachment” 
(emphasis added)); id. at 199 n.* (excluding members of Congress from the reach of the 
impeachment power); James E. Pfander, Removing Federal Judges, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1227, 
1227 n.2 (2007) (“Article II specifies the officers subject to impeachment as including the 
‘President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States’ . . . .” (emphasis added)); 
Saikrishna Prakash & Steven D. Smith, How to Remove a Federal Judge, 116 YALE L.J. 72, 
83 n.31 (2006) (asserting that Article II Section 4 “lists the officers subject to impeachment” 
(emphasis added)); id. at 82 (“The language in Article I relating to removal itself is 
instructive—it reads as a limitation rather than a grant of power to the Senate . . . .”).  
Compare id. at 84 (“A close examination of the text suggests that members of Congress are 
not the sorts of ‘civil Officers’ to which Article II’s impeachment provision applies at 
all . . . .” (emphasis added)), with id. at 84 n.38 (noting that “Article I does recognize that the 
branches of Congress will have their own ‘Officers,’ such as the Speaker of the House” but 
failing to explain why that does not put member-presiding officers in the scope of the 
Impeachment Clause).  By contrast, Professor Isenbergh, reading the Impeachment Clause 
(perhaps even more) closely, argues that it merely mandates removal in each case where a 
listed officeholder (President, Vice President, or civil officer of the United States) is 
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impeached and convicted, but that it does not restrict the impeachment power to the named 
officeholders.  In his view, military officers are also impeachable.  See Joseph Isenbergh, 
Impeachment and Presidential Immunity from Judicial Process, 18 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 53, 
66 & n.49, 98 & n.207 (1999); see also TIMOTHY FARRAR, MANUAL OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 436 (Boston, Little, Brown, and Company 3d ed. rev. 1872) 
(“The general power of impeachment and trial may extend to others besides civil officers, as 
military or naval officers, or even persons not in office, and to other offences than those 
expressly requiring a judgment of removal from office . . . .”); Charles Pergler, Note, Trial of 
Good Behavior of Federal Judges, 29 VA. L. REV. 876, 879 (1943) (“[W]e are dealing with a 
mandatory requirement, prescribing removal if a civil officer is impeached and convicted of 
the offenses . . . .”); cf. AMAR, supra at 198-99 (noting that the House could impeach the 
President or “any other executive or judicial ‘Officer[]’”—but failing to note that, in the 
consensus view, impeachment does not apply to military officers (emphasis added)); Prakash 
& Smith, supra at 80 n.20 (“It is hard to fathom [Tillman adding—is it?] why the Constitution 
would implicitly grant military officers more secure tenure than their civilian counterparts.”).  
Although I am sympathetic to (which is not to say I agree with) Isenbergh’s (old Whig 
unreconstructed textualist) reading, one does wonder if Isenbergh understands impeachment to 
extend to (current and former) members of Congress or to citizens and private persons who 
never took either an oath of (federal or state) office or an oath to uphold the Constitution?  Cf. 
infra note 42 (collecting authority suggesting that members of Congress are subject to 
impeachment and, by implication, to disqualification).  For example, Senator Blount was 
impeached by the House one day prior to his expulsion by the Senate.  See id. (collecting 
primary House and Senate documents).  But see DAVID E. KYVIG, THE AGE OF IMPEACHMENT: 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE SINCE 1960, at 22 (2008) (“The House of 
Representatives, not satisfied [with Blount’s expulsion by the Senate], impeached the ex-
senator to disqualify him from further office holding.”).  The propriety of the House’s action 
was, arguably, rejected by the Senate.  However, the Senate materials are not absent 
ambiguity.  See RICHARD D. HUPMAN, SENATE ELECTION, EXPULSION AND CENSURE CASES 
FROM 1789 TO 1960, S. DOC. NO. 87-71, at 3 (2d Sess. 1962) (“It is not clear whether . . . [the 
Senate’s] refusal to take jurisdiction is to be construed to mean (1) a Senator is not an officer 
within the meaning of Art. II, § 4 of the Constitution or (2) that a man who has ceased to hold 
a ‘civil office’ is no longer subject to impeachment.”); HAROLD H. BRUFF, BALANCE OF 
FORCES: SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 314 n.7 (2006) 
(“Following th[e] [Blount] case, it became the consensus within Congress that its members 
were not officers for purposes of impeachment; rather the expulsion power applied to them.”); 
JOHN D. FEERICK, FROM FAILING HANDS: THE STORY OF PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 144 (1965) 
(“The Senate dismissed the [Blount] case, giving no reason for its decision.”); JOHN D. 
FEERICK, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT: ITS COMPLETE HISTORY AND EARLIEST 
APPLICATIONS 40 n.§ (1976) (“[Blount’s] lawyers pleaded lack of [Senate] jurisdiction on the 
ground, among others, that a senator was not a civil officer and thus not subject to 
impeachment.  The Senate dismissed the case, giving no reason for its decision.  Since Blount 
had been expelled [by the Senate] before the dismissal [of the impeachment proceeding], 
another interpretation is that a member of Congress loses his status as a civil officer, and 
therefore may not be impeached, after he is expelled from Congress.” (emphasis added)); 
WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 214 
(Philadelphia, Philip H. Nicklin 2d ed. 1829) (“Their deliberations, after the arguments of 
counsel, being held in private, we can only infer from those arguments, that the term officers 
of the United States, as used in the Constitution, was held by a majority of the senate, not to 
include members of the senate, and on the same principle, members of the house of 
representatives would also be excluded from this jurisdiction.” (emphasis added)); RUTH C. 
SILVA, PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 134 (2d ed. 1968) (“The upper House ascribed no reason 
for its decision.”); 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 793, at 559 (Boston, Little, Brown, and Co. 1873) (“The reasoning, by which [the 
Senate’s decision in Blount] was sustained in the senate, does not appear, their deliberations 
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having been private.”); Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, If the Judicial Confirmation Process is 
Broken, Can a Statute Fix It?, 85 NEB. L. REV. 960, 1003 n.140 (2007) (“I recognize that the 
proposition that members of Congress are not subject to impeachment has not always been 
completely free from doubt. Early in the nation’s history the House impeached Senator 
William Blount, but the Senate dismissed the articles of impeachment.  Although the Senate’s 
action did not necessarily reflect the view that legislators are not impeachable officers, the 
incident has come to stand for that view . . . .”); Neil Kinkopf, The Scope of “High Crimes 
and Misdemeanors” After the Impeachment of President Clinton, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 201, 216 (2000) (“Because the[] [Senate] deliberated in closed session, there is no 
record to establish the grounds on which the Senate granted the dismissal [in Blount].”); Laura 
Krugman Ray, Discipline Through Delegation: Solving the Problem of Congressional 
Housecleaning, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 389, 399 (1994) (“The Senate deliberated in closed 
session before deciding that it lacked jurisdiction over the Blount impeachment, and thus the 
basis for its decision is unclear.” (footnote omitted)); Ruth C. Silva, The Presidential 
Succession Act of 1947, 47 MICH. L. REV. 451, 461 (1949) (noting that “[t]he Senate ascribed 
no reason for its decision”); H. Jefferson Powell, The Province and Duty of the Political 
Departments, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 365, 369 (1998) (reviewing DAVID P. CURRIE, THE 
CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789-1801 (1997)) (explaining that 
Currie argued that “the conclusion that members of Congress are not ‘officers of the United 
States’ within the meaning of the impeachment provisions may well be right, but it cannot be 
proven”).  But see ELIZABETH B. BAZAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-186A, IMPEACHMENT: 
AN OVERVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, PROCEDURE, AND PRACTICE CRS-22 (1998) 
(“The Senate concluded that [Blount] was not [a civil officer subject to impeachment] and that 
it lacked jurisdiction over him for impeachment purposes.”); AMAR, supra at 568 n.53 
(“Structurally, the Constitution provided for expulsion, not impeachment, of rotten federal 
lawmakers.  And in the impeachment of Senator William Blount in the late 1790s, a majority 
of the Senate sitting as a high court of impeachment read the Constitution in just this 
way . . . .” (emphasis added)); MARTIN B. GOLD, SENATE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE 164 
(2004) (“Senator Blount was acquitted when the Senate decided that sitting Senators did not 
represent ‘civil officers’ subject to impeachment proceedings.” (emphasis added)); WILLIAM 
MCKAY & CHARLES W. JOHNSON, PARLIAMENT & CONGRESS: REPRESENTATION & SCRUTINY IN 
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 507 (2010) (“[Blount’s] impeachment was subsequently 
determined inappropriate by the Senate—Senate removal by expulsion being the only 
available remedy, as a Senator is not a civil officer . . . .”); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION 
OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 523 n.7 (1998) (“Blount was acquitted on the 
ground that as a senator he was not a ‘civil officer’ within the meaning of the impeachment 
provision of the Constitution.”); Letter from Akhil Reed Amar to Stuart Taylor, Jr. (Feb. 4, 
1999), in Akhil Reed Amar, On Impeaching Presidents, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 291, 323 (1999) 
(apparently finding the Blount proceedings free of ambiguity, and explaining that “that [the 
Senate] decided that Sen. William Blount could not be impeached because, technically, he 
was not an executive or judicial ‘officer’ within the meaning of Article II, Section 4,” but 
failing to cite any authority or primary documents in support of this view); id. at 327 (same); 
Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Is the Presidential Succession Law Constitutional?, 
48 STAN. L. REV. 113, 115 & n.13 (1995) (“In the William Blount impeachment case in 1798, 
the Senate correctly rejected the idea that its members were ‘civil Officers’ within the 
meaning of the Constitution, and thus subject to impeachment.” (emphasis added) (citing 
Silva, supra passim)).  Notably, the Amars never explain why the Senate (which acquitted 
Blount) is better authority than the House (which impeached Blount) for the proposition that 
members of Congress are outside of the scope of the impeachment power.  See also Paolo O. 
Celeridad, Note, Convention vs. Coherence: An Alternative Perspective on Philippine 
Presidential Succession, 84 PHILIPPINE L.J. 1077, 1085 (2010) (“[C]learly impeachment 
cannot apply to legislators.” (citing Amar & Amar, supra passim)).   
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United States10 may be impeached by the House (by a mere majority of those voting, 
not counting abstentions, a quorum being present).  
                                                           
Admittedly, I have some doubts as to using Silva as a source.  See, e.g., Silva, supra at 452 
(“If [President Andrew] Johnson had been removed, [Senator and President pro tem] Ben 
Wade would have succeeded [Johnson, as no Vice President was in office]; yet Wade was 
himself concerned in the conspiracy to impeach Johnson and voted for the removal.” 
(emphasis added)); see also SILVA, supra at 117 (describing—roughly twenty years after 
publishing her Michigan Law Review article—the movement to impeach and remove 
President Johnson as merely an “alleged Republican conspiracy” (emphasis added)); cf. 3 
GIDEON WELLES, DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES: SECRETARY OF THE NAVY UNDER LINCOLN AND 
JOHNSON 510 (1911) (using language of “conspiracy” in regard to efforts to convict Johnson); 
Ron Smith, Compelled Cost Disclosure of Grass Roots Lobbying Expenses: Necessary 
Government Voyeurism or Chilled Political Speech?, 6 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 115, 123 n.37 
(1996) (also using language of “conspiracy” in the context of the Johnson impeachment). 
More recent scholarship has suggested that certain Senators voted to acquit Johnson for less 
than wholesome, if not illegal, reasons.  See, e.g., id. at n.37 (arguing that although Kansas 
Senator Edmund G. Ross—celebrated in John F. Kennedy’s Profiles in Courage (1956)—
“may have favored impeachment of Johnson [he] changed his mind at the last minute when he 
discovered the other Kansas Senator, Samuel Pomeroy, a Wade supporter, was conspiring so 
when Wade became President, all of Ross’ appointees would be fired” (emphasis added)); see 
also, e.g., DAVID O. STEWART, IMPEACHED: THE TRIAL OF PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON AND 
THE FIGHT FOR LINCOLN’S LEGACY 294-99 (2009) (concluding that it is “more likely than not” 
that some Republican Senators who voted to acquit Johnson had been bribed). 
 10 The phrase “Officers of the United States” as used in the Impeachment Clause appears 
to be coextensive with the identical phrase which appears in the Appointments Clause and 
Inferior Office Appointments Clause.  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] . . . 
shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint 
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other 
Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and 
which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of 
such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in 
the Heads of Departments.” (emphasis added)).  This phrase is understood to refer generally to 
officers appointed to statutory offices in the Executive Branch and in the Judicial Branch.  
Thus, it would appear that neither the President nor Vice President fall within the category of 
officers of the United States.  See, e.g., United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 510 (1878) 
(Miller, J.) (“That all persons who can be said to hold an office under the government about to 
be established under the Constitution [of 1787] were intended to be included within one or the 
other of these modes of appointment [i.e., Appointments Clause or Inferior Office 
Appointments Clause] there can be but little doubt . . . . It is therefore not to be supposed that 
Congress, when enacting a criminal law for the punishment of officers of the United States, 
intended to punish anyone not appointed in one of those modes.” (emphasis added)); United 
States v. Mouat, 124 U.S. 303, 307 (1888) (Miller, J.) (“Unless a person in the service of the 
Government, therefore holds his place by virtue of an appointment by the President, or of one 
of the courts of justice or heads of Departments authorized by law to make such an 
appointment, he is not strictly speaking, an officer of the United States.” (emphasis added)); 
see also, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3155 
(2010) (Roberts, C.J.) (“The diffusion of power carries with it a diffusion of accountability.  
The people do not vote for the ‘Officers of the United States.’ Art. II, § 2, cl. 2.  They instead 
look to the President [Tillman adding—who is elected] to guide the ‘assistants or deputies . . . 
subject to his superintendence.’  The Federalist No. 72, p.487 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A. 
Hamilton). Without a clear and effective chain of command, the public cannot ‘determine on 
whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious measures 
ought really to fall.’  Id., No. 70, at 476 (same).  That is why the Framers sought to ensure that 
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‘those who are employed in the execution of the law will be in their proper situation, and the 
chain of dependence be preserved; the lowest officers, the middle grade [officers], and the 
highest [officers], will depend, as they ought, on the President, and the President on the 
community.’  1 Annals of Cong., at 499 (J. Madison).” (emphasis added)); FRANK J. 
GOODNOW, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 225 (Law 
Book Exch., Ltd., photo. reprint 2003) (1905) (“[T]he United States Supreme Court has held 
that no one can be an officer of the United States government unless he be appointed as the 
constitution provides, viz., by the President and Senate, the President alone, one of the United 
States courts, or the head of an executive department.” (emphasis added)); JOHN E. NOWAK & 
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 7.12(a), at 314 (8th ed. 2010) (“The U.S. 
Constitution specifically authorizes the President to appoint ‘all other Officers of the United 
States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be 
established by Law . . . .’” (quoting the Appointments Clause)); SILVA, supra note 9, at 135 
(“The courts have been especially careful not to enlarge the meaning of the term ‘officer’ as 
used in the Constitution. They have defined an officer of the United States as a person 
appointed by the President and the Senate, by the President alone, by the courts of law, or by a 
department head.” (collecting case law)); RUTH C. SILVA, PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 149 
(1951) (“‘Officers of the United States’ are not appointed by electoral colleges. They are 
appointed by the President and Senate, by the President alone, by the department heads, or by 
the courts of law.”); J. Todd Applegate, Chapter 19 of the NAFTA: Are Binational Panels 
Constitutional?, 3 NAFTA: LAW & BUS. REV. OF THE AMERICAS 129, 140 (1997) (“Exactly 
who is an ‘Officer’ of the United States is a question that was addressed by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in a 1976 case, Buckley v. Valeo. The Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo interpreted 
the Appointments Clause to mean that individuals who exercise ‘significant authority pursuant 
to the law of the United States’ must be appointed by the President, with the confirmation of 
the Senate [Tillman adding—which would seem to exclude the President].” (footnote 
omitted)); Victoria Nourse & John P. Figura, Toward a Representational Theory of the 
Executive, 91 B.U. L. REV. 273, 302 (2011) (reviewing STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER 
S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008)) 
(“We should read [Chief] Justice Roberts’s reference to ‘the community’ [in Free Enter. 
Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3155] as a reminder that what really matters in any inquiry of executive 
power is the power of the people—for it is only through the Constitution’s connection of 
executive power to the power of the electorate that the President has any power at all.” 
(emphasis added)); Silva, supra note 9, at 462 (“The courts have been especially careful not to 
enlarge the meaning of the term [‘]officer[’] as used in the Constitution.  They have defined an 
officer of the United States as a person appointed by the President and the Senate, by the 
President alone, by the courts, or by a department head, and commissioned by the President.” 
(collecting case law)); id. at 475 (“[T]he only election by presidential electors known in the 
Constitution is the election of the President and Vice President.  ‘Officers of the United 
States’ are appointed by the President and the Senate, by the President alone, by the 
department heads, or by the courts.” (emphasis added)); cf., e.g., Michael R. Keefe, Note, The 
Constitutionality of the Double For-Cause Removal Restriction: Free Enterprise Fund v. 
Public Company Accounting Board, 537 F.3D 667 (D.C. Cir. 2008), 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 1653, 
1656-57 (2009) (“[A]ll officers—whether principal or inferior—must be appointed by the 
president, the courts, or the heads of department.”).  But see 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL 
STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY 
THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 26 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Washington, 
no publisher 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES] (“Some other gentlemen said . . . that the 
Vice-President was not a member of the Senate, but an officer of the United States, and yet 
had a legislative power . . . .” (reporting July 24, 1788 meeting of the North Carolina ratifying 
convention) (emphasis added)); but cf. BAZAN, supra note 9, at CRS-22 (“The term [‘civil 
Officers of the United States’] is not defined in the Constitution.”); MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, 
THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 64 (2d 
ed. 2000) (“The text does not define ‘officers of the United States.’”); Gary Lawson, The 
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The Removal and Disqualification Clause provides for two distinct punishments 
in consequence of Senate conviction.  If an impeached office-holder is convicted by 
the Senate (by a vote of two thirds of the Senators present, a quorum being present), 
he is automatically removed from office.11  If the Senate convicts, the Senate may,12 
                                                           
“Principal” Reason Why the PCAOB is Unconstitutional, 62 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 73, 77 
n.13 (2009) (“I do not address the thorny question whether congressional officers are ‘Officers 
of the United States’ under the Appointments Clause or for other purposes.” (emphasis 
added)).  
Nevertheless, modern scholars in the academic consensus would also include the President 
and Vice President in the category of officer of the United States.  See, e.g., Calabresi, 
Response, Political Question, supra note 1, at 159 n.24 (“The best reading is that the President 
and the Vice President are the ‘Officers of the United States’ contemplated by this language in 
the Appointments Clause.”); id. at 165-66 (suggesting that a “normal” President, unlike an 
“Acting President,” is an “Officer of the United States”); see also, e.g., Amar & Amar, supra 
note 9, at 136 n.143 (“If an acting President, wielding the full and awesome executive power 
of the United States, is not an ‘Officer of the United States,’ what is he?”); cf. 3 ANNALS OF 
CONG. 281 (1791) (Congressman Gerry: “[I]f [the Speaker] is not an officer [for Succession 
Clause purposes], what is he”?) (published 1849); 29 ANNALS OF CONG. 947 (1816) (quoting 
John Randolph of Roanoke’s asking rhetorically “[i]f the appointment in question [to a treaty-
created office] be not an office, he said he should like to know what an office is.”) (published 
1854). Compare U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (“[A]ll executive and judicial Officers, both of the 
United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this 
Constitution . . . .”), with Stephen G. Calabresi, Rebuttal, Does the Incompatibility Clause 
Apply to the President?, in Seth Barrett Tillman & Steven G. Calabresi, Debate, The Great 
Divorce: The Current Understanding of Separation of Powers and the Original Meaning of 
the Incompatibility Clause, 157 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 134, 143-44 (2008) (“Thus when 
the Oath Clause of Article VI requires that all federal and state executive and judicial officers 
take oaths to uphold the Constitution the Clause is clearly referring to the President, the Vice 
President and to state governors as well as to all federal and state judges.”).  As explained, the 
position of the modern scholars within the academic consensus has been rejected by the 
Supreme Court of the United States.  But those in the consensus have made no effort to 
explain how the Supreme Court’s long enduring view on this subject errs.  Whether or not the 
President and Vice President fall within the category of Officers of the United States (or, the 
related category of Officers under the United States), is, as I hope to show, no mere 
infructuous quodlibet.  See, e.g., infra notes 13 (discussing Officers . . . under the United 
States), 48 (distinguishing officers of the United States from Officers . . . under the United 
States), 67 (summarizing argument and evidence tending to establish that the President and 
Vice President are neither officers of the United States nor Officers . . . under the United 
States). 
 11 This understanding (arguably) arises directly from the text.  See supra note 8; see also 
supra notes 5-7; GOLD, supra note 9, at 163 (quoting Congressional Research Service report 
stating that “[t]he precedents in impeachment suggest that removal can flow automatically 
from conviction”); Peter M. Shane, Who May Discipline or Remove Federal Judges? A 
Constitutional Analysis, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 209, 209 n.2 (1993) (“As interpreted by the 
Senate, this provision requires removal from office as an automatic consequence of 
conviction, but disqualification from office requires a separate vote.”).  However, historically, 
Senate practice on this point has been uneven, and, on occasion, the Senate has taken a 
separate vote in regard to removal after having voted to convict.  See, e.g., The United States 
vs. West H. Humphreys, in 54 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
895, 897-904 (Washington, Government Printing Office 1861) (reporting separate Senate 
conviction, removal, and disqualification votes taken on June 26, 1862); GERHARDT, supra 
note 10, at 187 (noting that in “earlier impeachment trials . . . the Senate took separate votes 
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on guilt and removal”).  Compare, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Read the Constitution: It’s Removal 
or Nothing, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 1999, at 21A (asserting that “[t]he sole historical example of 
two votes in the Senate was the 1804 conviction and removal from office of district court 
judge John Pickering. . . . What is significant, however, is that . . . there have never been 
separate votes on conviction and removal since.”), with Robert H. Bork, Letter to the Editor, 
Desperate Action in 1804 Impeachment, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 1999, at 23A (retreating from 
his February 1, 1999 position, supra, and stating, instead, “I know of no instance, whether on 
one vote or two, in which conviction did not result in removal from office, as the Constitution 
states it must”). 
 12 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 65 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 4, at 351 (“The 
punishment, which may [Tillman adding—as a matter of discretion] be the consequence of 
conviction upon impeachment [Tillman adding—which appears to refer to disqualification], 
is not to terminate the chastisement of the offender. After having been sentenced to a 
perpetual ostracism [Tillman adding—again in apparent reference to disqualification] from 
the esteem and confidence, and honors and emoluments of his country; he will still be liable to 
prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law.” (emphasis added)); THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 79 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 4, at 420 (“[Article III judges] are liable 
to be impeached for mal-conduct by the house of representatives, and tried by the senate, and 
if convicted, may be dismissed from office and disqualified for holding any other.” (emphasis 
added)).  But see Ingram v. Shumway, 164 Ariz. 514, 518 (1990) (Feldman, V.C.J.) 
(“Hamilton’s dissertations [in Federalist Nos. 65 & 66] are far from clear on the precise 
question before us, though it can certainly be inferred that he may have considered 
disqualification to automatically follow impeachment and removal. . . . We are left with the 
conclusion that Hamilton may have thought disqualification was automatic [in the case of 
conviction], but no record exists that he ever stated this in so many words.”); but cf. Nixon v. 
United States, 938 F.2d 239, 252 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Edwards, J., dissenting in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (suggesting that like removal, disqualification is mandatory upon 
conviction by noting that “[t]he injury [Judge] Nixon alleges as a result of his removal [by the 
Senate] goes far beyond the loss of his salary. It includes not only removal from the federal 
bench, but permanent disqualification from holding Government office.” (citing Article I, 
Section 3, Clause 7)), aff’d, 506 U.S. 224 (1993).   
Over the course of American history, the Senate has disqualified all of three officers: West 
Hughes Humphreys, a federal district court judge, was impeached, convicted, and disqualified 
in 1862 for taking a confederate judgeship (without having resigned from his federal judicial 
position); Robert Wodrow Archbald, a federal circuit court judge, was impeached, convicted, 
and disqualified in 1913 for corruption in office; and, on December 8, 2010, Judge Thomas 
Porteous, a federal district court judge, was impeached, convicted, and disqualified for 
corruption.  See The United States vs. West H. Humphreys, in 54 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, supra note 11, at 904 (reporting a June 26, 1862 unanimous 
Senate vote disqualifying Humphreys); Henry J. Abraham, The Pillars and Politics of Judicial 
Independence in the United States, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY 27 
(Peter H. Russell & David M. O’Brien eds., 2001) (noting that in 1913 Judge Archbald was 
disqualified by a 39-to-35 vote); GERHARDT, supra note 10, at 60 (noting in a 2000 publication 
that the only officers ever disqualified by the Senate were Judges Archbald and Humphreys); 
KYVIG, supra note 9, at 25 (explaining the Humphreys proceedings); U.S. Senate Roll Call 
Votes 111th Congress—2nd Session, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/ 
roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=111&session=2&vote=00265 (last visited 
Dec. 29, 2010) (noting that Judge Porteous was disqualified in a 94 to 2 Senate vote).  
Notably, Archbald was disqualified by a simple majority, not a two-thirds, vote.  See 
Waggoner v. Hastings, 816 F. Supp. 716, 719-20 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (Roettger, J.) (citing the 
Senate Archbald disqualification proceedings approvingly).  It seems somewhat odd that the 
(arguably) greater punishment of disqualification may be imposed by a smaller majority (i.e., 
a simple majority vote) than the (arguably) lesser sentence and punishment of conviction with 
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in its discretion, by simple majority vote (again, a quorum being present), also 
impose an additional punishment: disqualification from holding any Office of honor, 
Trust or Profit under the United States.13  
                                                           
concomitant removal, requiring a two-thirds vote.  See, e.g., Joel B. Grossman & David A. 
Yalof, The Day After: Do We Need a “Twenty-Eighth Amendment?”, 17 CONST. COMM. 7, 12 
(2000) (“[Disqualification by the Senate] is now routinely [! & ?] done by majority vote; we 
would require a two-thirds vote.”); see also State v. Hill, 55 N.W. 794, 796 (Neb. 1893) 
(Norval, J.) (stating that “[a]ll will concede that disqualification to hold office is a punishment 
much greater than removal”); cf. Michael Abramowicz, Impeaching Judges at the Fringe, 106 
YALE L.J. 2293, 2297-98 (1997) (reviewing MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL 
IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS (1996)) (arguing that 
“[i]f a statute may effectively disqualify judges automatically upon criminal conviction, it 
should be able to remove judges as well” which suggests that disqualification is a greater 
punishment than removal).  But see Chandler v. Judicial Council of 10th Cir. of the U.S., 398 
U.S. 74, 141-42 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) (“While judges, like other people, can be tried, 
convicted, and punished for crimes, no word, phrase, clause, sentence, or even the 
Constitution taken as a whole, gives any indication that any judge was ever to be partly 
disqualified or wholly removed from office except by the admittedly difficult method of 
impeachment by the House of Representatives and conviction by two-thirds of the Senate.” 
(emphasis added)); GERHARDT, supra note 10, at 94-95 (noting that “one of the specific 
safeguards set forth in the Constitution for the disqualification of federal judges is that at least 
two-thirds of senators must agree on the propriety of a conviction and the imposition of such a 
penalty”—leaving unclear if “penalty” refers to second-in-time “disqualification” or mere 
first-in-time “conviction”); but cf. AMAR, supra note 9, at 567 n.52 (asserting, in 2005, prior to 
the 2010 Porteous disqualification, that “[t]wice in American history, the Senate has imposed 
disqualification . . . by a simple majority vote . . . .” (citing GERHARDT, supra note 10, at 77-
79)).  Professor Amar does not appear to be correct: although Judge Archbald was disqualified 
by a narrow majority, Judge Humphreys was disqualified by an unanimous vote.  See 
Abraham, supra at 27 (reporting conviction and disqualification votes for Archbald and 
Humphreys). 
 
 13 The phrase “Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States” within the 
Removal and Disqualification Clause is textually distinguishable from “Office[] of the United 
States” within the Appointments Clause and Impeachment Clause.  See Application of the 
[Foreign] Emoluments Clause of the Constitution and the Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act, 
6 Op. O.L.C. 156, 157 (1982) (Shanks, Dep’y Asst. Att’y Gen.) (“It is not clear, however, that 
the words ‘any Office of Profit or Trust [under the United States],’ as used in [Article I, 
Section 9, Clause 8] the [Foreign] Emoluments Clause, should be limited to persons 
considered ‘Officers’ under [Article II, Section 2, Clause 2] the Appointments Clause.  Both 
the language and the purpose of the two provisions are significantly different.” (emphasis 
added)).  See generally Sykes v Cleary (1992) 176 CLR 77, 95 (Austl.) (Mason, C.J., Toohey 
& McHugh, JJ.) (“The meaning of the expression ‘office of profit under the Crown’ is 
obscure.”); 3 CYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 8 (Andrew C. McLaughlin & Albert 
Bushnell Hart eds., N.Y., Peter Smith 1963) (1914) (“The question of what is an office of trust 
or profit under the United States, has never been completely settled.” (emphasis added)); 
MICHAEL J. GLENNON, WHEN NO MAJORITY RULES: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND 
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 23 (1992) (“What constitutes an office of trust or profit is not 
clear.”); RAWLE, supra note 9, at 217 (“The judgment [of the Senate] is of a limited and 
peculiar nature—it extends no further than to removal from office, and disqualification to 
hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit, under the United States.” (emphasis 
added)); Gerald S. Schatz, Note, Federal Advisory Committees, Foreign Conflicts of Interest, 
the Constitution, and Dr. Franklin’s Snuff Box, 2 D.C. L. REV. 141, 158 (1993) (“The 
Supreme Court never has ruled on the question of what constitutes an ‘Office of Profit or 
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A.  Must Senate Conviction Upon Impeachment Effectuate Removal (Chafetz’s 
“Political Death”)?  
No.  Senate conviction (founded on a prior House impeachment), standing apart 
from a subsequent Senate disqualification vote, works a removal from office only if 
the party convicted is still in office at the time the Senate votes to convict.  And like 
most within the modern academic consensus, Professor Chafetz takes the view that 
so-called “late impeachment” (of former officers)—that is, the House impeachment, 
Senate trial, conviction, and possible disqualification of former officers based upon 
their conduct while in office—is constitutional.14  If House impeachment or Senate 
                                                           
Trust’ under th[e] [Emoluments] [C]lause.”).  Notwithstanding the Constitution’s textual 
distinction, and the lack of consensus among prior commentators, Professor Chafetz, like 
Professor Akhil Amar and many other scholars within the (anti-textual) modern academic 
consensus, appears to believe that the two phrases are coextensive.  See JOSH CHAFETZ, 
DEMOCRACY’S PRIVILEGED FEW: LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGE AND DEMOCRATIC NORMS IN THE 
BRITISH AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 168 & n.68, 280-81 (2007); see also GOLD, supra 
note 9, at 163 (assuming an identity between Offices of honor, trust, or profit under the United 
States and offices of public trust under the United States—notwithstanding that the latter 
phrase nowhere appears in the Constitution).  My position is that the Constitution makes use 
of textually distinct office-laden language because a different meaning was intended and was 
so understood by contemporaries during and in the aftermath of ratification. See supra note 10 
(discussing officers of the United States), infra notes 48 (distinguishing officers of the United 
States from Officers . . . under the United States), 67 (summarizing argument and evidence 
tending to establish that the President and Vice President are neither officers of the United 
States nor Officers . . . under the United States). 
 14 See Josh Chafetz, Executive Branch Contempt of Congress, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1083, 
1152 (2009) (“Even former executive branch officials may be impeached . . . .”).  Admittedly, 
the “late impeachment” scenario (that is, the House impeachment, Senate trial, conviction, 
removal, and possible disqualification of former officers based upon their conduct while in 
office) is somewhat theoretical: although the House has impeached a former cabinet member, 
Secretary of War William Belknap, the Senate has never purported to convict a former 
officeholder.  As a result, there is no settled federal practice or jurisprudence on this point, but 
the academic consensus—including Professor Chafetz—appears to support so-called “late 
impeachment.”  See id.; BRIAN C. KALT, CONSTITUTIONAL CLIFFHANGERS: A LEGAL GUIDE FOR 
PRESIDENTS AND THEIR ENEMIES 110 n.*, 113, 122, 126-29, 168 n.* (2012) (discussing late-
impeachment concept, and Belknap’s impeachment by the House, which occurred after he had 
left office); id. at 106-32 (dedicating an entire chapter to discussing pro’s and con’s of late 
impeachment); Brian C. Kalt, The Constitutional Case for the Impeachability of Former 
Federal Officials: An Analysis of the Law, History, and Practice of Late Impeachment, 6 TEX. 
REV. L. & POL. 13 (2001); see also Michael J. Broyde & Robert A. Schapiro, Impeachment 
and Accountability: The Case of the First Lady, 15 CONST. COMM. 479, 490 (1998) (“Scholars 
today generally agree that in principle former officials are subject to impeachment.”).  But see 
Laurent Sacharoff, Former Presidents and Executive Privilege, 88 TEX. L. REV. 301, 315 
(2009) (“[Congress] cannot impeach a former President . . . .”); but cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, 
AN AFFAIR OF STATE: THE INVESTIGATION, IMPEACHMENT, AND TRIAL OF PRESIDENT CLINTON 
101 n.21 (1999) (“[I]t is unclear whether resignation moots an impeachment 
proceeding . . . .”).   
Professor Akhil Amar appears to be in the camp supporting the permissibility of late 
impeachment.  See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION 573 n.5 (2012) 
(explaining that “former officers are also arguably subject to impeachment”); AMAR, supra 
note 9, at 568 n.53 (“Perhaps impeachment could properly extend to former officers who 
should be disqualified from future officeholding . . . .” (emphasis in the original)); Akhil Reed 
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trial proceedings start after the Chief Magistrate or Vice President or officer has 
already left office or if the office-holder resigns during House impeachment or 
Senate trial proceedings but prior to conviction, then conviction (standing alone and 
apart from disqualification) does not (and, indeed, cannot) work a removal, and, at 
most, may result in the loss of the statutory perquisites that accrue to former office-
holders (e.g., pensions, etc.).15  
                                                           
Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer’s Rightness, 95 MICH. L. REV. 203, 214 n.36 
(1996) (“Even after he left office, Richard Nixon was probably subject to impeachment and 
disqualification from future officeholding . . . .”); cf. Hearing Before the Task Force on 
Judicial Impeachment of the [H.] Comm. on the Judiciary: To Consider Possible 
Impeachment of United States District Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr. (Part IV), 111th Cong. 
17 (Dec. 15, 2009) (testimony of Akhil Amar: “[I]t is a gross mistake to believe that [f]ederal 
officers may be impeached only for misconduct committed while in office or, even more 
strictly, for misconduct that they committed in their capacity as [f]ederal officers.”); id at 21 
(reproducing Professor Amar’s prepared statement where he argued that “treason and 
bribery . . . can be committed by someone prior to taking office,” yet remain “impeachable 
offenses”).  Professor Amar’s position here is quite puzzling.  If impeachment extends to 
former officers (notwithstanding the office-laden language of the Impeachment Clause), then 
why are not former officers proper candidates for statutory succession under the Presidential 
Succession Clause (another clause using the language of office and officer)?  See U.S. CONST. 
art. II, § 1, cl. 6 (“In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, 
Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall 
devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of 
Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring 
what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the 
Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.”  (emphasis added)).  Professor Amar 
has expressly rejected this possibility.  See AMAR, supra note 9, at 171 (“Yet once [the Senate 
President pro tem or Speaker] resigned [guided by separation of powers concerns], the ex-
legislative leader would no longer even be a congressional ‘officer.’”); Amar & Amar, supra 
note 9, at 120 (“[T]he moment an officer resigns, he becomes a mere citizen and is thus 
ineligible to succeed to or remain in the Oval Office [under any succession statute].”); cf. 
Akhil Reed Amar, A Few Thoughts on Constitutionalism, Textualism, and Populism, 65 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1657, 1660 (1997) (“If Newt Gingrich is an officer because he is Speaker of 
the House, were he to take up the presidency, he would have to step down from the 
speakership.  But then he would no longer be the officer that was the basis for his 
ascension.”).  What accounts for the distinction Professor Amar would have us make?  What 
is the difference between current and former officers for the purposes of the Succession 
Clause and the Impeachment Clause?  Both clauses speak to officers. 
 15 I suggest that removal may “at most” result in the loss of statutory perquisites of office.  
There is, however, some doubt on this point.  Some commentators point out that the loss of 
such perquisites appears to be in tension with the Removal and Disqualification Clause, which 
provides that “Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal 
from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under 
the United States.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7 (emphasis added).  Authorities noting this 
tension include Professors Gerhardt, Kalt, Samahon, etc.  See, e.g., GERHARDT, supra note 10, 
at 99 (noting possible loss of pension); Hugh Brown, A Plague on Both Your Houses: 
Challenges to the Role of the Independent Counsel in a Presidential Impeachment, 34 TULSA 
L.J. 579, 586 (1999) (“A removed President can lose not only the office of the presidency and 
the right to hold future political positions, but also pension benefits and Secret Service 
protection.”); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitutional Limits to Impeachment and Its 
Alternatives, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1, 72 (1989) (“Removal results in the permanent loss of the 
judge’s power to decide cases or controversies and the forfeiture of any pension, benefits, and 
opportunity to serve on judicially related panels such as the Judicial Council.”); Kalt, supra 
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The bottom line is that impeachment, even of Presidents, may, but need not, 
result in removal.  That is some reason to believe that Chafetz’s metaphor does not 
meaningfully explain or account for the constitutional processes relating to 
impeachment.  
This is no mere minor point at the theoretical boundary of the law.  The core of 
Professor Chafetz’s normative position is that the substantive standard for 
impeachment of Presidents is connected to the paradigmatic cases of historically 
justified assassinations as understood by Benjamin Franklin, the Framers and 
Ratifiers, and their generation.16  Such cases include Charles I17 and Julius 
Caesar18—men who undermined their (relatively) free domestic political institutions 
                                                           
note 14, at 124 (“It was assumed by some of these same commentators that an impeachment 
conviction would allow Congress to strip [President] Nixon of his pension, but it now seems 
that this would have violated the constitutional limitation on judgments to removal and 
disqualification.  In retrospect, Congress could have taken steps to allow late impeachment to 
strip an ex-officer of his pension, but it was probably too late to apply such a law to Nixon.” 
(footnotes omitted)); id. at 129-30 (collecting authorities); Tuan Samahon, Impeachment as 
Judicial Selection?, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 595, 643 n.315 (2010) (citing GERHARDT, 
supra note 12, at 99, approvingly); Alexa J. Smith, Federal Judicial Impeachment: Defining 
Process Due, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 639, 657 n.121 (1995) (“An impeachment conviction results 
in expulsion from the judiciary and the subsequent loss of salary, pensions, and other benefits 
ordinarily due.”).  See generally KALT, supra note 14, at 110-11 (“[Senator] Specter indicated 
that if convicted, Clinton could lose things like his pension and his government-provided 
security.  Specter was not quite right; [a] federal . . . [statute] provides that a president who is 
impeached and convicted loses his pension and other benefits, but only if he is impeached 
while in office.  Congress could always change that law, though.  In doing so, it would protect 
the country from malfeasant officers who commit their offenses shortly before leaving office, 
and it would add teeth to late impeachment, thereby making it more likely to be a worthwhile 
exercise.”); id. at 111 n.7 (“One could argue that making the punishment on conviction 
include such a severe financial penalty would violate the constitutional provision that 
‘Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and 
disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United 
States.’  If this is true, however, it makes the current presidential benefits . . . [statute] 
unconstitutional as well.  But the benefits law operates independently of the impeachment 
process—loss of the pension would be based on the operation of the pension law, not on the 
‘judgment’ of the Senate in the impeachment case.”).  
Some academic discussion relating to pensions relates merely to the loss of the opportunity to 
vest in a pension in connection with continuing service, as opposed to the forfeiture of a 
pension which has already accrued to the claimant.  Furthermore, where the statutory 
provision for the loss of perquisites in connection with conviction in impeachment 
proceedings is enacted after the close of impeachment proceedings, or after the pension or 
other statutory right has vested in the claimant, or after the accused wrongdoer commits the 
alleged wrong, there may be implications arising under the Due Process Clause, the Ex Post 
Facto Clause, and/or the Bill of Attainder Clause.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No Bill 
of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.”); U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person 
shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”). 
 16 See, e.g., Chafetz, supra note 1, at 352. 
 17 See id. at 367-88.  Charles I was not actually assassinated; rather, he was tried, 
convicted, and executed by an irregular court.  Id. 
 18 See id. at 353-67. 
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in an effort to entrench19 and aggrandize20 their personal power.  But men who allow 
themselves to be turned out of office or who peaceably resign never deserve to be 
assassinated, particularly under any aggrandizement or entrenchment rationale.  
Again, Chafetz affirms, as a matter of original public meaning, that late 
impeachment is constitutional; he also affirms that the substantive standard for 
impeachment is the commission of an assassinable offense (as historically 
understood at the time of ratification).  Is it not fair to say that these two positions 
are (at the very least) in deep tension?  
B.  Is it Reasonable to Characterize Removal in Consequence of Conviction a 
“Political Death”?  
No.  When the Senate votes to convict an impeached office-holder, the legal 
effect of Senate conviction, automatic removal from office, if in office,21 is 
indistinguishable from removals achieved by other means. Examples are readily at 
hand. When a President’s second term ends, or when the public fails to reelect a first 
term President, he can no longer exercise the powers and duties of office (its trust); 
he can no longer enjoy its perquisites (its profits); he is no longer saluted as the 
Chief Magistrate (its honors).  The end of the period for which he is elected is 
legally and functionally indistinguishable from removal in consequence of 
conviction—indistinguishable in all respects, except for the timing. 
Likewise, the result of a Senate conviction vote is no different from removal of 
Executive Branch officers effectuated by the President under his historical Article II 
powers.  Similarly, an officer may sometimes be removed by another officer (or 
commission) acting under a statutory or regulatory grant of authority.  Furthermore, 
                                                           
 19 See id. at 422 (noting anti-entrenchment rationale for impeachment). 
 20 See id. at 353 (tying assassination to the aggrandizement rationale). 
 21 Even if in office, it seems to me that an impeached and convicted office-holder must be 
in an office that is itself subject to impeachment in order to be seised by automatic removal at 
the time of conviction.  For example, a civil officer (e.g., a cabinet member) might be 
appointed to high military office.  If while in military office he is impeached and convicted for 
his prior conduct committed while in civilian office, would that work a removal from military 
office?  I think not.  The effect of House impeachment and Senate conviction would be limited 
to its moral opprobrium and to the loss of collateral statutory benefits accruing to former 
office-holders subsequently convicted by the Senate.  Cf. 3 U.S.C. § 19 (2006) (removing 
impeached officers from the line of succession, even if not yet convicted).  After all, the 
Impeachment Clause does not expressly reach Representatives, Senators, and military officers.  
See Chafetz, supra note 1, at 351 n.23.  But cf. infra note 42 (collecting sources indicating that 
members of Congress are impeachable).  Thus, it is difficult to see why conviction should 
work a removal from such offices.  On the other hand, if the House votes to impeach, and the 
Senate votes to convict, remove, and disqualify, based on conduct in a formerly held office 
subject to impeachment, then disqualification would extend to military office, but not to 
Senate or House membership.  In other words, although a simple conviction would not 
effectuate a removal from military office, disqualification, quite possibly, may do so, 
assuming that disqualification reaches offices currently held, and not merely would-be 
attempts at future (i.e., post-Senate-conviction) office-holding.  If Professor Chafetz agrees 
with my textual analysis (which is, I believe, consistent with his writings), he might well 
consider whether the complexity of our legal system forbids the adoption of his beautiful 
Benjamin-Franklinesque simplicity: impeachment-as-assassination.  See Chafetz, supra 
note 1 passim. 
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an office created by statute can be terminated by Congress via statute, which, 
although it does not formally remove an officer from office, effectively terminates an 
officer from government service by terminating the office held.22  Finally, conviction 
of certain crimes in the course of judicial proceedings sometimes works an automatic 
removal or disqualification from office as determined by statute.23  
                                                           
 22 Termination and removal are not coextensive.  A removal leaves an office vacant, with 
the possibility of a subsequent appointment.  A termination, by contrast, leaves the appointing 
officer (or commission) with no office to fill.  The full extent of Congress’s power to 
terminate statutory offices has been and is controverted.  Compare Seth Barrett Tillman, 
Senate Termination of Presidential Recess Appointments, 101 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 82 
(2007) (arguing that the Senate can terminate a presidential recess appointment by 
reconvening and terminating its session), and Seth Barrett Tillman, Terminating Presidential 
Recess Appointments: A Reply to Professor Brian C. Kalt, 101 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 94 
(2007) (same), with Brian C. Kalt, Response, Keeping Recess Appointments in Their Place, 
101 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 88 (2007) (putting forward constitutional and practical 
objections to the proposed procedure), and Brian C. Kalt, Keeping Tillman Adjournments in 
Their Place: A Rejoinder to Seth Barrett Tillman, 101 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 108 (2007) 
(same).  Does Congress’s power to terminate statutory offices extend to Article III judges and 
Justices and other officers with good behavior tenure?  Apparently so.  Compare Stuart v. 
Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803) (Paterson, J.) (approving, by implication, congressional 
termination of judicial office), with Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 725-27 (1986) 
(Burger, C.J.) (denying, in dicta, propriety of congressional removals).  Some have suggested 
that Congress has no power to terminate and instantly recreate a terminated office.  See 
Saikrishna Prakash, Removal and Tenure in Office, 92 VA. L. REV. 1779, 1786 (2006) (“In 
other words, [according to this view] though Congress may terminate an office and thereby 
oust the incumbent, it cannot enact a simple removal statute.  Nor can Congress terminate an 
office and recreate an identical office, for that would be, in substance, a simple removal 
statute.  [This] nuanced position presumably remains the view of the executive branch.” 
(collecting presidential statements and other Executive Branch authority)). 
 23 See, e.g., De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., plurality 
opinion) (“Barring convicted felons from certain employments is a familiar legislative device 
to insure against corruption in specified, vital areas.  Federal law has frequently and of old 
utilized this type of disqualification. . . .  In addition, a large group of federal statutes 
disqualify persons ‘from holding any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States’ 
because of their conviction of certain crimes, generally involving official misconduct.”); see 
also, e.g., supra note 21 and accompanying text; infra notes 55-65 and accompanying text.  
Statutory removal frequently works a statutory disqualification in regard to holding appointed 
or statutory offices.  But this disqualification arises as a statutory, not as a constitutional 
restriction against future office-holding.  Likewise, to the extent that these statutes purport to 
create a disqualification against holding federal elective positions—Representative, Senator, 
Vice President, or President—these statutes would appear to be unconstitutional.  See U.S. 
Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (Stevens, J.) (holding that states may not 
add to the textually express qualifications in the Constitution for Representatives and 
Senators); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 550 (1969) (Warren, C.J.) (suggesting that 
Congress may not add to the textually express qualifications in the Constitution for 
Representatives and Senators); THE FEDERALIST NO. 60 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 4, 
at 326 (noting that the qualifications for membership in Congress are “defined and fixed in the 
constitution, and are unalterable by the [national] legislature”); CHAFETZ, supra note 13, 
at 171 (same).  But see P. Allan Dionisopoulos, A Commentary on the Constitutional Issues in 
the Powell and Related Cases, 17 J. PUB. L. 103, 108 n.16, 111, 116-21 (1968) (arguing that 
Congress may add statutory qualifications to congressional membership); John C. Eastman, 
Open to Merit of Every Description? An Historical Assessment of the Constitution’s 
Qualifications Clauses, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 89, 136 (1995) (concluding that “the arguments 
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Thus, outside of the impeachment context, removal can be effectuated by action 
of each of the three branches of the federal government.24  The legal effect of 
removal—achieved by any of these means, including the mere passage of time in 
regard to elected officials—is indistinguishable from that achieved by a Senate 
conviction vote in the impeachment context. 
What is that effect?  A person removed in consequence of Senate conviction 
loses his current statutory office25 or the presidency (a constitutional office) or vice 
presidency (another constitutional office).  That is all.  Such a person is perfectly 
free to seek any other elected position—state or federal—and any appointing 
official, officer, or commission may choose that person for a vacant statutory office 
(absent a statutory limitation). 
In short, if a person convicted by the Senate has suffered, per Chafetz, a political 
death, then it is a death with very little sting, for many individuals who have been 
removed or suffered loss of office have come back another day and held (elective or 
appointed) positions once again.  Just think of Grover Cleveland’s two non-
consecutive presidential terms.  A temporary interlude in the political wilderness 
may be a personal or party setback, but it is not a death, metaphorically or otherwise. 
                                                           
against the exclusive interpretation of the Qualifications Clauses, and in favor of the power of 
states to superadd to the qualifications listed in them, are stronger and more consistent, both 
logically and with the historical record and the nature of the American regime”).  See 
generally Roderick M. Hills, Jr., A Defense of State Constitutional Limits on Federal 
Congressional Terms, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 97, 113 n.59 (1991). 
 24 But cf. Gerhardt, supra note 15, at 49 (“It would have been illogical for the framers to 
have given Congress two separate methods to expel its own members.”); Jason J. Vicente, 
Impeachment, A Constitutional Primer, 3 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 117, 133 (1998) (“Providing 
two methods for removing a legislator seems redundant and illogical.” (citing Gerhardt, 
supra)).  It is unclear to me what the basis for this intuition is.  In regard to the removal of 
officers, for example, few doubt that the President’s power to remove (even high ranking) 
Executive Branch officers is not exclusive.  Such a result does not appear, to me at least, 
“illogical” or “redundant.”  See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.  
Perhaps, an alternative reason to doubt that Congress may impeach, try, remove, and 
disqualify its own members is that such processes would seem to trespass on the (apparent) 
norm of intracameral autonomy.  Compare Bruhl, supra note 9, at 996-1007 (affirming the 
existence of a constitutional intracameral autonomy norm), with BERGER, infra note 42 
(discussing the Foreign Emoluments Clause and implying that the ability of a member of 
Congress to accept a gift from a foreign state hinges on the member’s receiving consent from 
both houses of Congress to accept the gift), and Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption 
Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 361-62, 364, 366, 410 n.302 (2009) (same); compare 
AMAR, supra note 9, at 568 n.53 (“Structurally, the Constitution provided for expulsion, not 
impeachment, of rotten federal lawmakers.  And in the impeachment of Senator William 
Blount in the late 1790s, a majority of the Senate sitting as a high court of impeachment read 
the Constitution in just this way . . . .” (emphasis added)), with supra note 9 (collecting 
contrary authority).  Of course, finding a norm of intracameral autonomy assumes that we 
already know that impeachment does not reach members of Congress.  If, as a matter of 
original meaning, impeachment does reach members of Congress, then no such norm exists, 
or, at best, it only may be said to exist (weakly) in other contexts outside of impeachment. 
 25 See supra note 8; see also supra notes 5-7. Compare KYVIG, supra note 9, at 308 
(“[I]mpeachment and conviction imposed no mandatory punishment other than the loss of 
office . . . .”), with GERHARDT, supra note 10, at 187 (noting that in “earlier impeachment 
trials . . . the Senate took separate votes on guilt and removal”). 
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Professor Chafetz might argue my position is too cramped: conviction and 
removal carry with them a sort of moral opprobrium beyond the pure legal 
consequences of removal.  Perhaps the Framers expected that the judgment of the 
Senate (founded on House charges) would carry serious weight with the public in 
this regard.  But that expectation—that the public would give due weight to the sense 
of the Senate26—was not embodied in the four corners of the national charter in any 
meaningful way, and, more importantly, that expectation (if it existed at all) has 
turned out to be dead wrong.  Examples of the public’s disregard for removals 
effectuated by political officeholders (i.e., Senators and others) are not difficult to 
come by.  Senator William Blount was expelled from the Senate in 1797 by a two-
thirds vote, in a process akin to a Senate conviction in impeachment proceedings.  
He returned to his native Tennessee to be elected to the state senate, and then was 
chosen as that body’s president.27  Likewise, during the Civil War several senators 
were expelled for aiding the Confederacy, but nevertheless held significant state and 
federal positions after the war ended in 1865. For example, Virginia Senator Robert 
M.T. Hunter was expelled in 1861; from 1874 to 1880, he held the office of state 
treasurer, and from 1885 to 1887, he was collector of the Port of Tappahannock, 
Virginia—a federal office.28  North Dakota Governor William Langer, after being 
convicted in federal court of a felony, was removed from state office in 1934 by his 
                                                           
 26 A successor Senate will not always give due weight to the sense of a prior Senate.  The 
Twenty-Third Senate entered a resolution censuring President Jackson for his decision to 
remove government funds from the Bank of the United States absent express statutory 
authority.  After the next election, the successor Senate expunged the resolution from the 
Senate’s Journal.  Compare 23 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
197 (Washington, Duff Green 1833) (recording March 28, 1834 resolution censuring 
President Jackson), with 26 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 123-
24 (Washington, Gales & Seaton 1836) (recording January 16, 1837 resolution expunging the 
Jackson censure from the Journal).  See generally 1 ROBERT C. BYRD, THE SENATE, 1789-
1989: ADDRESSES ON THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 127-41 (Mary Sharon Hall 
ed., 1988).  But see generally KYVIG, supra note 9, at 308 (noting that Alcee Hastings “proved 
unable to escape the stigma of impeachment altogether” when, for example, his “party 
regained control of the House” and he was denied a chairmanship). 
 27 See CHAFETZ, supra note 13 passim.  See generally BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE 
U.S. CONGRESS, bioguide.congress.gov (last visited Dec. 7, 2010) (entries for Blount, Bright, 
Hastings, Hunter, Andrew Johnson, Waldo Johnson, Langer, Nicholson, and Powell).  
 28 There are several other such examples.  Tennessee Senator Alfred O. P. Nicholson was 
expelled in 1861; from 1870 to 1876, he served as Chief Justice of the Tennessee Supreme 
Court.  Missouri Senator Waldo P. Johnson was expelled in 1862; in 1875, he was chosen 
president of his state’s constitutional convention.  Indiana Senator Jesse D. Bright was 
expelled in 1862; from 1867 to 1871, Bright was a member of the Kentucky House of 
Representatives.  Albeit, the Civil War and Reconstruction were arguably sui generis.  See 
BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS, supra note 27.  See generally 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3 (“No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, 
or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of 
Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as 
an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, 
shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the 
enemies thereof.  But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such 
disability.”).  
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state’s supreme court.  He was subsequently reelected to the governor’s post in 1937, 
and in 1941, he was elected to the United States Senate.  He was reelected to the 
Senate in the three subsequent elections.29  Congressman Adam Clayton Powell was 
excluded from membership by the House in 1967; he was reelected in a special 
election caused by his exclusion, and, thereafter, reelected to the next Congress.30  
Judge Alcee Hastings, an Article III judge, was impeached by the House in 1988 
and convicted by the Senate in 1989.  Subsequently, he ran for and won a House seat 
in 1992.  A position he holds to this day.31  Political death?  
C.  Is Senate Disqualification a “Political Death Without Possibility of 
Resurrection”?32  
As Professor Chafetz recognizes, disqualification by the Senate, a punishment it 
may impose, in addition to conviction (and consequent automatic removal), leaves 
the former office-holder free to pursue state office.33  This is no small thing.  Under 
the original Constitution, state legislatures chose United States senators and also had 
the power to choose presidential electors themselves, without the intervention of any 
                                                           
 29 See BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS, supra note 27; JAMES 
E. LEAHY, THE NORTH DAKOTA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 61, 98 (2003).  
During his term as Governor of North Dakota, William Langer was convicted of a felony in a 
federal district court.  After he was convicted, but before the conclusion of federal appellate 
review, Langer was removed from his position as governor by his state’s supreme court in, 
what was in effect, a collateral proceeding.  See id.  After he was removed from office, his 
conviction was overturned on appeal, and he was subsequently reelected governor.  See The 
Expulsion Case of William Langer of North Dakota (1942), U.S. SENATE, 
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/expulsion_cases/123WilliamLanger_ex
pulsion.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2011).  According to the consensus view, even if Langer’s 
felony conviction had been affirmed on appeal, he, nonetheless, remained “qualified” to hold 
a Senate seat as a matter of federal constitutional law.  See supra note 23. 
 30 See supra note 27; see also supra note 23 (citing Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 
(1969) (Warren, C.J.)). 
 31 Judge Hastings has been continuously reelected since 1992, and he has been reelected as 
recently as Tuesday, November 6, 2012.  See KYVIG, supra note 9, at 309 (“[Hastings’s] 
repeated elections to the House of Representatives signaled his constituents’ indifference to 
his impeachment . . . .” (emphasis added)); see also id. at 307 (explaining that post-1992, 
“[t]he resurrection of Alcee Hastings steadily continued” (emphasis added)); id. at 306 (using 
resurrection-language to describe Hastings’s career); id. at 308 (“Alcee Hastings dented the 
notion of impeachment as the ultimate political disgrace . . . .”).  It is again worth noting that 
even had Judge Hastings been disqualified by the Senate, according to the consensus view, he 
would have been eligible to serve in Congress.  See infra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.  
But cf. KYVIG, supra note 9, at 309 (“Until the 1990s no federal official impeached and 
convicted had ever resumed a public career.”). 
Likewise, President Andrew Johnson was impeached by the House and escaped Senate 
conviction by a single vote.  He was subsequently elected to the Senate for a term starting 
in 1875 by his home state’s (that is Tennessee’s) legislature.  See supra note 27. 
 32 Chafetz, supra note 1, at 421 (capitalization added). 
 33 Id. at 351 n.23. 
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popular election.34  Even today, state officers hold a variety of powers intimately 
affecting the federal government.  State governors may, in certain circumstances, 
make appointments to fill vacancies in the United States Senate.35  State legislatures 
or state conventions ratify proposed federal constitutional amendments.36  State 
legislatures make calls for Article V national conventions to amend the federal 
constitution.37  State statutes determine voter qualifications for elected federal 
office38 (subject to federal constitutional limitations39), and state statutes control 
                                                           
 34 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (1789) (“The Senate of the United States shall be 
composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years; 
and each Senator shall have one Vote.”), amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (1913) 
(mandating popular election of Senators); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“Each State shall 
appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to 
the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the 
Congress . . . .”).  Arguably, state legislatures have retained this power, notwithstanding the 
advent of popular election.  See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 113-15 (2000) (Rehnquist, 
C.J., concurring). 
 35 See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, § 2 (“When vacancies happen in the representation of 
any State in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of election to fill 
such vacancies: Provided, That the legislature of any State may empower the executive 
thereof to make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the 
legislature may direct.”), amending U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 2 (“[I]f Vacancies happen by 
Resignation, or otherwise, during the Recess of the Legislature of any State, the Executive 
thereof may make temporary Appointments until the next Meeting of the Legislature, which 
shall then fill such Vacancies.”); Michael Stern, I’m Not Dead . . . . I’m Just in Congress, 
POINT OF ORDER: A DISCUSSION OF CONGRESSIONAL LEGAL ISSUES (Jan. 6, 2011, 4:59 AM), 
http://pointoforder.com/ (same). 
 36 See U.S. CONST. art. V; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XXI (ratifying amendment by 
state convention process). 
 37 See U.S. CONST. art. V.  Although state legislatures have made such calls from time to 
time, no Article V convention has ever been convened.  It is a matter of debate amongst 
academics whether a sufficient number of states have made valid calls for a national 
convention.  Compare Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The 
Constitutional Lessons of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 677, 684 & n.15 
(1993) (suggesting the “somewhat startling conclusion that Congress is currently obliged by 
Article V to call a constitutional convention, unlimited in the subjects it may consider for 
proposed amendments”), with Sara R. Ellis et al., Note, Article V Constitutional Conventions: 
A Primer, 78 TENN. L. REV. 663, 668 (2011) (noting that “Congress’s duty to call a 
convention may not have been triggered” because the state “applications covered a multitude 
of subjects rather than a single specific topic”), id. at 668 n.28 (“[I]t is reasonable to assume 
that at least thirty-four [of fifty states, i.e., two-thirds of the states] specific applications [for an 
Article V convention] must share the same subject area.”), and Michael Stokes Paulsen, How 
to Count to Thirty-Four: The Constitutional Case for a Constitutional Convention, 34 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 837, 855-58 (2011) (explaining that rescissions since 1993 leave only 33 
valid state conventions calls, and 34 are necessary to trigger an Article V convention). 
 38 Cf., e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“The House of Representatives shall be composed 
of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in 
each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of 
the State Legislature.”); U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, § 1 (“The electors [for the Senate] in each 
State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the 
State legislatures.”). 
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election procedures to such offices40 (although Congress has an express power to 
override such state statutes41).  Likewise, Professor Chafetz takes the position that 
disqualified former officers can also be elected to Congress.42  This is nothing like a 
                                                           
 39 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to 
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, 
color, or previous condition of servitude.”); cf. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2 (“The Congress 
shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”). 
 40 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding 
Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the 
Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, 
except as to the Places of ch[oo]sing Senators.”); Shelby County v. Holder, No. 12-96, 570 
U.S. ____, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 4917, at *23 (June 25, 2013) (Roberts, C.J.) (“[T]he Federal 
Government retains significant control over federal elections.  For instance, the Constitution 
authorizes Congress to establish the time and manner for electing Senators and 
Representatives. But States have broad powers to determine the conditions under which the 
right of suffrage may be exercised.” (citations and quotation marks omitted)); THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 44 (James Madison), supra note 4, at 248 (“And the election of the house of 
representatives, will equally depend [on the state legislatures] in the first instance; and will 
probably, for ever be conducted by the officers and according to the laws of the states.”).  
 41 See supra note 40 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1). 
 42 See Chafetz, supra note 1, at 351 n.23; see also Amar & Amar, supra note 9, at 115 
n.14 (same); Michael Stern, Is Former Judge Porteous Eligible to Serve in Congress?, POINT 
OF ORDER: A DISCUSSION OF CONGRESSIONAL LEGAL ISSUES (Dec. 29, 2010, 4:25 AM), 
http://pointoforder.com/ (same).  Here too, there is no settled federal practice or jurisprudence 
on this point.  See Amar & Amar, supra note 9, at 115 n.14 (noting that this issue was left 
open in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 520 n.41 (1969) (Warren, C.J.)).  As indicated 
in the main text, Professor Chafetz takes the position that disqualified former officers may be 
subsequently elected to Congress.  His position appears to be the majority view in legal 
academia today.  (For what it is worth, I will venture to affirm that I share Chafetz’s view on 
this contested point.)  But it must be admitted that this opinion is not, and, perhaps, has not 
been universally held.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 65 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 4, 
at 351 (“The punishment, which may be the consequence of conviction upon impeachment 
[Tillman adding—which appears to refer to disqualification], is not to terminate the 
chastisement of the offender.  After having been sentenced to a perpetual ostracism [Tillman 
adding—again in apparent reference to disqualification] from the esteem and confidence, and 
honors and emoluments of his country [Tillman adding—which might be thought to include 
election to Congress]; he will still be liable to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary 
course of law.” (emphasis added)).  The modern academic consensus—permitting a 
disqualified officer to serve in Congress—does not command universal assent among modern 
judges and commentators.  See Waggoner v. Hastings, 816 F. Supp. 716, 719-20 (S.D. 
Fla. 1993) (Roettger, J.) (noting that impeached and convicted federal judge Alcee Hastings 
had not been disqualified by the Senate and his apparent eligibility to sit in the House 
thereafter; leaving the implication that had he been disqualified, his eligibility to sit in the 
House was in question); RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 225 
n.10 (1974) (arguing that the Constitution’s use of office and officer embraces Senators and 
Representatives else “a judge impeached, convicted, and disqualified ‘to hold any office’ 
could yet be elected to the Congress, for a member of Congress would not be a ‘person 
holding an office.’”); GERHARDT, supra note 10, at 60-61 (implying that a disqualified officer 
cannot hold congressional office); MCKAY & JOHNSON, supra note 9, at 515 n.43 (implying 
that a disqualified officer cannot hold congressional office); NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra 
note 10, at 153 n.9 (“[W]hen the Senate impeaches someone, it can impose a disqualification 
for U.S. Representative and Senator, as well as any other office of trust under the United 
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States.” (emphasis added)); Grossman & Yalof, supra note 12, at 12 n.8 (implying that a 
disqualified officer cannot hold congressional office); Samahon, supra note 15, at 613 n.113 
(implying that a disqualified officer cannot hold congressional office); J. Peter Pham & 
Michael I. Krauss, Speaker Pelosi’s Impending Intelligence Failure, TCS DAILY (Nov. 9, 
2006, 12:00 A.M.), http://www.ideasinactiontv.com/tcs_daily/2006/11/speaker-pelosis-
impending-intelligence-failure.html (same). 
 
A related controverted question is whether members of Congress are subject to impeachment 
(as opposed to whether prior conviction and disqualification precludes such a person from 
taking a seat in Congress).  The modern consensus is that members are not subject to 
impeachment.  See, e.g., supra note 9 (quoting positions of Professors Akhil Amar, Pfander, 
Prakash, and Smith); Vikram Amar, High Crimes and Misdemeanors: The Case Against Bill 
Clinton, 16 CONST. COMM. 403, 406 n.7 (1999) (reviewing ANN COULTER, HIGH CRIMES AND 
MISDEMEANORS (1998)) (“[L]et me set the record straight on a non-truth [!] Ms. Coulter 
asserts about the impeachability of Congresspersons.  Notwithstanding her suggestions . . . 
House members and Senators are not ‘officers’ within the meaning of the impeachment 
clauses of the Constitution and are thus not impeachable.”  (citing, somewhat unhelpfully, 
Amar & Amar, supra note 9, at 115-16)); Joel K. Goldstein, Taking from the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment: Lessons in Ensuring Presidential Continuity, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 959, 1020 
(2010) (asserting that “legislative leaders,” such as the Senate President pro tem and Speaker 
of the House, “cannot be impeached”); cf., e.g., Letter from Akhil Reed Amar to Stuart Taylor 
Jr. (Feb. 8, 1999), in Akhil Reed Amar, On Impeaching Presidents, supra note 9, at 327 
(asserting, without explanation, that Federalist No. 65 is “dramatic [!] historical evidence” 
against the proposition that private persons are impeachable).  I know of only a single 
Founding era source in clear agreement with the modern consensus.  Compare JAMES 
MONROE (nom de plume A NATIVE OF VIRGINIA), Observations Upon the Proposed Plan of 
Federal Government (Petersburg, Hunter & Prentis 1788), in 1 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES 
MONROE 1778-1794, at 347, 361 (Elibron Classics 2005) (Stanislaus Murray Hamilton ed., 
N.Y., G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1898) (“I conceive that the Senators are not impeachable, and 
therefore Governor Randolph’s objection falls to the ground.”), id. at 359 (same with regard to 
Members of Congress generally), id. (“[B]y no construction can [Senators] be considered as 
civil officers of State.”), and id. at 398 (noting that “at first [I] conceived that the Senators 
were liable to impeachment” but later changed positions), with 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra 
note 10, at 202 (“Who are your senators?  They are chosen by the legislatures, and a third of 
them go out of the Senate at the end of every second year.  They may also be impeached. 
There are no better checks upon earth.” (quoting Edmund Randolph’s June 10, 1788 speech at 
the Virginia ratifying convention)).  But again, this view—that Members of Congress are 
beyond the scope of the impeachment power—is not and has not been universally held.  See 
supra note 9 (describing Professor Isenbergh’s position); Ronald D. Rotunda, An Essay on the 
Constitutional Parameters of Federal Impeachment, 76 KY. L.J. 707, 716 (1988) (“Thus, 
judges, as well as all legislators and all executive officials, whether in the highest or the 
lowest departments of the national government, are subject to impeachment.” (emphasis 
added) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Letter from Stuart Taylor Jr. to Akhil Reed Amar 
(Feb. 5, 1999), in Akhil Reed Amar, On Impeaching Presidents, supra note 9, at 325 
(“Similarly, ‘civil officers’ is most naturally (and structurally) read as a limitation of this 
mandatory sentencing provision to executive branch officials.  I therefore doubt the 
correctness of the conventional wisdom that the words ‘civil officers’ were stuck into 
Article II, Section 4 to denote a grab-bag category of all impeachable persons—a grab-bag 
that somehow has been read for 200 years or so to include Article III judges, but not Article I 
senators!”).  Many early sources support Isenbergh, Rotunda, and Taylor’s position: i.e., that 
office-holders other than those listed in the Impeachment Clause are subject to impeachment. 
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 66 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 4, at 357 (“A fourth 
objection to the senate, in the capacity of a court of impeachments, is derived from their union 
with the executive in the power of making treaties.  This, it has been said, would constitute the 
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senators their own judges, in every case of a corrupt or perfidious execution of that trust.  
After having combined with the executive in betraying the interests of the nation in a ruinous 
treaty, what prospect, it is asked, would there be of their being made to suffer the punishment, 
they would deserve, when they were themselves to decide upon the accusation brought against 
them for the treachery of which they had been guilty?”).  My reading of Hamilton’s position 
in Federalist No. 66, although not universal, is not idiosyncratic.  See, e.g., BUCKNER F. 
MELTON, JR., THE FIRST IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTION’S FRAMERS AND THE CASE OF 
SENATOR WILLIAM BLOUNT 49 & n.105 (1998) (citing Federalist No. 66 for the proposition 
that Hamilton believed that legislators were amenable to impeachment, and noting that 
Hamilton’s view was “widespread”); see also PETER CHARLES HOFFER & N.E.H. HULL, 
IMPEACHMENT IN AMERICA, 1635-1805, at 157 (1984) (noting that Hamilton took the position 
that Senators were impeachable).  But see GERHARDT, supra note 10, at 15 & 199 n.21 
(asserting that Hamilton took the position that “members of Congress could not be 
impeached” (citing Federalist No. 66)).  Hamilton was not the only early authority who 
asserted that members of Congress were within the scope of the impeachment power. See, 
e.g., HOFFER & HULL, supra at 157 (noting that “Wilson, Hamilton, Mason, and others” took 
the view that members of the upper house were impeachable).  Compare, e.g., BERGER, supra 
at 224-33 (collecting early authorities suggesting that Senators and Representatives are subject 
to impeachment), with AMAR, supra note 9, at 568 n.53 (“Berger’s argument on this point 
made a hash of constitutional text, structure, and precedent.”  (emphasis added)), and Amar & 
Amar, supra note 9, at 115 (dropping the ellipses and misquoting James Iredell as stating: 
“[W]ho ever heard of impeaching a member of the legislature”? when, in fact, Iredell stated: 
“[W]ho ever heard of impeaching a member of the legislature for any legislative misconduct”?  
(emphasis added) (quoting 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 10, at 127)); compare, e.g., 
AMAR, supra note 9, at 568 n.53 (“[I]n England even private persons were impeachable; and 
the Constitution plainly broke with this aspect of English law. . . . Textually only ‘Officers of 
the United States’ are impeachable.” (emphasis added)), with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
(extending the reach of the Senate Trial Clause to “person[s],” not “Officers of the United 
States”), and U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7 (describing the reach of the Removal and 
Disqualification Clause in terms of any “Party convicted,” not “Officers of the United 
States”).  The use of “person[s]” or “party,” rather than “Officers” or “Officers of the United 
States” may mean the scope of the impeachment power extends beyond “Officers” to former 
officers and/or to Members of Congress (or even to former members) and/or to private 
persons.  See Goldstein, supra at 1023 (“‘Person’ is, of course, broader than ‘Officer of the 
United States’ or even ‘Officer’ . . . .”).  Compare, e.g., 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 10, 
at 477 (James Wilson: “I admit the force of the observation made by the gentleman from 
Fayette, (Mr. Smilie,) that, when two thirds of the Senate concur to forming a bad treaty, it 
will be hard to procure a vote of two thirds against [the Senators], if they [the Senators] should 
be impeached [!].  I think such a thing is not to be expected [Tillman adding—as a practical 
matter]; and so far they [the Senators] are without that immediate degree of responsibility 
which I think requisite to make this part of the work perfect.” (emphasis in the original)), with 
AMAR, supra note 9, at 299 (suggesting that “[a]t the Founding,” Madison and Wilson were 
“the two deepest Federalist thinkers”), and id. at 467 n.* (stating that “Wilson was far more 
fluent in law” than Madison).  Likewise, the decision of the House on July 7, 1797 to impeach 
Senator Blount was dependent on the majority’s believing that Senators were subject to 
impeachment, notwithstanding the fact that a majority of the Senate arguably rejected that 
position on January 14, 1799.  See 3 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 72-73 (Washington, Gales & Seaton 1826) (recording July 7, 
1797 resolution of the House to impeach Blount); 2 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA 392 (Washington, Gales & Seaton 1820) (recording Senate adoption of a 
resolution to expel Blount on July 8, 1797); 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2319 (Washington, Gales & 
Seaton 1851) (recording Senate adoption of a resolution on January 11, 1799 to the effect that: 
“this Court ought not to hold jurisdiction”).  Modern authorities continue to disagree as to the 
meaning of the Senate’s opaque resolution affirming that the Senate “ought not to hold 
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political death, much less a political death without chance of a return to highly 
significant public office, including positions within the federal government43 and 
                                                           
jurisdiction.” See supra note 9 (collecting authority).  Compare, e.g., KYVIG, supra note 9, 
at 22 (“The outcome of the Blount case left unresolved most questions about impeachment, 
including whether legislators fell within the category of ‘civil officers’ of the United States 
eligible for impeachment.”), and EMILY FIELD VAN TASSEL & PAUL FINKELMAN, 
IMPEACHABLE OFFENSES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY FROM 1787 TO THE PRESENT 88 (1999) 
(“It is not clear whether the decision [by the Senate to terminate the Blount proceedings] was 
based on Blount’s argument that senators were not government officers or on his argument 
that he was not an officer because he had been expelled.”), with HUPMAN, supra note 9, at 3 
(“[The Senate] decided that a Senator who has been expelled from his seat is not after such 
expulsion subject to impeachment.”), AMAR, supra note 9, at 199 n.* (affirming that the 
Senate “decided” in Blount that Senators were not impeachable because they were not 
“Officers”), William F. Swindler, High Court of Congress: Impeachment Trials, 1797-1936, 
60 A.B.A. J. 420, 421 (1974) (suggesting that the Senate held in Blount that a former Senator 
having been expelled by the Senate, as opposed to having resigned, is outside the scope of the 
impeachment power), and Horatius, The Presidential Knot, THE PHILADELPHIA GAZETTE & 
DAILY ADVERTISER, Jan. 10, 1801, at 1 (“Upon the impeachment of William Blount, a 
distinction was taken between an officer and a Member of Congress; and it was held that a 
Senator was not an officer of the United States, and therefore was not liable to impeachment. 
Upon this ground, the majority of the Senate would not hold cognizance of that 
impeachment.”) (reprinting January 6, 1801 article from the Washington Advertiser).  Some 
believe Horatius was John Marshall, then Chief Justice.  See ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE 
OF JOHN MARSHALL 541 n.2 (Standard Library ed. 1916) (taking the position that Marshall’s 
“authorship would appear to be reasonably certain”); see also BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE 
FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS: JEFFERSON, MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL 
DEMOCRACY 45 (2005) (“[T]here is substantial reason to believe that the brilliant author of the 
Horatius essay was none other than John Marshall himself.”); Vasan Kesavan, Is the Electoral 
Count Act Unconstitutional?, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1653, 1781 n.273 (2002) (noting that 
“Professor [Bruce] Ackerman believes that ‘Horatius’ is John Marshall . . . .”).   
 
Moreover, to the extent that the House and Senate are considered coordinate authorities, the 
Blount impeachment (by the House) and acquittal (by the Senate) are ambiguous evidence for 
the position that members of Congress are outside of the scope of the impeachment power. 
See generally Blount, William (1749-1800), BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE U.S. 
CONGRESS, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=B000570 (last visited 
Nov. 17, 2010). 
 
 43 Other positions which a disqualified officer might hold include: advisors to the 
President, even those situated in the White House, who lack individualized legal discretion or 
power to affect binding legal relations; an office created by state compact; federal elector; 
member of a state convention convened to act on a proposed amendment to the federal 
constitution; member of an Article V national convention called by two-thirds of the states; 
qui tam plaintiff in a federal cause of action; an American-sponsored nominee or appointee to 
office in an ad hoc or permanent international, multinational, or binational institution or 
commission (e.g., a treaty-created office); a holder of a letter of marque and reprisal; a 
director, trustee, member, officer, or employee of a federally chartered corporation, etc.  The 
list is, if not endless, quite substantial.  See Aaron Saiger, Obama’s “Czars” for Domestic 
Policy and the Law of the White House Staff, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2577, 2598 (2011) 
(concluding that so-called “czars” situated in the White House are not “officers of the United 
States” per the Appointments Clause, but are, rather, at-will employees of the President); cf. 
Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause, 2007 WL 
1405459, at *24 n.13 (Apr. 16, 2007) (Bradbury, Acting Asst. Att’y Gen.) (taking no position 
in regard to whether or not an office of the United States, per the Appointments Clause, may 
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state offices of every description, including those that deeply influence the operation 
of the federal government.44  
II.  BUT IS THE PRESIDENCY DIFFERENT?  
Professor Chafetz might argue that his article was not about impeachment and 
disqualification generally, but about the impeachment and disqualification of 
Presidents.  But here too, I hope to show that his position is not on firm ground.  If a 
President or Vice President or officer is impeached by the House, and convicted, 
removed, and disqualified by the Senate, he is barred from holding “any Office of 
                                                           
be validly created by treaty, as opposed to by statute); ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE DEFENCE 
NO. 37 (Jan. 6, 1796), reprinted in 20 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 13, 20 (Harold 
C. Syrett ed., 1974) (“As to what respects the Commissioners agreed to be appointed [under 
the Jay Treaty with Great Britain], they are not in a strict sense OFFICERS.  They are 
arbitrators between the two Countries.  Though in the Constitutions, both of the U[nited] 
States and of most of the Individual states, a particular mode of appointing officers is 
designated, yet in practice it has not been deemed a violation of the provision to appoint 
Commissioners or special Agents for special purposes in a different mode.” (fonts in the 
original)).  But see Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution 
Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043, 1061 n.67 (1988) (“[I]t should be noted that if 
[Article V] delegates can be considered ‘officers of the United States’—and it is not 
implausible to view them as such . . . .”).  Modern authorities are divided on the propriety of 
the practice of the appointment of American members to international arbitrations outside of 
the confines of the Appointments Clause. Compare Harold H. Bruff, Can Buckley Clear 
Customs?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1309 (1992) (supporting the validity of such 
appointments), with Jim C. Chen, Appointments With Disaster: The Unconstitutionality of 
Binational Arbitral Review Under the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, 49 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1455 (1992) (opposing). 
 44 Historically, this has certainly been the case.  See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James 
Madison), supra note 4, at 252 (“Without the intervention of the state legislatures [which 
determine the process by which electors are chosen or elected], the president of the United 
States cannot be elected at all.  They must in all cases have a great share in his appointment, 
and will perhaps in most cases of themselves determine it.”); cf., e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 36 
(Alexander Hamilton), supra note 4, at 189 (“In other cases [involving the potential for both 
federal and state taxation], the probability is, that the United States will either wholly abstain 
from the objects pre-occupied for local purposes, or will make use of the state officers and 
state regulations, for collecting the additional [federal] imposition.”).  Compare, e.g., THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Madison), supra note 4, at 248 (“The election of the . . . senate, 
will depend in all cases, on the legislatures of the several states.”), with U.S. CONST. 
amend. XVII (providing for popular election of senators).  In modern times, some state 
Secretaries of State prepare certificates of election or credentials for Representatives-elect and 
Senators-elect. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:22-7 (West 1999); cf., e.g., Scott Conroy, 
Secretary Of The Senate Explains Why Burris Wasn’t Seated, POLITICAL HOTSHEET (Jan. 6, 
2009, 5:17 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-4702877-503544.html 
(explaining that the Secretary of the United States Senate “refused to seat Burris, who was 
appointed to the seat by embattled Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich, because [Burris] lacked 
the necessary signature of the Illinois Secretary of State, Jesse White, and the state seal of 
Illinois”).  Likewise, governors certify the votes of electors for President and Vice President. 
See Act of Feb. 3, 1887 (the Electoral Count Act), ch. 90, § 15, 1524 Stat. 373 (codified as 
amended at 3 U.S.C. §§ 5-6, 15-18 (2000)) (“But if the two Houses shall disagree in respect of 
the counting of such votes [of competing slates of electors], then, and in that case, the votes of 
the electors whose appointment shall have been certified by the executive of the State, under 
the seal thereof, shall be counted.”). 
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honor, Trust or Profit under the United States.”45  Professor Chafetz affirms that this 
bar does not extend to congressional office.  But, does the bar preclude a disqualified 
                                                           
 45 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.  The view that the presidency is an Office . . . of or under 
the United States amounts to little more than free-floating legal intuition. See, e.g., 
Applicability of the [Foreign] Emoluments Clause and the Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act 
to the President’s Receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize, 2009 WL 6365082, at *3 (Dec. 7, 2009) 
(Barron, Acting Asst. Att’y Gen.) (announcing in ipse dixit that “[t]he President surely 
‘hold[s] an[] Office of Profit or Trust[] [under the United States]’ . . . .”  (emphasis added) 
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8)); Steven G. Calabresi, Rebuttal, Does the 
Incompatibility Clause Apply to the President?, in Tillman & Calabresi, supra note 10, at 143 
(stating that “the President is most certainly an officer under the United States” (emphasis 
added)); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Response, Why the Incompatibility Clause Applies to 
the Office of President, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 143, 143 (2009), 4 DUKE J. CONST. 
L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 35, 35 (2008) (asserting, without citation to any authority, that 
“[t]he President occupies an ‘Office under the United States’” and denominating that position 
the “conventional wisdom” (emphasis added)); Josh Chafetz, 20th Amendment Trivia, 
CONLAWPROF (Nov. 10, 2008, 12:17:44 PST), http://lists.ucla.edu/pipermail/conlawprof/2008-
November/033299.html (“I happen to think that the President is an officer under the United 
States, but some think otherwise.” (emphasis added)); see also, e.g., AMAR, supra note 9, 
at 171 (“The instant such a [legislative leader] became acting president [under a succession 
statute], he would thereby ‘hold[]’ an ‘Office under the United States’ . . . .” (emphasis 
added)); cf., e.g., Memorandum for the Vice President, from Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Asst. 
Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Constitutionality of the Vice President’s Services as 
Chairman of the National Aeronautics and Space Council, at *3 n.1 (Apr. 18, 1961), available 
at http://works.bepress.com/seth_barrett_tillman/164/ (click “April 1961 Katzenbach Memo”) 
(affirming, without citation to any authority, that “the Vice President holds ‘an Office under 
the United States[]’” (quoting the Incompatibility Clause)); Memorandum for the Vice 
President, from Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Asst. Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, Re: 
Participation by the Vice President in the Affairs of the Executive Branch, at *10 n.10 
(Mar. 9, 1961), available at http://works.bepress.com/seth_barrett_tillman/164/ (click 
“March 1961 Katzenbach Memo”) (same); Richard D. Friedman, Some Modest Proposals on 
the Vice-Presidency, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1703, 1720 n.72 (1988) (arguing that the vice 
presidency is an “Office under the United States” (emphasis added)); John W. Whelan, The 
Law of Public Administration: Need for Legal Study, 53 GEO. L.J. 953, 972 n.67 (1965) 
(asserting that the “Vice President . . . holds an office under the United States”).  Compare 
John F. Manning, Response, Not Proved: Some Lingering Questions About Legislative 
Succession to the Presidency, 48 STAN. L. REV. 141, 146 (1995) (asserting, without analysis, 
that “[t]he Presidency is surely an ‘Office under the United States[]’” (emphasis added)), with 
John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1939, 
2003 (2011) (“In the end, the special committee on postponed matters struck a compromise, 
vesting the authority over appointments of all officers in the President of the United States, 
subject to the advice and consent of the Senate.” (emphasis added)).  Has Manning changed 
his position?  Or, is he positing a difference between officers of and under the United States? 
As stated, the view—that the President is an Officer under the United States—is an intuition. 
To the extent that this intuition relies on separation of powers norms, it is ahistorical.  See 
Oliver P. Field, The Vice-Presidency of the United States, 56 AM. L. REV. 365, 382 (1922) 
(“Whether the president and vice-president are officers of the United States is a subject on 
which conflicting opinions are held.  It is not possible to deal here at length with . . . that 
question . . . .”  (footnote omitted)); infra note 67 (collecting authority based on the 
Constitution’s text supporting the contrary position, i.e., that the President is not an officer of 
the United States); infra notes 77-79 (collecting American and British authority supporting the 
position that the President is not an officer of the United States). 
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former officer from holding the presidency?  Professor Chafetz seems to think so.  
After all, what else could he mean by “death” without possibility of “resurrection” 
except that a removed and disqualified President is unable to hold his prior office, 
that is, the presidency?46 
But what is the basis for that view: that the presidency is an Office . . . under the 
United States, i.e., an office within the scope of the Disqualification Clause?47  If 
                                                           
 46 See, e.g., Chafetz, supra note 1, at 351 (“[L]ike death, impeachment and conviction may 
be permanent.”); Vaidotas A. Vaicaitis, Lithuania, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF 10 EU 
MEMBER STATES: THE 2004 ENLARGEMENT VI-31 & n.31 (Constantijn Kortmann et al. eds., 
2006) (noting that the Constitutional Court held that removal of a president by impeachment 
precludes his later standing in presidential or parliamentary elections, and precludes his 
holding ministerial office, and citing the coordinate provision of the United States 
Constitution); see also, e.g., Josh Chafetz, 20th Amendment Trivia, CONLAWPROF (Nov. 10, 
2008, 12:17:44 PST), http://lists.ucla.edu/pipermail/conlawprof/2008-November/033299.html 
(“If you think that the President is an officer under the United States, then a President-elect 
could fail to qualify by having been impeached and disqualified . . . .  I happen to think that 
the President is an officer under the United States, but some think otherwise.”  (emphasis 
added)); cf. Michael Stern, Could Judge Porteous Become President?, POINT OF ORDER: A 
DISCUSSION OF CONG. LEGAL ISSUES (Feb.  2, 2011, 8:30 AM), http://pointoforder.com/ 
(same). 
 47 See supra notes 7 & 45; infra note 67; see also AMAR, supra note 9, at 171 (“The instant 
such a [legislative leader] became acting president [under a succession statute], he would 
thereby ‘hold[]’ an ‘Office under the United States’ . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. at 625 n.38; 
Calabresi, Response, Political Question, supra note 1, at 159 n.24 (“The best reading is that 
the President and the Vice President are the ‘Officers of the United States’ contemplated by 
this language in the Appointments Clause.” (emphasis added)); id. at 165-66 (suggesting that a 
“normal” President, unlike an “Acting President,” is an “Officer of the United States”); 
Friedman, supra note 45, at 1720 (arguing that the vice presidency is an “Office under the 
United States,” and supporting that position with an argument to the effect that the Vice 
President is an “officer of the United States” (emphasis added)); cf. John O. McGinnis, 
Impeachment: The Structural Understanding, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 650, 660 (1999) (“[The 
Disqualification Clause] shows that the Framers recognized that officials who should be 
impeached and convicted may not only remain popular in the face of serious charges, but even 
after conviction.  This provision is consistent with the Framers’ understanding that popularity 
alone is not the only qualification for office . . . .”).  Compare Amar & Amar, supra note 9, 
at 119 n.34 (“A quibbler [!] might try to argue that the President does not, strictly speaking, 
‘hold[] . . . Office under the United States,’ and is instead a sui generis figure.” (emphasis 
added)), with Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 (1982) (Powell, J.) (“The President 
occupies a unique position in the constitutional scheme.” (emphasis added)), Suspension of 
the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 10 Op. Att’y. Gen. 74, 79 (1861) (Bates, Att’y 
Gen.) (“The President is a department [Tillman adding—not an ‘officer’] of the government; 
and . . . the only department which consists of a single man . . . .” (emphasis added)), KALT, 
supra note 14, at 17 (“[T]he president can argue that he is the only person in the government 
for whom the personal and the official are linked so inextricably.”  (emphasis added)), id. 
at 16 (“The answer is that the president really is uniquely indispensable.” (emphasis added)), 
Akhil Reed Amar, On Prosecuting Presidents, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 671, 673 (1999) (“But the 
Presidency is constitutionally unique—in the President the entirety of the power of a branch of 
government is vested.”), Akhil Reed Amar & Brian C. Kalt, The Presidential Privilege 
Against Prosecution, 2 NEXUS 11, 11 & passim (1997) (noting that “[t]he [p]resident [i]s 
[u]nique”), Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Executive Privileges and Immunities: 
The Nixon and Clinton Cases, 108 HARV. L. REV. 701, 702 (1995) (noting the president’s 
“unique constitutional role”), and Chafetz, supra note 1, at 350 n.13 (noting “the 
constitutional uniqueness of the presidency” (emphasis added)).  Quibble? 
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there is none, then surely Professor Chafetz’s metaphor fails.  To put it another way, 
if an impeached, convicted, removed, and disqualified former President is 
constitutionally eligible to hold the presidency again, then “resurrection” is quite 
possible.  
In papers and publications over the past several years, I have repeatedly made the 
claim that the President and Vice President are neither officers of the United States, 
nor officers under the United States.48  In support of my position, I noted that the 
                                                           
One early commentator seems to have suggested that disqualification extends only to 
appointed office.  See WILLIAM ALEXANDER DUER, OUTLINES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 94 (N.Y., Collins & Hannay 1833) (noting that if 
convicted “an appointment made by the Executive authority is superseded” and if disqualified 
“the party is rendered incapable of re-appointment to any office”). 
 48 I am not arguing that these two phrases (officers of the United States and officers under 
the United States) have identical meaning, but only that they are related terms of art.  My view 
is that officers of the United States extends exclusively to officers chosen under the aegis of 
the Appointments Clause, the Inferior Office Appointments Clause, and the Recess 
Appointments Clause.  Officers under the United States is a superset of the former, and also 
includes non-member non-presiding legislative officers holding statutory offices (e.g., the 
Clerk of the House, the Secretary of the Senate—offices receiving statutory emoluments 
although outside the scope of the Appointments Clause).  See also Peter W. Johnston, The 
Legal Personality of the Western Australia Parliament, 20 U.W. AUSTL. L. REV. 323, 336 
(1990) (“[T]he Clerks and the Parliamentary staff are in an ambiguous situation.  Their status 
is somewhat unique.”); cf. G.J. Craven, A Few Fragments of State Constitutional Law, 20 
U.W. AUSTL. L. REV. 353, 355 (1990) (“To whom are [state parliamentary officers] 
answerable”?).  There are some substantial materials contemporaneous with ratification 
supporting this position, including debate from the Philadelphia Convention.  Under this view, 
neither officers of the United States nor officers under the United States includes either the 
presidency or vice presidency.  See Tillman, Why Our Next President, infra note 50, at 114 
n.17 (noting that Edmund Randolph at the Philadelphia Convention used office . . . under the 
authority of the United States in a way that embraced legislative officers, and that Luther 
Martin reported Randolph’s language to the Maryland legislature); see also supra notes 10 
(discussing officers of the United States), 13 (discussing Officers . . . under the United States), 
infra note 67 (summarizing argument and evidence tending to establish that the President and 
Vice President are neither officers of the United States nor Officers . . . under the United 
States).  But see Vasan Kesavan, The Very Faithless Elector?, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 123, 129 
n.28 (2001) (citing nineteenth century materials for the position that “The textual argument is 
incredibly [!] straightforward: A ‘Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United 
States’ holds an ‘Office . . . under the United States’ and is therefore an ‘Officer of the United 
States.’” (emphasis added)).  But compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (distinguishing, in the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, “department[s]” from “officer[s]”), with Suspension of the 
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 10 Op. Att’y. Gen. 74, 79 (Bates, Att’y Gen.) (“The 
President is a department of the government; and, although the only department which 
consists of a single man, he is charged with a greater range and variety of powers and duties 
than any other department.  He is a civil magistrate . . . .” (emphasis added)).  Interestingly, 
Professor Prakash has characterized Bates’s opinion as “remarkable,” and as embracing “a 
curious distinction,” and finally he quotes approvingly another scholar’s conclusion to the 
effect that Bates’s opinion was “simply incomprehensible.”  Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, 
The Great Suspender’s Unconstitutional Suspension of the Great Writ, 3 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 
575, 581, 583 (2010) (quoting John P. Frank, Edward Bates: Lincoln’s Attorney General, 10 
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 34, 43 (1966)).  The inability of modern scholars to understand Bates’s 
opinion may be a reflection of the world we (and I include myself) have lost.  See, e.g., Steven 
G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE 
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L.J. 541, 638 n.428 (1994) (“Our first President was not involved only in vital administrative 
affairs, however, as he intimately involved himself in seemingly trivial matters as well.  White 
insists that ‘no collector of customs, captain of a cutter, keeper of a lighthouse, or surveyor of 
revenue was appointed except after special consideration by the President.’”  (emphasis 
added) (quoting LEONARD D. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS 106 (1948))).  The loyalty and courage 
of a lighthouse keeper or cutter captain in the face of an enemy flotilla may have been the only 
means of advance warning of an invasion.  When the United States was in diapers, perhaps, 
the selection of such personnel might have been substantially more important than the choice 
of and centralized control over United States Attorneys, i.e., high profile public positions of 
great interest to certain law professors and historians.  See ROBERT A. CIUCEVICH, TYBEE 
ISLAND: THE LONG BRANCH OF THE SOUTH 19 (2005) (“[During the War of 1812] [t]here was, 
however, a system of early warning arranged with the keeper of Tybee lighthouse, who would 
warn of an approaching British fleet . . . .”); Portsmouth Harbor Light, NEW ENGLAND 
LIGHTHOUSES: A VIRTUAL GUIDE, http://lighthouse.cc/portsmouth/history.html (last visited 
Dec. 29, 2010) (“It appears that the lighthouse was not lit from 1774 to 1784, although it did 
serve as a lookout post in the defense of Portsmouth [New Hampshire] during the Revolution.  
In 1784, the tower was renovated and relighted.  The lighthouse was transferred to the federal 
government in 1791, and in 1793 President George Washington ordered that the light be 
maintained at all times, with a keeper living on site.”); E-mail from William Thiesen, Atlantic 
Area Historian, United States Coast Guard to Seth Barrett Tillman (Jan. 17, 2011) (“[D]uring 
the War of 1812, revenue cutter captains would report all movements of enemy units after 
they made sightings of [Royal Navy] vessels and returned to port.”); cf. Prakash, supra 
note 45, at 148 (affirming, in a 2008 publication, that the President is both an “officer under 
the United States” and an “officer of the United States,” and suggesting that the contrary 
position is “highly obscure” (emphasis added)).  I submit that Prakash’s position is (once 
again) indicative of the world we have lost. 
‘[C]ivil officers of the United States’ meant such, as derived their appointment from, 
and under the national government, and not those persons, who, though members of 
the government, derived their appointment from the states, or the people of the states. 
In this view, the enumeration of the president and vice president, as impeachable 
officers, was indispensable; for they derive, or may derive, their office from a source 
paramount to the national government.  And the [Impeachment Clause] of the 
[C]onstitution . . . does not even affect to consider them officers of the United States.  
It says, ‘the president, vice-president, and all civil officers (not all other civil officers) 
shall be removed,’ &c.  The language of the clause, therefore, would rather lead to the 
conclusion, that they were enumerated, as contradistinguished from, rather than as 
included in the description of, civil officers of the United States. 
2 STORY, COMMENTARIES, supra note 9, § 791, at 260 (emphasis added); DAVID A. 
MCKNIGHT, THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES: A CRITICAL AND HISTORICAL 
EXPOSITION OF ITS FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES IN THE CONSTITUTION, AND OF THE ACTS AND 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONGRESS ENFORCING IT 346 (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1878) 
(noting that “[i]t is obvious that . . . the President is not regarded ‘as an officer of, or under, the 
United States,’ but as one branch of ‘the Government.’”  (emphasis added)); infra note 67 
(collecting authority). Compare AMAR, supra note 14, at 577 n.17 (suggesting that the 
President and Vice President are listed separately from “civil officers” in the Impeachment 
Clause “to blunt any argument that their role atop—or in the VP’s case, potentially atop—the 
military chain of command removes them from the category of ‘civil’ officers”), with Burton 
v. United States, 202 U.S. 344, 369-70 (1906) (Harlan, J.) (“[A]nyone convicted under [the 
statutory] provision[] shall be incapable of holding any office of honor, trust, or profit ‘under 
the government of the United States,’ refers only to offices created by, or existing under the 
direct authority of, the national government, as organized under the Constitution, and not to 
offices the appointments to which are made by the states, acting separately, albeit proceeding, 
in respect of such appointments, under the sanction of that instrument.  While the Senate, as a 
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Commissions Clause mandates that the President commission “all”49 officers of the 
United States, yet historically, Presidents and Vice Presidents (like members of 
Congress—who are also elected officials) have not received such commissions (as 
do, by contrast, cabinet members).50  In response, Professor Saikrishna Prakash 
                                                           
branch of the legislative department, owes its existence to the Constitution, and participates in 
passing laws that concern the entire country, its members are chosen by state legislatures, and 
cannot properly be said to hold their places ‘under the government of the United States.’” 
(emphasis added)).  In my view, Prakash’s characterization of views with which he disagrees 
as “highly obscure” is hyperbole and free-floating intuitionism.  His criticism is not analytic.  
It is not even consistent with his own prior writings. Indeed, this “highly obscure” view is one 
Professor Prakash used to actively espouse, at least until 2008.  See, e.g., Saikrishna Prakash, 
How the Constitution Makes Subtraction Easy, 92 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1871 (2006) (affirming 
that “Congress may remove, via statute, all officers of the United States, save for federal 
judges with good behavior tenure”—a conclusion, which quite obviously, Prakash did not 
intend to apply to the presidency and vice presidency (emphasis added)); Saikrishna Prakash, 
The Chief Prosecutor, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521, 583 n.360 (2005) (“The Appointments 
Clause grants the president the power to appoint all officers of the United States, with the 
advice and consent of the Senate.” (emphasis added)); Saikrishna B. Prakash, Branches 
Behaving Badly: The Predictable and Often Desirable Consequences of the Separation of 
Powers, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 543, 546 (2003) (noting that “the Constitution grants 
to the Senate the responsibility of confirming all non-inferior officers of the United States” 
(emphasis added)); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Deviant Executive Lawmaking, 67 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1, 41 n.244 (1998) (noting that the Appointments Clause “establish[es] the 
requirement of senate confirmation for all officers, but permitting Congress, by law, to vest 
the appointment of inferior officers with the President, heads of departments, and courts” 
(emphasis added)); Saikrishna Prakash, Regulating Presidential Powers, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 
215, 244 n.154 (2005) (reviewing HAROLD J. KRENT, PRESIDENTIAL POWERS (2005)) (“I have 
argued elsewhere that the [Inferior Office Appointments Clause] was necessary as a means of 
circumventing the burdensome requirement that all officers of the United States be appointed 
by the President and confirmed by the Senate.”  (emphasis added)).  It is difficult to 
understand what Professor Prakash’s current position is.  See, e.g., Saikrishna Bangalore 
Prakash, When an Appointment Vests 19 (U. Va. School of Law Public Law & Legal Theory 
Working Paper Series 2012-16), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=2008396 
(“[T]he Appointments Clause provides that the President ‘shall nominate, and by and with the 
advice and consent of the Senate, appoint’ all officers of the United States. . . . [T]he President 
must commission all officers of the United States.” (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)).  
Does not Professor Prakash’s 2012 language exclude the President and Vice President from 
the category of officers of the United States? 
 49 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[The President] . . . shall Commission all the Officers of the 
United States.” (emphasis added)); see also Raoul Berger, Impeachment for “High Crimes 
and Misdemeanors,” 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 395, 424 (1971) (“One who would make ‘all’ mean 
less than ‘all’ has the burden of proving why the ordinary meaning should not prevail.” (citing 
Henry M. Hart, Jr., Book Review, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1456, 1465 (1954))); cf. AMAR, supra 
note 9, at 236 (“In the Article III vesting clause and roster, ‘shall’ and ‘all’ meant what they 
said.”); Vasan Kesavan, Is the Electoral Count Act Unconstitutional?, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1653, 
1792 (2002) (“The word ‘every’ . . . means every and not some.”). 
 50 See, e.g., Seth Barrett Tillman, Opening Statement, Why President-Elect Obama May 
Keep His Senate Seat After Assuming the Presidency, in Tillman & Calabresi, supra note 10, 
at 135-40; Seth Barrett Tillman, Closing Statement, An “Utterly Implausible” Interpretation 
of the Constitution: A Reply to Professor Steven G. Calabresi, in Tillman & Calabresi, supra 
note 10, at 146-53.  Compare Seth Barrett Tillman, Why Our Next President May Keep His or 
Her Senate Seat: A Conjecture on the Constitution’s Incompatibility Clause, 4 DUKE J. CONST. 
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suggested that the validity of my position depends on whether I could produce 
evidence supporting my historical claim, i.e., that Presidents and Vice Presidents 
have not received presidential commissions.51  I can.  Indeed, there is an abundance 
of such evidence.52  By contrast, Professor Steven Calabresi suggested that in order 
to determine the original public meaning of these related phrases (officers of and 
                                                           
L. & PUB. POL’Y 107 (2009), 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 1 (2008), with 
Prakash, supra note 45. 
 51 See Prakash, supra note 45, at 147. 
 52 See, e.g., CASE OF BRIGHAM H. ROBERTS, OF UTAH, H. REP. NO. 56-85, pt. 1, at 36 
(1900) (“[T]he provision in the last paragraph of section 3, of article 2, relating to the duties of 
the President, that he shall commission all the officers of the United States, does not mean that 
he is to commission members of Congress, [and] he is himself an officer, and he does not 
commission himself, nor does he commission the Vice President . . . .”); MORTON 
ROSENBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., APPLICABILITY OF THE EMOLUMENTS CLAUSE (ARTICLE 
I, SECTION 6, CLAUSE 2) OF THE CONSTITUTION TO THE OFFICE OF VICE-PRESIDENT CRS-10 
(1973), available at http://works.bepress.com/seth_barrett_tillman/164/ (click “Rosenberg 
Memorandum”) (“Of course, the Vice-President is not commissioned by the President and it is 
significant that under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, the nomination and confirmation of a 
new Vice-President by both Houses of Congress is not followed by a commissioning.”); Roy 
E. Brownell II, Can the President Recess Appoint a Vice President?, 42 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. 
Q. 622, 628 (2012) (“[T]he unavoidable conclusion to draw . . . is that the [vice president] is 
not an ‘Officer of the United States’ . . . .”); see also, e.g., 3 ASHER C. HINDS, HINDS’ 
PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES § 2316, at 671 (1907) 
(“It is provided that the President shall commission all officers, and that all civil officers shall 
be removed on impeachment and conviction; but the President does not commission himself 
and the Vice-President, and therefore as it was intended to affect them by the impeachment 
power, it became necessary to expressly name them.” (quoting Alexander H. Dallas’s speech 
on January 4, 1799 for the defendant at the Blount Impeachment trial before the Senate)); 
FRANCIS WHARTON, STATE TRIALS OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF 
WASHINGTON AND ADAMS 268 (Philadelphia, Carey & Hart 1849) (“[The President] is an 
officer himself, and so expressly denominated throughout the 2d article, and yet he has no 
commission.  It is equally clear that the Vice-President is an officer, and yet not 
commissioned.” (quoting Congressman James A. Bayard, Sr.’s speech on January 3, 1799 for 
the House managers at the Blount Impeachment trial before the Senate)); cf., e.g., FEERICK, 
supra note 9, at 195 n.† (suggesting that Vice Presidents nominated by the President and 
confirmed by Congress under the aegis of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment do not receive 
commissions); Steven G. Calabresi, Rebuttal, Does the Incompatibility Clause Apply to the 
President?, in Tillman & Calabresi, supra note 10, at 145 (affirming that historically 
presidents and vice presidents have not received commissions, and denominating such failure 
an “oversight”!).  Generally, I would expect that Professor Calabresi is a particularly reliable 
source in regard to conventions surrounding the vice presidency, because he—unlike others 
who have taken contrary positions—worked for a sitting vice president.  See Steven G. 
Calabresi & Joan L. Larsen, One Person, One Office: Separation of Powers or Separation of 
Personnel?, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1156 n.552 (1994) (“Technically, the Vice President 
also represents the same national constituency [as the President], but those of us who have 
worked for a U.S. Vice President know that, in many respects, they represent a constituency of 
one.”  (emphasis added)).  But cf. JACK MASKELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42662, GIFTS TO 
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES CRS-4 to CRS-5 (Aug. 16, 2012) (“The President and 
all federal officials are restricted by the Constitution, at Article I, Section 9, clause 8, from 
receiving any ‘presents’ from foreign governments, kings, or princes, without the consent of 
the Congress.” (emphasis added)). 
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under the United States), one should look to how Congress used these phrases in its 
early statutes.53  Professor Chafetz appears to adhere to Calabresi’s view.54  
                                                           
 53 Steven G. Calabresi, Closing Statement, A Term of Art or the Artful Reading of Terms?, 
in Tillman & Calabresi, supra note 10, at 157-58 (looking to early congressional statutes to 
determine original public meaning of a constitutional term). 
 54 See, e.g., CHAFETZ, supra note 13, at 281 n.86 (taking the position that the phrase 
“Office . . . under the United States,” as used in 1 Stat. 112 (1790), an act of the First 
Congress, was used in the same sense as it is used in the Constitution). 
Likewise, as opposed to early federal statutes, if one turns to early state constitutional 
materials, one arrives at a similar conclusion: officer under this State-language does not reach 
the office of governor, i.e., an official at the apex of governmental authority (within a branch 
of government).  See, e.g., DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. III, § 5 (“No member of Congress, nor 
person holding any office under the United States or this State, shall exercise the office of 
Governor.” (emphasis added)).  This Delaware constitutional provision—enacted some three 
years after ratification of the Constitution—would seem to exclude the office of governor from 
the category of office under . . . this State (apparently referring to lesser offices).  Such 
antebellum materials are quite common; they appear in each and every decade prior to the 
Civil War.  See, e.g., PA. CONST. of 1790, art. II, § 5 (“No member of Congress, or person 
holding any office under the United States, or this state, shall exercise the office of Governor.” 
(emphasis added)); KY. CONST. of 1792, art. II, § 5 (“No member of Congress, or person 
holding any office under the United States or this State, shall execute the office of Governor.” 
(emphasis added)); N.H. CONST. of 1792, § 93 (“No governor, or judge of the supreme 
judicial court, shall hold any office or place under the authority of this state, except such as by 
this constitution they are admitted to hold . . . .” (emphasis added)); OHIO CONST. of 1802, 
art. II, § 13 (“No member of Congress, or person holding any office under the United States, 
or this State, shall exercise the office of Governor.” (emphasis added)); IND. CONST. of 1816, 
art. IV, § 5 (“No member of Congress, or person holding any office under the [U]nited States, 
or this State, shall exercise the office of Governor, or Lieutenant Governor.” (emphasis 
added)); ME. CONST. of 1820, art. V, § 5 (“No person holding any office or place under the 
United States, this State, or any other power, shall exercise the office of Governor.” (emphasis 
added)); MICH. CONST. of 1835, art. V, § 16 (“No member of congress, nor any other person 
holding office under the United States, or this state, shall execute the office of Governor.” 
(emphasis added)); N.J. CONST. of 1844, art. V, § 8 (“No member of Congress, or person 
holding an office under the United States, or this State, shall exercise the office of 
Governor . . . .” (emphasis added)); CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. V, § 12 (“No person shall, 
while holding any office under the United States, or this State, exercise the office of Governor, 
except as hereinafter expressly provided.”  (emphasis added)); OR. CONST. of 1857, art. V, § 3 
(“No member of Congress, or person holding any office under the United States, or under this 
State, or under any other power, shall fill the office of Governor, except as may be otherwise 
provided in this Constitution.”  (emphasis added)); The State ex rel. Ragsdale v. Walker, 33 
S.W. 813, 814 (Mo. 1896) (Macfarlane, J.) (“An office under the state must be one created by 
the laws of the state.  The incumbent must be governed by state laws and must exercise his 
powers and perform his duties in obedience to a statute of the state [Tillman adding—which 
would seem to exclude the governor].” (emphasis added)).  But, contrary authority also exists. 
See, e.g., PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IV, § 3 (”The Governor, and all other civil officers, under 
this commonwealth, shall be liable to impeachment for any misdemeanor in office . . . .” 
(emphasis added)); OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. I, § 24 (“The Governor, and all other civil 
officers under this State, shall be liable to impeachment for any misdemeanor in office . . . .” 
(emphasis added)); Willis v. Potts, 377 S.W.2d 622, 628 (Tex. 1964) (Hamilton & Steakley, 
JJ., dissenting) (“Without exception every jurisdiction has declared a municipal office not to 
be an office under the state unless it is one created by the Constitution or statutes, its powers 
and duties defined by statute, or an office created by some other authority such as a 
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In 1790, the First Congress enacted an anti-bribery statute.  The statute stated:  
That if any person shall, directly or indirectly, give any sum or sums of 
money, or any other bribe, present or reward, or any promise, contract, 
obligation or security, for the payment or deliver of any money, present or 
reward, or any other thing to obtain or procure the opinion, judgment or 
decree of any judge or judges of the United States, in any suit, 
controversy, matter or cause depending before him or them, and shall be 
thereof convicted . . . and the judge or judges who shall in any wise 
accept . . . shall be fined and imprisoned . . . and shall forever be 
disqualified to hold any office of honor, trust or profit under the United 
States.55  
                                                           
municipality, but upon which there is imposed by statute certain state duties.” (emphasis 
added)); cf., e.g., S.C. CONST. of 1802, art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (“No person shall hold the office of 
governor and any other office or commission . . . either in this State, or under any State, or the 
United States . . . at one and the same time.” (emphasis added)). 
 55 An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes against the United States, ch. 9, § 21, 1 
Stat. 112, 117 (1790) (emphasis added).  Professor Chafetz cites this very statute in his own 
publication.  See CHAFETZ, supra note 13, at 281 n.86.  Notice that the language of the statute 
is identical to that found in the Removal and Disqualification Clause—office of honor, trust or 
profit under the United States. 
There is some dispute as to whether or not this statute works a removal or just a 
disqualification in regard to future office-holding.  Compare, e.g., REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL, 152 F.R.D. 265, 289 (Aug. 2, 1993) 
(“Although it might seem that disqualification from office would include disqualification from 
the office one occupies at the time of conviction, Congress in 1790 apparently regarded 
disqualification and removal as distinct.”), ELIZABETH B. BAZAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 92-
905A, DISQUALIFICATION OF FEDERAL JUDGES CONVICTED OF BRIBERY—AN EXAMINATION OF 
THE ACT OF APRIL 30, 1790 AND RELATED ISSUES CRS-Summary (1992) (“However, the 
stronger arguments appear to militate against the use of the 1790 bribery statute’s 
disqualification provision as support for the constitutional sufficiency of statutory [removal] 
mechanisms [as an alternative to impeachment].”), id. at CRS-19 (“[I]t would seem, on 
reflection, that the stronger arguments militate against reliance upon the passage of the 1790 
act as a foundation upon which to build an argument that statutory mechanisms for removal of 
federal judges, supplementary to the impeachment process, would pass constitutional 
muster.”), and Pfander, supra note 9, at 1233 (asserting that the statute only limits future 
office-holding), with AMAR, supra note 9, at 222-23 (asserting that the 1790 Act worked a 
removal), Laurence Claus, Constitutional Guarantees of the Judiciary: Jurisdiction, Tenure, 
and Beyond, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 459, 478 n.92 (2006) (“The First Congress apparently sought 
to provide for automatic removal of judges convicted by a criminal jury of bribery, without 
individualized impeachment by the House and conviction by a super-majority of the Senate.”), 
Gerhardt, supra note 15, at 42-43 (“[The 1790 Act] suggests that at least under certain 
circumstances the First Congress did not regard impeachment as the sole means of removing 
federal judges.” (footnote omitted)), Prakash & Smith, supra note 9, at 122 (concluding “the 
Act contemplated that ordinary courts could remove judges from office for their 
misbehavior—in this case the taking of bribes”), Paul Taylor, Congress’s Power to Regulate 
the Federal Judiciary: What the First Congress and the First Federal Courts Can Teach 
Today’s Congress and Courts, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 847, 901 (2010) (“The terms ‘holding,’ as 
used in the Pennsylvania Constitution, and ‘hold,’ as used in the Crimes Act of 1790, would 
seem by their plain meaning to apply to offices contemporaneously held as well as future 
offices.” (footnote omitted)), and Maria Simon, Note, Bribery and Other Not So “Good 
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This statute works a statutory disqualification: any judicial officer convicted of 
the specified crimes is disqualified from holding any office . . . under the United 
States.  Does the statute disqualify such persons from holding the positions of 
representative or senator?  The consensus view, rooted in the text of the Constitution, 
is “no”: congresspersons are not officers.56  So the disqualification does not go so 
                                                           
Behavior”: Criminal Prosecution as a Supplement to Impeachment of Federal Judges, 94 
COLUM. L. REV. 1617, 1652 (1994) (taking the position that “the most sensible reading of 
these early statutes indicates that the penalty of disqualification necessarily included removal 
when applied to a sitting officer”).  But cf. Chandler v. Judicial Council of the 10th Cir. of the 
U.S., 398 U.S. 74, 141-42 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) (“While judges, like other people, can 
be tried, convicted, and punished for crimes, no word, phrase, clause, sentence, or even the 
Constitution taken as a whole, gives any indication that any judge was ever to be partly 
disqualified or wholly removed from office except by the admittedly difficult method of 
impeachment by the House of Representatives and conviction by two-thirds of the Senate.  
Such was the written guarantee in our Constitution of the independence of the judiciary, and 
such has always been the proud boast of our people.”); Shane, supra note 11, at 239 n.118 
(“Moreover, if Professor Amar is correct in suggesting that [judicial] removal through 
criminal processes is permissible because of considerations unique to criminal law, then the 
Act of 1790—even under the Gerhardt interpretation—would not necessarily be probative as 
to the permissibility of removal through civil processes.”).  Nothing in this Article turns on 
whether this statute effectuated a removal. 
 56 See infra notes 89-90 (illustrating the modern consensus, through the positions of 
Professors Akhil Amar, Vikram Amar, and Josh Chafetz).  But see Hills, supra note 23 (“The 
First Congress, for instance, seemed to believe that the qualifications in the Qualifications 
[C]lause did not exclude its power to add qualifications: it enacted a statute that barred from 
‘any office of trust or profit’ any person who had been convicted of accepting or offering a 
bribe.  Such a statute added a qualification for congressional seats (which are offices of trust 
or profit) not enumerated by the Qualifications clause.” (internal citation omitted)); supra 
note 42 (collecting authority suggesting that members of Congress are officers, at least in 
regard to certain constitutional provisions).  But see also David P. Currie, The Constitution in 
Congress: The Second Congress, 1791-1793, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 606, 624-25 (1996) 
(“Article I, Section 3 provides that judgment in impeachment cases may include 
disqualification from ‘any office of honor, trust or profit under the United States,’ Article I, 
Section 9 [provides] that no one holding such an office may accept gifts, emoluments, or titles 
from any foreign state without congressional consent.  It is hard to find anything in the text or 
purpose of either of these provisions to justify construing them to apply only to executive and 
judicial officers.  Thus, it is difficult to say that the Constitution adopts a single meaning of 
the term ‘office’ or ‘officer’; each clause employing these terms must be interpreted according 
to its own context, history, and purpose.” (footnotes omitted)).  The reason that 
Representatives and Senators are not considered “officers” is rooted in the text of the 
Constitution.  See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6, cl. 2 (Incompatibility Clause: “[N]o Person holding 
any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance 
in Office.” (emphasis added)); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (Elector Incompatibility Clause: 
“[N]o Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the 
United States, shall be appointed an Elector.” (emphasis added)).  In neither case is the 
office . . . under the United States-language preceded by the word “other.”  The consensus 
view is that the absence of the word “other” indicates that Members of Congress are not 
Officers under the United States.  However, Professor Raoul Berger has expressly rejected this 
type of text-sensitive analysis.  See BERGER, supra note 42.  It is worth remarking that the 
Impeachment Clause states: “The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United 
States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, 
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors . . . .”  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.  Here too, the 
word “other” does not precede Officers of the United States.  This would seem to indicate, by 
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far.  But what about the presidency and vice presidency?  If the presidency and vice 
presidency are officers . . . under the United States, then this statute is deeply 
problematic because it purports to add, by statute, to the qualifications for 
constitutionally established elected federal offices.  And, as Professor Chafetz has 
noted in his own publications, that result is unconstitutional: Congress has no such 
power.57  
                                                           
a parity of logic, that the President and Vice President are not Officers of the United States.  
But those in the consensus have not adopted this position.  What accounts for this strange 
inconsistency? 
 57 See supra note 23 (citing U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) and 
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 550 (1969), but also noting scholarly counter-authority); 
AMAR, supra note 9, at 529 n.22 (same); CHAFETZ, supra note 13, at 171, 280 n.68, 281 
nn.81, 86, 282 n.90.  Likewise, Chafetz quotes Justice Story for the proposition that officers of 
the United States extends to executive and judicial officers only.  Id. at 280 n.68 (quoting 
Story’s Commentaries).  However, Story expressly excludes the President and Vice President 
from this category.  See 1 STORY, COMMENTARIES, supra note 9, § 791, at 559-60 (“‘[C]ivil 
officers of the United States’ meant such, as derived their appointment from, and under the 
national government, and not those persons, who, though members of the government, derived 
their appointment from the states, or the people of the states.  In this view, the enumeration of 
the president and vice president, as impeachable officers, was indispensable; for they derive, 
or may derive, their office from a source paramount to the national government.  And the 
[Impeachment Clause] of the [C]onstitution . . . does not even affect to consider them officers 
of the United States.  It says, ‘the president, vice-president, and all civil officers (not all other 
civil officers) shall be removed,’ &c.  The language of the clause, therefore, would rather lead 
to the conclusion, that they were enumerated, as contradistinguished from, rather than as 
included in the description of, civil officers of the United States.” (emphasis added)); cf. THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 67 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 4, at 360-62 (explaining that Senators, 
and by implication Representatives, are not “officers of the United States” under the 
Appointments Clause).  But compare Steven G. Calabresi, Closing Statement, A Term of Art 
or the Artful Reading of Terms?, in Tillman & Calabresi, supra note 10, at 154-55 (“Original 
meaning is thus about what the ordinary citizen on the street would have thought words 
meant.  It is not about the understanding of someone as erudite [!] as Justice Story.” (emphasis 
added)), with Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 391 (1798) (Chase, J.) (“The expressions 
‘ex post facto laws,’ are technical, they had been in use long before the Revolution, and had 
acquired an appropriate meaning, by Legislators, Lawyers, and Authors.”).  Strangely, I have 
seen any number of journal articles by Professor Calabresi citing Story’s Commentaries 
approvingly, and until 2008, never once warning the reader that Story’s views might be too 
erudite.  Likewise, post-2008, Professor Calabresi returned to form and continued to cite 
Story’s Commentaries approvingly.  See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, 
Remove Morrison v. Olson, 62 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 103, 106 n.16 (2009).  What precisely 
should we make of Calabresi’s claim that Story was too “erudite”?  Has anyone in the entire 
history of Anglo-American law ever sought to reject an otherwise respectable source on such 
a ground? 
Moreover, Presidents are not “appointed”; rather, they are “elected” or “chosen.”  U.S. CONST. 
art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (mandating presidential selection by “elect[ion]” of the electors), amended by 
U.S. CONST. amend. XII (mandating elector participation by “votes,” and presidential 
selection by “choice” of the House when electoral college mode fails).  In other words, 
Presidents, textually, do not fit into the framework of the Appointments Clause.  For that 
reason, arguably, Presidents are not officers of the United States. Cf. JOINT COMMITTEE TO 
EXAMINE THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL POSITION RELATING TO OFFICE OF PROFIT 9 (New 
Delhi, Lok Sabha Secretariat Dec. 22, 2008), available at http://tinyurl.com/4xenbte (“An 
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To put it another way, this statute could be understood in one of two ways.  
Under the first view, the scope of offices . . . under the United States, the scope of 
disqualification would attach exclusively to statutory and appointed offices: that is, 
those offices filled under the aegis of the Appointments Clause58 (and under the aegis 
of the Inferior Office Appointments Clause,59 and under the aegis of the Recess 
Appointments Clause60), and under the aegis of the House Officers Clause and the 
Senate Officers Clause.61  This interpretation would exclude the presidency and vice 
presidency, senators, and representatives, elected or constitutionally mandated 
offices, from the category Office . . . under the United States.  
The second possibility is that the presidency and vice presidency are offices . . . 
under the United States, and, if so, then the statute is unconstitutionally overbroad 
when applied in those situations.  But why go there?  Is not the former view the 
better view, that is, under the avoidance canon, the statute is constitutional precisely 
because Congress chose language that does not incorporate the presidency and vice-
presidency?  
I suppose Professor Calabresi (or others) might argue that the latter or second 
view is the correct view (as a matter of the original public meaning of the statute in 
question), and that the choice of language leading to an unconstitutional result (as 
would be the case under the second view) was an “oversight”62 on Congress’s part.  
In other words, the First Congress just was not careful enough; the members did not 
see the implications in the language they chose and enacted into law.  Those long 
gone members were d-u-m-b; we, by contrast, prove our great wisdom by realizing 
their error, by noticing their “oversight.”  I suppose that is possible.  But the claim of 
“oversight” (when applied exclusively to others), when repeated too often, becomes 
constitutional interpretation by narcissism.  The simpler view, applying Ockham’s 
razor, is not that the First Congress passed an unconstitutional statute, and the 
modern consensus right, but that the First Congress chose language that passed 
constitutional muster, and the modern consensus wrong.63  The constant claim of 
                                                           
office of profit is a term used in a number of national constitutions to refer to executive 
appointments.” (emphasis added)).  
 58 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 59 Id. 
 60 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (“The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies 
that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire 
at the End of their next Session.”). 
 61 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (“The House of Representatives shall ch[oo]se their 
Speaker and other Officers . . . .”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 5 (“The Senate shall ch[oo]se 
their other Officers, and also a President pro tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President, or 
when he shall exercise the Office of President of the United States.”). 
 62 See Steven G. Calabresi, Rebuttal, Does the Incompatibility Clause Apply to the 
President?, in Tillman & Calabresi, supra note 10, at 145 (affirming that historically 
presidents and vice presidents have not received commissions, and denominating such failure 
an “oversight”). 
 63 See, e.g., Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 217 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“Ockham is offended by today’s decision, even if no one else is.”); Chauffeurs, Teamsters & 
Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 575 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment) (“The time has come to borrow William of Occam’s razor 
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“oversight” would simply reduce interpretevism to a series of unfalsifiable 
hypotheses or pseudo-religious faith claims—interesting, but intellectually wholly 
unsatisfying, or nearly so.  
At a normative level, should not we interpret constitutional and statutory 
disqualifications narrowly—thereby preserving the widest scope for democratic 
action?  Is it not more than merely noteworthy that the Constitution included express 
language in the Impeachment Clause reaching the President and Vice President,64 but 
                                                           
and sever this portion of our analysis.”); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Zelener, 373 
F.3d 861, 868 (7th Cir. 2004) (Easterbrook, J.) (“Best to take Occam’s Razor and slice off 
needless complexity.”); Raoul Berger, Response, Impeachment: A Countercritique, 49 WASH. 
L. REV. 845, 856 (1974) (“Ever since Ockham, scientists have preferred the simpler to the 
more complicated explanation.”); Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of the Written 
Constitution: A Comment on Professor Lessig’s Theory of Translation, 65 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1435, 1449 (1997) (explaining that Lessig’s “translation theory fails the test of 
Ockham’s razor because it is not necessary to explain the changes that Professor Lessig seeks 
to explain”).   
 64 Just as I argue in this Article that the President and Vice President are not within the 
ambit of the Officers . . . under the United States-type language in the Removal and 
Disqualification Clause, I argued in 2009 that the President does not fall within the ambit of 
the Office under the United States-type language within the Incompatibility Clause and the 
Ineligibility Clause.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (“No Senator or Representative shall, 
during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority 
of the United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have 
been [i]ncreased during such time; and no Person holding any Office under the United States, 
shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.” (the Ineligibility Clause 
(in italics) and the Incompatibility Clause) (bold added)); Tillman, Why Our Next President 
May Keep His or Her Senate Seat: A Conjecture on the Constitution's Incompatibility Clause, 
supra note 50 passim.  Professor Prakash responded: 
Presidents and Vice Presidents could freely accept presents, emoluments, offices and 
titles from foreign states because the constitutional bar [in the Foreign Emoluments 
Clause, Article I, Section 9, Clause 8] applies only to offices under the United States, 
and, according to Mr. Tillman, those two offices are not [offices] under the United 
States.  But the provision barring Presidents from accepting foreign emoluments was 
arguably added to prevent Presidents from being corrupted by foreign bribes, as 
occurred when Charles II accepted money from France’s Louis XIV. 
Prakash, supra note 45, at 149-50 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (citing 2 THE 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 68-69 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) 
[hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS] (reporting Gouverneur Morris’s statement at the 
Philadelphia Convention)); see also Prakash & Smith, supra note 9, at 84 (“A close 
examination of the text suggests that members of Congress are not the sorts of ‘civil Officers’ 
to which Article II’s impeachment provision applies at all . . . .” (emphasis added)).  Compare 
BERGER, supra note 42, at 226 n.11 (“If a Senator holds no ‘office [under the United States],’ 
it follows that he is exempt from th[e] prohibition [of the Foreign Emoluments Clause], so that 
we may have a Duke of Oklahoma serving in the Senate[]”—a position methodologically 
identical to Prakash’s, supra, but a position I doubt he would accept), WHARTON, supra 
note 52, at 270 (“If a Senator holds no office of profit or trust under the United States, it is 
lawful for him to accept a present title or office from any King or any foreign state.  Can it be 
possible that a public functionary, of all others the peculiar object of this jealous restriction, is, 
in fact, the sole object of exemption from its operation?” (quoting Congressman James A. 
Bayard, Sr.’s speech on January 3, 1799 for the House managers at the Blount Impeachment 
trial before the Senate)), Francis Paschal, The Constitution and Habeas Corpus, 1970 DUKE 
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L.J. 605, 613 n.26 (affirming that the Foreign Emoluments Clause limits “all branches of the 
government” (emphasis added)), Teachout, supra note 24 (affirming that members of 
Congress are subject to the Foreign Emoluments Clause), Teachout, infra note 66 passim 
(same), Paul R. Verkuil, Separation of Powers, the Rule of Law and the Idea of Independence, 
30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 310 & n.45 (1989) (“Other provisions of [A]rticle I prevent 
members of Congress from assuming or receiving gifts, titles or offices that might create 
conflicts of interest in the personal bias or interest sense.” (citing the Foreign Emoluments 
Clause)), and Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Official Compensation, 102 
COLUM. L. REV. 501, 510 (2002) (asserting that the Foreign Emoluments Clause applies to 
“all federal officeholders” and describing the Clause as one of a number of “limited 
anticorruption provisions” (emphasis added)), with AMAR, supra note 9, at 182 (“The 
[Presidential Emoluments] [C]lause also prohibited individual states from greasing a 
president’s palm, and the more general language of Article I, section 9 barred all federal 
officers, from the president on down, from accepting any ‘present’ or ‘Emolument’ of ‘any 
kind whatever’ from a foreign government without special congressional consent.” (emphasis 
added)), WALTER BERNS, DEMOCRACY AND THE CONSTITUTION: ESSAYS 139-40 (2006) (stating 
that “the president is ineligible to serve as an elector” because “he holds an ‘Office of Trust or 
Profit under the United States’”), LAWRENCE G. KRAUS, THE DEMOCRACY ISSUE: REFORM 
THROUGH THE CONSTITUTION 40 (1987) (“Who besides the President and the Vice President 
holds an ‘office of trust’?”), FURMAN SHEPPARD, THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT-BOOK § 342, 
at 146-47 (Philadelphia, Sower, Barnes & Potts 1855) (asserting that the Foreign Emoluments 
Clause applies to the President), and Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitutional Power to 
Interpret International Law, 118 YALE L.J. 1762, 1772 (2009) (implying that the President 
falls under the scope of the Foreign Emoluments Clause).  But see GLENNON, supra note 13, 
at 23 (“What constitutes an office of trust or profit is not clear.”).  
It appears to me that Professor Prakash misunderstands the source he cites. Gouverneur 
Morris made his speech referencing the Chares II-Louis XIV incident during discussion on the 
clauses relating to impeachment, and not during debate on either the Foreign Emoluments 
Clause or on the Incompatibility and Ineligibility Clauses.  E.g., 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra 
at 68-69 (“[Gouverneur Morris] was now sensible of the necessity of impeachments, if the 
Executive was to continue for any time in office. . . .  One would think the King of England 
well secured agst [sic] bribery. . . .  Yet Charles II was bribed by Louis XIV.  The Executive 
ought therefore to be impeachable . . . .”); see also, e.g., 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra at 251 
(reproducing General Pinckney’s floor statement to the South Carolina legislature, on 
January 16, 1788, discussing the Charles II-Louis XIV incident in relation to impeachment 
powers and to the treaty-making power); cf., e.g., Berger, supra note 49, at 430 n.168  (“[T]he 
bribe Louis paid to Charles . . . came out in the impeachment of Danby . . . .” (emphasis 
added)).  The Impeachment Clause uses express language in regard to the President and Vice 
President.   
By contrast, no such express language naming the President and Vice President appears in the 
Incompatibility Clause, in the Ineligibility Clause, or in the Removal and Disqualification 
Clause, and Professor Prakash puts forward no evidence that the Charles II-Louis XIV 
incident was on anyone’s mind during debate on those clauses, clauses which merely make 
use of Officers under the United States-type language.  Like the Incompatibility Clause, the 
Ineligibility Clause, and the Removal and Disqualification Clause, the Foreign Emoluments 
Clause also makes use of Officers under the United States-type language.  See U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (“[N]o Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without 
the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind 
whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.” (emphasis added)).  When the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause was debated at the Philadelphia Convention, the discussion focused on 
the dangers associated with foreign powers bribing our ambassadors, particularly while posted 
abroad.  Cf. Application of the Emoluments Clause to Part-Time Consultant for the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, 1986 OLC LEXIS 66, at *6 (1986) (Cooper, Asst. Att’y Gen.) 
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(“[A]lthough the possibility of corruption and foreign influence of foreign ministers 
apparently was of particular concern to the Framers, they expressly chose not to limit the 
prohibition on accepting emoluments from foreign governments to foreign ministers.” 
(emphasis added)).  Thus there was no strong reason to institute language in the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause affecting Presidents, Vice Presidents, or members of Congress. 
Moreover, I have not found a trace of debate or discussion at the Philadelphia Convention or 
in the ratifying debates on the Charles II-Louis XIV incident, in relation to the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause, the clause which interests us here, and Professor Prakash has put no such 
evidence forward. See ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 10 passim; 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, 
supra passim.  The entirety of his evidence relates to debate on impeachment related 
provisions, and the Impeachment Clause, unlike the Foreign Emoluments Clause, uses express 
language to reach the President and Vice President. This would seem to substantially, if not 
entirely, undercut Prakash’s historical argument.  See Applicability of Emoluments Clause to 
Employment of Government Employees by Foreign Public Universities, 1994 OLC LEXIS 
52, at *6 n.4 (1994) (Dellinger, Asst. Att’y Gen.) (“The [Foreign] Emoluments Clause builds 
upon practices that had developed during the period of the Confederation.  ‘It was the practice 
of Louis XVI [not Louis XIV] of France to give presents to departing ministers who signed 
treaties with France.’” (emphasis added)); id. (reporting incident involving John Jay and the 
King of Spain); President Reagan’s Ability to Receive Retirement Benefits from the State of 
California, 5 Op. O.L.C. 187, 1981 OLC LEXIS 33, at *4 (1981) (Simms, Dep’y Asst. Att’y 
Gen.) (noting that the [Foreign Emoluments] [C]lause had been “prompted by the gift of a 
snuff box by the King of France to Benjamin Franklin, then Ambassador to France” 
(emphasis added)); 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra at 327 (reporting Edmund Randolph’s 
position at the Virginia ratifying convention, on June 17, 1788, who noted that the King of 
France had given a gift to the American “ambassador” during the Revolution); Gary J. Edles, 
Service on Federal Advisory Committees: A Case Study of the OLC’s Little-Known [Foreign] 
Emoluments Clause Jurisprudence, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2006) (“Its inclusion in the 
Constitution was occasioned by a gift of a snuffbox to Benjamin Franklin when he was the 
American ambassador to France during the period of confederation. Other American envoys 
similarly received gifts from foreign monarchs, and the Continental Congress authorized, or at 
least acquiesced in, the acceptance of these gifts.” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)); 
Teachout, supra note 24, at 361, 410 n.302 (suggesting that the clause arose in the context of 
gifts from Louis XVI to Benjamin Franklin and Arthur Lee); cf. The Constitutionality of 
Cooperative International Law Enforcement Activities Under the Emoluments Clause, 20 Op. 
O.L.C. 346, 1996 OLC LEXIS 17, at *4-5 (1996) (Schroeder, Acting Asst. Att’y Gen.) (“The 
Emoluments Clause was intended to protect foreign ministers, ambassadors, and other 
officers of the United States from undue influence and corruption by foreign governments.” 
(emphasis added)). 
One is genuinely left wondering upon what facts the modern consensus is based.  See Citizens 
United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 948 n.51 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“The notion that Congress might lack the authority to distinguish foreigners from citizens in 
the regulation of electioneering would certainly have surprised the Framers, whose ‘obsession 
with foreign influence derived from a fear that foreign powers and individuals had no basic 
investment in the well-being of the country.’” (quoting Teachout, supra note 24, at 393 
n.245)); 3 WILLIAM LAWRENCE, DECISIONS OF THE FIRST COMPTROLLER IN THE DEPARTMENT 
OF THE TREASURY OF THE UNITED STATES 444 (Washington, Government Printing Office 
1882) (suggesting that the Foreign Emoluments Clause extends to members of Congress); 
AMAR, supra note 9, at 182 (asserting that the Foreign Emoluments Clause applies to the 
President); Teachout, supra note 24, at 366 (asserting, without citations to any authority, that 
“[f]oreign corruption of the Executive was a concern [of the Framers] . . . as we saw in the 
Foreign Gifts Clause”); id. at 364 (asserting, without citation to any authority, that the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause applies to members of Congress, and thereby embracing a position akin 
to that of Raoul Berger, supra note 42); id. at 361-62 (suggesting that the Foreign Emoluments 
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Clause reached Senators); id. at 362 (misquoting the Foreign Emoluments Clause as extending 
to “Office[s] of Project [?] or Trust under [the United States]”—a phrase nowhere appearing 
in the Constitution); Teachout, infra note 66 passim (taking the position that the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause reaches the President (and, by implication, the Vice President), members 
of Congress, and even state officials!); Zephyr Teachout, The Historical Roots of Citizens 
United v. FEC: How Anarchists and Academics Accidentally Created Corporate Speech 
Rights, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 163 (2011) (asserting that the Framers (or, perhaps, merely 
Hamilton) believed that “the President could be corrupted by foreign temptations”); Zephyr 
Teachout, Original Intent: How the Founding Fathers Would Clean Up K Street, 
DEMOCRACY: A J. OF IDEAS, Winter 2009, at 44, 49, available at 
http://www.democracyjournal.org/11/6666.php (affirming that the Foreign Emoluments 
Clause precluded “federal officials—without a special dispensation from Congress—from 
receiving gifts ‘of any kind whatever’ from any foreign party.” (emphasis added)); cf. Hills, 
supra note 23 (describing “congressional seats” as “offices of trust or profit”).  But see 8 
ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 42, at 1592-93 (reporting May 4, 1798 debate, i.e., the first 
recorded congressional debate on the Foreign Emoluments Clause, with Representative Albert 
Gallatin arguing that officers stand on a different ground from members of Congress); THE 
LETTERS OF LAFAYETTE TO WASHINGTON 1777-1799, at 347-48 (Louis Gottschalk ed., 1976) 
(reproducing March 17, 1790, letter from Lafayette, then an officer of the French government, 
giving the key to the Bastille to Washington).  Washington never sought congressional 
consent, under the aegis of the Foreign Emoluments Clause, to keep the key, which is some 
indication that Washington did not believe that the President was subject to the clause, i.e., 
that the presidency was not an officer . . . under the United States.  However, Professor 
Prakash rejects the inferences I draw from the incident involving the key to the Bastille.  He 
reads the Lafayette letter as a personal gift to Washington and suggests that nothing in the 
letter put Washington (or, apparently, anyone else) on notice that the gift was from a foreign 
government and would, therefore, fall under the aegis of the Foreign Emoluments Clause.  See 
Prakash, supra note 45, at 145-46. Prakash’s position is both puzzling and somewhat 
overwrought.  Id. at 146 (“Had Mr. Tillman dug deeper . . . .”—which, although not ad 
hominem, seems to casually personalize what should be, in my view, a fair minded academic 
inquiry).  First, the gift was delivered to Washington at the capital, not at his home in Mt. 
Vernon.  Second, all contemporaneous newspaper accounts represent the gift as a gift to the 
President, not to him personally.  See, e.g., Philadelphia, 12 August, FED. GAZETTE & 
PHILADELPHIA DAILY ADVERTISER, Aug. 12, 1790, at 2 (“Last week the key of the Bastille, 
accompanied with a fine drawing of that famous building, was presented to the President of 
the United States, by John Rutledge, [J]un[.], Esq. to whose care they were committed by the 
illustrious patriot the Marquis de la Fayette . . . .”); New-York, August 10, PA. PACKET & 
DAILY ADVERTISER, Aug. 13, 1790, at 2 (same).  Third, Lafayette’s letter to Washington 
suggests that the key came into Lafayette’s possession as a result of his “order[ing]” the 
destruction of the Bastille—which seems to indicate that the key was not Lafayette’s personal 
property, but public property which he was authorized (or so Lafayette thought) to give to 
Washington as a gift.  See THE LETTERS OF LAFAYETTE, supra at 348 (“Give me leave, my 
dear General, to present you with a picture of the Bastille just as it looked a few days after I 
had ordered its demolition, with the main kea [sic] of that fortress of despotism—It is a tribute 
which I owe as a son to my adoptive father . . . .” (emphasis added)).  Fourth, our modern 
concepts of private, personal, and public do not easily map onto the world of 1789.  Compare 
Prakash, supra note 45, at 146 n.22 (“Moreover, that governments always act through their 
officers hardly means that every act an officer takes is an act of the government. Officers of 
government have personal lives too.” (emphasis added) (citing Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 
(1997) (Stevens, J.))), with Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 539 (1977) 
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“Since George Washington’s Presidency, our constitutional 
tradition, without a single exception, has treated Presidential papers as the President’s 
personal property.  This view has been congressionally and judicially ratified, both as to the 
ownership of Presidential papers . . . and, by the practice of Justices as to ownership of their 
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judicial papers.”), To Amend the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949: 
Hearing on H.R. 7545, H.R. 8353, H.R. 8416, Hr. 8890, and H.R. 9219 Before the Executive 
and Legislative Reorganization Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Expenditures in the 
Executive Dept’s, 81st Cong. 99-100 (1950) (Dr. Wayne C. Grover, Archivist of the United 
States: “[T]he papers—in fact all of the papers—accumulated in the White House by our 
Presidents from George Washington to President Herbert Hoover have been removed as 
personal papers . . . .  It would be at the discretion of the President whether or not he deposited 
the papers in the National Archives at all.”), and KALT, supra note 14, at 17 (“[T]he president 
can argue that he is the only person in the government for whom the personal and the official 
are linked so inextricably.” (emphasis added)).  Finally, and most importantly, no anti-bribery 
regime could function if the mere representation made by the party giving the gift or bribe, 
that is, that the gift or bribe was made in a personal capacity, could take the recipient out of 
the purview of the monitoring regime.  On these facts, where the status of Lafayette’s gift was 
ambiguous, best practice would have been to have consulted Congress, assuming the 
President fell under the aegis of the Foreign Emoluments Clause.  The fact that Washington 
did not consult Congress, in regard to this gift or any other gift, is some substantial indication 
that he did not believe the Foreign Emoluments Clause applied to him.  See, e.g., Calabresi & 
Prakash, supra note 48, at 642 n.450 (“Moreover, Washington was acutely aware that the 
precedents established in the beginning would influence posterity.  Accordingly, [President 
Washington] ‘devoutly wished’ that ‘these [Executive Branch] precedents may be fixed on 
true principles.’” (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Washington to Madison correspondence 
from May 5, 1789)); Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power, 2003 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 701, 792 n.524 (same).  As far as I know, the first President to consult Congress 
in regard to a gift and also to receive congressional authority to accept the gift was President 
Benjamin Harrison.  See J. Res. 39, 54th Cong., 29 Stat. 759 (1896) (“authoriz[ing]” President 
Harrison “to accept certain medals presented to him by the Governments of Brazil and Spain 
during the term of his service as President of the United States”); Applicability of the 
Emoluments Clause and the Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act to the President’s Receipt of 
the Nobel Peace Prize, 33 Op. O.L.C. 1, 2009 WL 6365082, at *5 n.5, 2009 OLC LEXIS 18, 
at *14 n.5 (2009).  Practice from the late nineteenth century Benjamin Harrison administration 
is hardly strong evidence as to original public meaning. 
As to earlier Presidents the record is less than clear.  President John Quincy Adams apparently 
received, circa 1827, a medal of no intrinsic value from the King of Sweden.  I have found no 
indication that Adams (or the United States’ minister to Sweden) asked for or received 
congressional consent to accept the gift.  It may be that Adams thought no permission was 
necessary, as he may have regifted the medal to the United States.  Or, perhaps, Adams 
thought permission was unnecessary because the medal only had de minimis value.  President 
Andrew Jackson received a gold medal from the South American revolutionary Simón 
Bolívar, President of Colombia.  Jackson deposited the medal with Congress and asked for 
consent to accept it.  It appears that Jackson only received consent from the House. 
Subsequently, circa February 9, 1830, the House directed the medal to be deposited with the 
State Department.  See MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE TWO 
HOUSES OF CONGRESS AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE TWENTY-THIRD 
CONGRESS 258-59 (Washington, Gales & Seaton 1833) (reproducing January 22, 1834 letter 
from the Secretary of State to the President explaining, in summary fashion, the history of the 
Adams and Jackson medals and how they came into the possession of the State Department); 
CALVIN TOWNSEND, ANALYSIS OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 227 (N.Y., Ivison, Blakeman, Taylor & 
Co. rev. ed. 1868) (“Were a costly present to be made by the Emperor of France or Queen of 
England to the President of the United States, he would not be at liberty to accept it on his 
own account, though he might in behalf of the people, and have it preserved in the archives of 
the nation, as it might seem rude to decline it.”). 
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no such language appears either in the Constitution’s Removal and Disqualification 
Clause65 or in Congress’s 1790 anti-bribery statute?  
Does this statute (in conjunction with all the other evidence mustered to date66) 
establish that the President and Vice President are neither officers of the United 
                                                           
 65 Again, unlike the Impeachment Clause, there is no express language either in the 
Ineligibility Clause or in the Incompatibility Clause reaching either the President or Vice 
President.  See infra note 64 (quoting the Ineligibility Clause and the Incompatibility Clause).  
Should not all such exclusions be interpreted narrowly, thereby preserving the widest domain 
for democratic action?  Since when do exclusions, incompatibilities, and disqualifications 
arise by mere implication?  See infra notes 68 & 75 and accompanying text; 
Commonwealth ex rel. Bache v. Binns, 17 Serg. & Rawle 219, 229 (Pa. 1828) (“[I]f there was 
a doubt upon the subject [of incompatibility between federal and state office], that policy 
required a decision affirming the incompatibility of the offices in question.  But this court 
unanimously answered, no [in a prior case]; and held that the doubt and uncertainty of the 
letter [of the law in regard to incompatibility] was to have an operation directly the 
reverse.” (emphasis added)); THOMAS FALCONER & EDWARD H. FITZHERBERT, CASES OF 
CONTROVERTED ELECTIONS, DETERMINED IN COMMITTEES OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, IN THE 
SECOND PARLIAMENT OF THE REIGN OF QUEEN VICTORIA 587 (Saunders & Benning 1839) 
(reproducing committee debate from disputed Galway election of 1838, where Mr. Austin 
(counsel for the sitting member who prevailed) stated: “In all cases respecting eligibility, 
eligibility is to be aided, and ineligibility ought to be strictly proved. Severe penalties are 
imposed by the acts of parliament creating disqualification, and they are not favoured.”); 67 
C.J.S. Officers § 23 (2012) (“The courts have a duty to liberally construe words limiting the 
right of a person to hold office so that the public may have benefit of choice from all those 
who are in fact and in law qualified, and in favor of those seeking to hold office.  Ambiguities 
should be resolved in favor of eligibility to office, and constitutional and statutory provisions 
which restrict the right to hold public office should be strictly construed against ineligibility.” 
(footnotes omitted)); see also 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 273 (2012) (“Statutory or 
charter provisions prescribing the qualifications for members in a municipal council are to be 
strictly construed, and a person elected or appointed to membership therein should not be 
prevented from taking office unless he is clearly ineligible . . . .”); 62 C.J.S. Municipal 
Corporations § 280 (2012) (“The proceedings and grounds for removal of a member of a 
municipal governing body are controlled by constitutional, statutory, and charter provisions, 
which are to be strictly construed.” (footnote omitted)); 3 G.M. TREVELYAN, HISTORY OF 
ENGLAND 179 (1953) (“The [Municipal Corporations] Act of 1835 was more dramatic than 
the [Great] Reform Bill [of 1832], for it gave all ratepayers the right to vote for the new 
Municipalities.  At last the ice-age of English institutional and corporate life had come to an 
end . . . .” (emphasis added)).  Compare Prakash, supra note 45, at 144 (objecting to using 
evidence from corporate law field in order to understand public law terms), with Prakash & 
Smith, supra note 9, at 107 (using evidence from trust law in order to understand public law 
terminology). 
 66 See, e.g., supra notes 10-13, 42-52; infra note 67 and accompanying text.  See generally 
IV JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 651, at 577 (Washington, 
Government Printing Office 1906) (citing State Department material taking the position that 
persons holding offices under a state are not subject to the Foreign Emoluments Clause); Seth 
Barrett Tillman, Opening Statement, Citizens United and the Scope of Professor Teachout’s 
Anti-Corruption Principle, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 399 (2012), 107 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 1 
(2012) (arguing based on other Washington-era precedents that the Office . . . under the 
United States language of the Foreign Emoluments Clause does not reach elected federal or 
state officials); Seth Barrett Tillman, Closing Statement, The Original Public Meaning of the 
Foreign Emoluments Clause: A Reply to Professor Zephyr Teachout, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 
COLLOQUY 180 (2013) (same).  But see generally Zephyr Teachout, Rebuttal, Gifts, Offices, 
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States, nor officers under the United States?  I think so.67  But if Professor Chafetz, 
and Professors Akhil Amar, Vikram Amar, Steven Calabresi, Saikrishna Prakash, 
                                                           
and Corruption: A Response to Tillman, 107 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 30 (2012) (arguing 
that the Foreign Emoluments Clause reaches federal and state elected officials). 
 67 See, e.g., Field, supra note 45 (“Whether the president and vice-president are officers of 
the United States is a subject on which conflicting opinions are held. It is not possible to deal 
here at length with . . . that question . . . .” (footnote omitted)); see also supra note 45 
(collecting sources); infra notes 77-79 (collecting sources).  The position that the President 
and Vice President are not officers of the United States has deep roots in early and modern 
sources.  See United States v. Mouat, 124 U.S. 303, 307 (1888) (“Unless a person in the 
service of the Government, therefore holds his place by virtue of an appointment by the 
President, or of one of the courts of justice or heads of Departments authorized by law to 
make such an appointment, he is not strictly speaking, an officer of the United States.” 
(emphasis added)); ROSENBERG, supra note 52, at CRS-7 (“[T]he constitutional term ‘civil 
office’ was meant to include only those offices which are created by Congress and subject to 
appointment, and not those elective offices established by the Constitution itself.” (emphasis 
in the original)); PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE SITTING FOR THE TRIAL OF WILLIAM W. 
BELKNAP, LATE SECRETARY OF WAR, ON THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT EXHIBITED BY THE 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 130 (Washington, Government Printing Office 1876) (Senator 
George Sewell Boutwell stating, on May 27, 1876, “[F]or according to the Constitution, as 
well as upon the judgment of eminent commentators, the President and Vice-President are not 
civil officers”); id. at 145 (Senator Newton Booth, from California, stating, on May 27, 1876, 
“[T]he President is not an officer of the United States.  As was tersely said by the Senator 
from Massachusetts, [Mr. BOUTWELL,] ‘He is part of the Government.’”); GOODNOW, supra 
note 10, at 225 (“[T]he United States Supreme Court has held that no one can be an officer of 
the United States government unless he be appointed as the constitution provides, viz., by the 
President and Senate, the President alone, one of the United States courts, or the head of an 
executive department.”); WILLIAM BENNETT MUNRO, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED 
STATES NATIONAL, STATE, AND LOCAL 297 (5th ed. 1946) (“The phraseology [of the 
Incompatibility Clause and Elector Incompatibility Clause] suggests that appointment, as 
against election, is the essential mark of ‘civil office’ or even ‘office.’ In more recent times 
both the President and members of Congress appear as elective federal officers, though not as 
‘civil’ officers, in statutes and judicial decisions.”); SILVA, supra note 9, at 135 (“The courts 
have been especially careful not to enlarge the meaning of the term ‘officer’ as used in the 
Constitution.  They have defined an officer of the United States as a person appointed by the 
President and the Senate, by the President alone, by the courts of law, or by a department 
head.” (collecting case law)); SILVA, supra note 10, at 149 (“‘Officers of the United States’ are 
not appointed by electoral colleges.  They are appointed by the President and Senate, by the 
President alone, by the department heads, or by the courts of law.”); 1 JOHN RANDOLPH 
TUCKER, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: A CRITICAL DISCUSSION OF ITS GENESIS, 
DEVELOPMENT, AND INTERPRETATION § 199(i), at 412-13 (Henry St. George Tucker ed., 
Chicago, Callaghan & Company 1899) (“The language of the [Impeachment] [C]lause 
indicates that, in a constitutional sense, the President and Vice-President are not civil officers 
of the United States, for otherwise the language would have been ‘and other civil officers.’”); 
id. § 199(k), at 413 (“The President and Vice-President are constitutional officers.  Who, then, 
were included in the terms ‘civil officers’?  The meaning of these words is interpreted by the 
last clause of [S]ection 3 of [A]rticle II, which just precedes the use of the term ‘civil officers’ 
as subject to impeachment.  It explicitly declares that the President ‘shall commission all the 
officers of the United States,’ and these are the officers who, under [A]rticle II, [S]ection 2, 
[C]lause 2, are to be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the 
Senate, under the words ‘ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, judges of the 
Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States,’ etc.”); JAMES WILSON & THOMAS 
M’KEAN, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 111 
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(London, J. Debrett et al. 1792) (reproducing James Wilson’s December 11, 1787 A.M. 
statement to the Pennsylvania ratifying convention: “[e]very officer must be nominated solely 
and exclusively, by the President” (originally published in T. Lloyd’s Debates)); Luther 
Martin, “The Genuine Information,” Laid Before the Legislature of Maryland, in ROBERT 
YATES, SECRET PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION ASSEMBLED AT 
PHILADELPHIA, IN THE YEAR 1787, FOR THE PURPOSE OF FORMING THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 49 (John Lansing, Jr. ed., Louisville, Ky., Alston 1844) (“[T]he 
President ha[s] the power to nominate all offices . . . .” (emphasis added)); Steven G. 
Calabresi, The President, the Supreme Court, and the Founding Fathers: A Reply to Professor 
Ackerman, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 480 (2006) (noting that “the Constitution of 1787 created a 
unitary executive, provided for no executive council, and gave the president the power to 
nominate all officers of the United States and the power to make recess appointments” 
(emphasis added)); Steven G. Calabresi & Gary S. Lawson, The Unitary Executive, 
Jurisdiction Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to Justice Scalia, 
107 COLUM. L. REV. 1002, 1021 (2007) (noting that “if some of the ‘other Officers of the 
United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for,’ are not inferior, 
then they must be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate”—the 
logic of which would seem to exclude the President and Vice President (emphasis added)); id. 
at 1010 (“Although the Constitution assumes that there will be officers of the House and 
Senate, heads of executive departments (specifically including a Treasury department), 
‘Ambassadors [and] other public Ministers and Consuls,’ and various other ‘Officers of the 
United States,’ [the Constitution] does not itself create any of these legislative or executive 
offices.  Rather, it is left to Congress to create (or not to create) these institutions pursuant to 
its power to ‘make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution 
the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of 
the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.’” (emphasis added) (footnotes 
omitted)); id. at 1021 (“The Appointments Clause does not in any way distinguish the named 
officers from ‘all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein 
otherwise provided for.’”); Pergler, supra note 9 (“The President and Vice President, being 
elective functionaries, are not ‘civil officers of the United States’ within the meaning of 
Article II, Section 4.”); Prakash, How the Constitution Makes Subtraction Easy, supra 
note 48, at 1871 (“Congress may remove, via statute, all officers of the United States, save for 
federal judges with good behavior tenure.” (emphasis added)).  It appears that Professors 
Calabresi and Prakash no longer adhere to their prior positions.  See Steven G. Calabresi, 
Rebuttal, Does the Incompatibility Clause Apply to the President?, in Tillman & Calabresi, 
supra note 10, at 141-46 (arguing that the President and Vice President are officers of and/or 
under the United States); Steven G. Calabresi, Closing Statement, A Term of Art or the Artful 
Reading of Terms?, in Tillman & Calabresi, supra note 10, at 154-59 (same); Prakash, supra 
note 45 passim (same).  See generally supra notes 10 (discussing officers of the United 
States), 13 (discussing Officers . . . under the United States), 48 (distinguishing officers of the 
United States from Officers . . . under the United States).  It is also important to keep in mind 
that the technical meaning of officer of the United States, as used in the Appointments Clause, 
and elsewhere in the Constitution, is somewhat distinct from the everyday use of that phrase—
which merely distinguishes state from federal officeholders.  Compare Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1, 275 (1976) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[N]o case in this 
Court even remotely supports the power of Congress to appoint an officer of the United States 
aside from those officers each House is authorized by Art. I to appoint to assist in the 
legislative processes.” (emphasis added)), with Steven G. Calabresi, Closing Statement, A 
Term of Art or the Artful Reading of Terms?, in Tillman & Calabresi, supra note 10, at 155 
(“Speakers and Committee Chairs are thus not officers of the United States but are only 
officers of the House of Representatives or the Senate. Surely [my interlocutor] would not 
confound the United States with the House or the Senate”! (emphasis added)).  Maybe I would 
not, but apparently Justice White would, at least depending on context. 
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etc., remain unconvinced.  I must ask, in clear and direct language, what (if 
anything) would it take to convince you?  Do I need to find a signed letter from a 
Framer or Ratifier?  
III.  IS THIS RESULT “ABSURD”? 
Is it absurd to argue that impeached, convicted, removed, and disqualified 
Presidents, Vice Presidents, and civil officers are eligible to hold the presidency?  
Some people who have taken the time to privately comment on this Article think 
so.68  In other words, those that doubt the position put forward here ask: what is the 
                                                           
As an aside, it is interesting to note that Justice Story appears (although the matter is hardly 
free from doubt) to have taken the position that office under the United States, as used in the 
Incompatibility Clause, also extended to state office.  Compare 1 STORY, COMMENTARIES, 
supra note 9, § 869, at 635 (noting that the Incompatibility Clause was “doubtless founded in 
a deference to state jealousy, and a sincere desire to obviate the fears . . . that the general 
government would obtain an undue preference over the state governments” (emphasis added) 
(citing RAWLE, supra note 9, ch. 19, and THE FEDERALIST NO. 56 (James Madison), supra note 
4), with RAWLE, supra note 9, ch. 19, at 189 (“The [C]onstitution contains no provision 
adverting to the [joint] exercise of offices under the United States and separate states at the 
same time, by the same persons.” (emphasis added)), and THE FEDERALIST NO. 56 (James 
Madison), supra note 4, at 306 (affirming that federal legislators may hold simultaneous 
membership in their state legislature).  But see Amar & Amar, supra note 9, at 117 n.25 
(noting that Elbridge Gerry took the position in debate in the First Congress that the reach of 
“Office” in the Succession Clause extended beyond federal office to mere state office, and 
denominating Gerry’s position as “implausibl[e]”); but cf. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The 
Objects of the Constitution, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1014 (2011) (“In other words, when the 
Constitution restricts the states, it does so expressly, usually with the words ‘No State 
shall.’”).  Madison’s report of the Federal Convention’s debate on this subject lacks his 
customary level of confidence and clarity.  See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 64, at 535 
(reporting debate from September 7, 1787, and stating: “It seemed to be an objection to [the 
Succession Clause] . . . that the Legislature was restrained in the temporary appointment to 
‘officers’ of the U.S[.] . . .” (emphasis added) (emphasis in the original omitted)).  Seemed? 
 68 See also Randall Kennedy, A Natural Aristocracy?, in CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, 
CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES 54, 55 n.1 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds., 
1998) (asserting that a disqualified official cannot become President); Prakash, supra note 45, 
at 149 (denominating the position that a disqualified President, Vice President, and officer 
remains eligible to serve as President and Vice President as a “fairly odd conclusion[]” but 
supplying no reasoned basis for his intuition); cf. BERGER, supra note 42 (arguing that the 
Constitution’s use of office and officer embraces Senators and Representatives else “a judge 
impeached, convicted, and disqualified ‘to hold any office’ could yet be elected to the 
Congress, for a member of Congress would not be a ‘person holding an office’”); supra 
note 42 (collecting authority for the proposition that impeached, convicted, removed, and 
disqualified officials are not eligible to sit in Congress); WHARTON, supra note 52, at 270 (“If 
a Senator holds no office of profit or trust under the United States, it is lawful for him to 
accept a present title or office from any King or any foreign state.  Can it be possible that a 
public functionary, of all others the peculiar object of this jealous restriction, is, in fact, the 
sole object of exemption from its operation”? (quoting Congressman James A. Bayard, Sr.’s 
speech on January 3, 1799 for the House managers at the Blount Impeachment trial before the 
Senate)).  The argument from absurdity does not of necessity lead to the modern consensus 
position.  Indeed, in that light, Berger’s position (i.e., including all elected officials as officers 
of the United States) is far more attractive than the position announced by the Amars in 1995 
and subsequently embraced in Impeachment and Assassination by Chafetz (i.e., including the 
President and Vice President, but not members of Congress, as officers of the United States).  
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logic, rationale, or normative justification which would limit disqualification to 
relatively low ranking appointed office (such as cabinet and subcabinet posts) while 
still leaving such persons eligible to hold elective office (such as the presidency and 
vice presidency).  There are several potential answers to this question. 
First, looking for a normative justification may be a mistake.  The various 
constitutional clauses relating to impeachment represent compromises arising from 
both shared and divergent experiences, first as (royal, proprietary, and corporate) 
colonies, and later as newly independent states.  The legal work product of such 
group efforts and compromises may not have any independent justification.  This is 
particularly true where multiple constitutional provisions, as is the case in regard to 
impeachment, are involved. 
Second, where a complex institution is not the creation of any single mind or, 
even, a single historical or legal epoch—where it is an inherited organic institution—
the only justification to be had may be Burkean: viz., if a long enduring institution 
conforms to our shared historical experience, then its maintenance (assuming it is 
permeable to evolutionary change short of violent revolution) confirms its 
usefulness.  To believe or search for a more particularistic justification is to fall into 
(what Hayek denominated) the constructivist-rationalist fallacy.69 
Alternatively, it may be that the Framers and Ratifiers believed that appointed 
office posed particular or acute dangers to society, dangers that elected office did 
not.  In that situation, extending the scope of disqualification exclusively to 
appointed or statutory office makes sense.  Indeed, the Ineligibility Clause 
hardwires this precise distinction into the Constitution.  The Ineligibity Clause 
precludes certain elected officeholders from subsequently taking appointed (not 
elected) office.70  Furthermore, even if the Framers and Ratifiers believed that 
                                                           
Compare, e.g., Arthur Krock, In The Nation; Succession List Now Suits the Politicos The 
“Officer” Dispute Holmes, White and John W. Davis, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1945, at 12 
(quoting former Solicitor General John W. Davis, who argued Lamar v. United States, 240 
U.S. 60 (1916) (Holmes, J.), as stating: “While the Lamar case deals with the statute and not 
with the Constitution itself, I think it stands for the doctrine that ‘members of Congress are 
officers.’ I don’t accept the contrary view that that term is applicable only to those who hold 
office by reason of appointment rather than election.” (emphasis added)), with Chafetz, supra 
note 1 passim, and Amar & Amar, supra note 9 passim.  What is the normative rationale for 
precluding a disqualified office-holder from holding the presidency (and vice-presidency), but 
permitting her to hold a seat in Congress? See supra note 65 and accompanying text; infra 
note 75 and accompanying text. 
 69 See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, 2 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY passim (1976); see also 
EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE passim (F.G. Selby ed., 1890) 
(1790). But see Steven G. Calabresi, Rebuttal, Does the Incompatibility Clause Apply to the 
President?, in Tillman & Calabresi, supra note 10, at 143 (affirming, without recourse to any 
authority, that the “whole point of the two houses of the British Parliament was to give the 
Lords temporal and spiritual a place in the House of Lords and the commoners their own 
distinct house—the House of Commons” (emphasis added)). 
 70 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (Ineligibility Clause: “No Senator or Representative shall, 
during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the 
Authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof 
shall have been [i]ncreased during such time . . . .” (emphasis added)); John F. O’Connor, The 
Emoluments Clause: An Anti-Federalist Intruder in a Federalist Constitution, 24 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 89, 104 (1995) (“The Emoluments Clause goes one step further than prohibiting 
Members of Congress from holding federal offices that were created or had their emoluments 
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disqualified former officers posed similar dangers in regard to both appointed and 
elected offices, the decision to install such a candidate via election may have 
cleansed the decision in a way that mere appointment could not.71  That may be why 
                                                           
increased during the Member’s current term; it literally proscribes the appointment to such 
offices, which in turn makes holding such offices impossible.  The key, then, is determining 
exactly when a person is ‘appointed’ to federal office.” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)). 
See generally Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Election as Appointment: The Tennessee Plan 
Reconsidered, 75 TENN. L. REV. 473 (2008); Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Errors, Omissions, and the 
Tennessee Plan, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 85 (2008).  On the other hand, some modern 
commentators do not appear to be sympathetic to the existence of the appointed-
officer/elected-officeholder divide.  See Akhil Reed Amar & Josh Chafetz, How the Senate 
can Stop Blagojevich, SLATE, Dec. 31, 2008, 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2008/12/how_the_senate_can_
stop_blagojevich.html (“Alternatively, we might think of an appointment as an ‘election’ by 
one voter [with Tillman adding—a view that, at the very least, fails to discuss the plainly 
contrary language of the Ineligibility Clause, supra].” (emphasis added)); Calabresi & Larsen, 
supra note 52, at 1083 (listing President George Bush and Vice President Al Gore as persons 
“recently appointed to executive . . . offices”); O’Connor, supra at 104 n.73 (arguing that a 
future court would hold that the Ineligibility Clause applies to a Senator appointed to fill a 
vacant seat in the Senate, notwithstanding the Clause's textual limitation to elected Senators 
and Representatives); cf. Currie, supra note 56, at 657 n.96 (“Whether the assumption of 
presidential powers [by an acting President] under the [Succession] statute would constitute an 
‘appointment’ to a ‘civil office under the Authority of the United States’ within this clause is 
not clear . . . .”); Friedman, supra note 45 (“Probably not much weight should be put on the 
term ‘appointment’ . . . .”).  Indeed, some early materials do support the view that the term 
appoint would also encompass election. See, e.g., GA. CONST. of 1789, art. I, § 10 (“[N]or 
shall any [state] senator or representative be elected to any office of profit which shall be 
created during his appointment.” (emphasis added)).  This may very well have been a 
scrivener’s error: transposing election-language with appointment-language.  Indeed, less than 
ten years later, in the revised state constitution, this language was replaced with language akin 
to that appearing in the federal constitution.  See GA. CONST. of 1798, art. I, § 11 (“[N]or shall 
any member [of the state legislature], after having taken his seat, be eligible to any of the 
aforesaid offices or appointments during the time for which he shall have been elected.”).  For 
another early authority suggesting that appointment-language might encompass election, see 
MONROE, supra note 42, at 362 (“[Senators] are appointed by the people themselves . . . .”). 
 71 See, e.g., 1 TUCKER, supra note 67, § 199(o), at 415 (“The impeachment power was 
intended to cleanse the government from the presence of worthless and faithless officials, but 
not to debar a State from electing whom it pleases to represent it in the [House or Senate].” 
(emphasis added)); Keith E. Whittington, Bill Clinton was no Andrew Johnson: Comparing 
Two Impeachments, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 422, 454 (2000) (“For those who sought to remove 
Clinton, the goal was to cleanse the presidency, not to weaken it.” (emphasis added)); Jack 
Chaney, Note, The Constitutionality of Censuring the President, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 979, 1005 
(2000) (“The power of impeachment is provided to guard the country against a President who 
cannot be trusted; it is a remedial mechanism, designed to cleanse and purify the office.” 
(emphasis added)); see also Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 713 (Del. 2009) (Jacobs, J.) 
(“With one exception, the ‘cleansing’ effect of such a ratifying shareholder vote is to subject 
the challenged director action to business judgment review [which is less demanding than 
entire fairness review], as opposed to ‘extinguishing’ the claim altogether (i.e., obviating all 
judicial review of the challenged action).” (emphasis added)); id. at 713 n.54 (“The only 
species of claim that shareholder ratification can validly extinguish is a claim that the 
directors lacked the authority to take action that was later ratified.” (emphasis added)); Orman 
v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 15 (Del. Ch. 2002) (Chandler, C.) (explaining that a decision of a 
conflicted board can be ratified by a majority vote of the fully informed disinterested 
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when Congress raises the salary of a cabinet post, representatives and senators are 
precluded from taking that office, during the term for which they were elected, via 
appointment.  But if Congress raises the salary of the President, the people can elect 
a sitting senator to the presidency, notwithstanding the change in salary, and 
notwithstanding that the person becomes President during the term for which she 
was first elected a senator.  The people cleanse the transaction.72  
To put it another way, disqualification might be thought of as a decision by the 
agent (the elected government of the day) to preclude a would-be office-holder from 
holding office, but the decision of the agent does not (permanently) preclude the 
principal (the people73 and, perhaps, the states74) from doing otherwise (even against 
                                                           
stockholders); cf. Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. v. Benihana, Inc., 906 A.2d 114, 120 (Del. 2006) 
(Berger, J.) (“After approval by disinterested directors, courts review the interested transaction 
under the business judgment rule . . . .”); Teachers’ Ret. Sys. of La. v. Aidinoff, 900 A.2d 654, 
669 (Del. Ch. 2006) (Strine, V.C.) (“The informed approval of a conflict transaction by an 
independent board majority remains an important cleansing device under our law and can 
insulate the resulting decision from fairness review under the appropriate circumstances.  For 
that device to be given credit, however, the board majority must have acted in an informed 
manner.” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)); 3 TREVELYAN, supra note 65, at 179 (“The 
[Municipal Corporations] Act of 1835 was more dramatic than the [Great] Reform Bill [of 
1832], for it gave all ratepayers the right to vote for the new Municipalities.  At last the ice-
age of English institutional and corporate life had come to an end . . . .” (emphasis added)); 
Prakash & Smith, supra note 9, at 107 (using evidence from trust law in order to understand 
public law terminology). 
 72 See id. (collecting authority suggesting cleansing rationale); Act of Jan. 17, 1969, Pub. 
L. No. 91-1, 83 Stat. 3 (doubling annual presidential compensation from $100,000 to 
$200,000).  The Democratic Party’s presidential candidate in 1972 was George McGovern 
who, prior to receiving his party’s presidential nomination, had been reelected to the Senate in 
1968.  Had McGovern prevailed in the Electoral College, who, then or now, believed or 
believes he was ineligible?  Was the whole country asleep?  Admittedly, for the cleansing 
rationale to work, the People must have some notice of Congress’s intent to raise a future 
President’s salary.  Compare AMAR, supra note 9, at 181 (“Congress could, however, change 
the salary for future presidential terms—presumably before anyone could be certain who 
would be in office when the new law would take effect.”), CHAFETZ, supra note 13, at 178 & 
180 (reporting House and Senate precedents holding that the age qualification is determined at 
the time the member-elect presents himself to the house to be sworn in, even if that is after the 
start of the constitutional term of office, even if as a result a district or state suffers a temporal 
loss of representation, but suggesting that a member-elect might be excluded if he “had 
actively lied about his age” to his constituents prior to his election (emphasis added)), and 
ADRIAN VERMEULE, MECHANISMS OF DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN WRIT SMALL 31-54 
(2007) (discussing the Constitution’s frequent use of “veil” rules), with supra note 71 (noting 
that action taken by disinterested directors or stockholders only has cleansing effect on 
conflicted board decision-making if the former were “informed”). 
 73 See U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, 
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.” (emphasis added)); 
see also Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Response, Against Mix-and-Match Lawmaking, 16 CORNELL 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 349, 360 (2007) (describing Members of Congress as “agents” and noting 
that “Every two years there comes a new mandate from the principals, and one must seek the 
agents’ views anew. The two houses of the legislature . . . are in this sense unlike people and 
unlike states.” (emphasis added)). 
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the expert advice of their ministers or masters—depending on your point of view). 
This normative worldview accounts for why a disqualified former officer remains 
free to take state office (including both elective positions and appointed state 
offices—each of which is beyond the scope of the President’s appointment power), 
to sit as a member of congress, and to become President or Vice President.  It is 
Professor Chafetz and others within the academic consensus who, by contrast, have 
yet to present any normative case for their position in regard to disqualification: that 
it extends to the presidency and vice presidency, but not to state office or 
congressional service.75  According to the consensus view, a disqualified former 
officer cannot become an Article III district court judge or circuit court judge, but he 
is permitted to sit as a Senator and to act in a judicial capacity in Senate trials in 
connection with impeachment proceedings.76  Why?  Again, according to the 
                                                           
 74 See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.” (emphasis added)); see also Bruhl, supra note 73, at 360. 
 75 Chafetz, supra note 1 passim; see also Amar & Amar, supra note 9 passim; supra 
notes 65 & 68, and accompanying text. 
 76 See Prakash & Smith, supra note 9, at 81-82 (“[The impeachment] provisions were 
absolutely necessary to invest the House and Senate with nonlegislative authority.  In the 
absence of the impeachment provisions, there would have been no way that the House would 
have enjoyed a judicial power to indict and an executive power to prosecute.  Likewise, but 
for the grant of power, the Senate would not have any judicial authority to try impeachments.” 
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted)); cf. AMAR, supra note 9, at 186 n.* (“In effect, the veto 
provisions of Article I, [S]ection 7 gave certain legislative powers to the president, and the 
impeachment provisions of Article I, [S]ections 2 and 3 conferred certain judicial powers 
upon Congress.”).  Characterizing Senate trial proceedings or House impeachment 
proceedings as an exercise of judicial authority is contestable.  See, e.g., Mecham v. Gordon, 
751 P.2d 957, 962 (Ariz. 1988) (Feldman, V.C.J.) (explaining that impeachment “is a 
uniquely legislative and political function.  It is not judicial.”).  Whether one considers Senate 
action on impeachment as judicial or legislative depends on whether one looks predominantly 
to the character of the action taken (judicial), or to the institutional history of the actor taking 
the action (legislative).  See R. v Richards (Ex parte Fitzpatrick & Browne) (1955) 92 CLR 
157, 167 (Austl.) (Dixon, C.J.) (“[T]hroughout the course of English history there has been a 
tendency to regard th[e] [power of a house of Parliament to jail a private person for contempt] 
as not strictly judicial but as belonging to the legislature, rather as something essential or, at 
any rate, proper for its protection.  This is not the occasion to discuss the historical grounds 
upon which these powers and privileges attached to the [United Kingdom] House of 
Commons.  It is sufficient to say that they were regarded by many authorities as proper 
incidents of the legislative function, notwithstanding the fact that considered more 
theoretically—perhaps one might even say, scientifically—they belong to the judicial 
sphere.”); see also Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028, 1066 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (per curiam) 
(“[I]t is fitting to consider how powers are constitutionally apportioned among the three 
branches.  However, a workable categorization has eluded even the most perspicacious of 
minds . . . .” (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, supra note 4)), disagreement on other grounds 
recognized by, Hatter v. United States, 64 F.3d 647 (Fed. Cir. 1995); THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 
(James Madison), supra note 4, at 195 (“Experience has instructed us that no skill in the 
science of government has yet been able to discriminate and define, with sufficient certainty, 
its three great provinces, the legislative, executive, and judiciary; or even the privileges and 
powers of the different legislative branches.”); James M. Landis, Constitutional Limits on the 
Congressional Power of Investigation, 40 HARV. L. REV. 153, 156 (1926) (“Legislative power 
unhappily fails to be either a word of art or a self-defining concept.  Like judicial power, it 
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consensus view, a disqualified former officer cannot become President, but he may 
sit as a Senator and make determinations in regard to treaties and appointments—
core executive activity.  Again, one must ask, why?  What is the logic, rationale, or 
normative justification for the consensus position? 
The position I put forward here, the so-called “absurd” position, is a world view 
very different from that taught in legal academia today.  I admit that this view is 
counter-intuitive; it cuts squarely against the ahistorical, but dominant, separation of 
powers theme77 (or cult78) at the core of our modern jurisprudence—at least as that 
                                                           
summarizes the history of an institution of government for any particular period of time.  It 
did so in 1789.”).  But cf. Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 547 (1917) (White, C.J.) 
(concluding that the “the implied power to deal with contempt [is] ancillary to the legislative 
power” and is not “judicial authority”); Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 
VA. L. REV. 327, 342 (2002) (“The terms ‘legislative,’ ‘executive,’ and ‘judicial’ meant 
something to Madison, even if he could not articulate precisely (or even vaguely) what they 
meant.” (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, supra)). 
 77 See supra notes 45 & 67; infra note 79; cf. Calabresi & Larsen, supra note 52, at 1061 
(concluding that prior to 1787, “the idea of providing for some measure of interdepartment[al] 
incompatibility had become something of an American constitutional tradition.  Interestingly, 
it was a tradition that existed independently of the contemporaneous devotion to the 
separation of powers.” (emphasis added)).  Compare AMAR, supra note 9, at 304 
(“[Convicting a President in impeachment proceedings] is not something that Senators should 
do lightly, lest we slide toward a kind of parliamentary government that our entire structure of 
government was designed to repudiate.” (emphasis added)), Akhil Reed Amar, An(other) 
Afterword on the Bill of Rights, 87 GEO. L.J. 2347, 2359 (1999) (“[Convicting a President in 
impeachment proceedings] is not something that senators should do lightly, lest we slide 
towards a kind of parliamentary government that our entire structure of government was 
designed to repudiate.” (emphasis added)), Amar & Amar, supra note 9, at 114 (asserting that 
“our Constitution[] [has] careful[ly] reject[ed] . . . a Parliamentary/Prime Minister Model of 
presidential selection” (emphasis added)), id. at 118 (“The Framers self-consciously rejected 
the governmental model embodied by eighteenth century Prime Minister Robert Walpole, 
who served simultaneously as the leading Member of Parliament and the Chief Executive 
Minister—simultaneously as Speaker and President in American constitutional parlance.” 
(emphasis added) (citing, absent any pin-point cite, Steven G. Calabresi & Joan L. Larsen, 
One Person, One Office: Separation of Powers or Separation of Personnel?, 79 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1045 (1994))), id. at 120 (using strangely anthropomorphic language in asserting that “to 
act simultaneously as President/Chief Executive Officer and Speaker of the House is to be 
precisely the kind of Walpolian Prime Minister our Constitution’s text, history, and structure 
self-consciously reject” (emphasis added) (citing, again, absent any pin-point cite, Calabresi & 
Larsen, supra)), id. at 124 (“[T]he Constitution[] fundamental[ly] reject[s] . . . a parliamentary 
system in which the legislature, or its dominant party, elects its own leader as Prime 
Minister/Chief Executive Officer.” (emphasis added)), id. at 127 (“In sum, whether we 
consider the deep implications of the Constitution’s separation of powers and its rejection of a 
Parliamentary/Prime Minister model or focus on the more mundane, practical issues of time 
and place, we reach the same conclusion . . . .” (emphasis added)), id. at 120 n.48 (“If [the 
Speaker] must remain in this office in order to act as President, as the [purported] Madisonian 
reading insists, then his service as [acting] President wholly depends on the will of a simple 
House majority, in obvious violation of the Constitution’s rejection of the Walpole Prime 
Minister Model.” (emphasis added)), Goldstein, supra note 42, at 1022 (asserting that 
legislative officer succession “resembles parliamentary government, which our Constitution 
emphatically rejected” (emphasis added)), Kesavan, supra note 49, at 1766 (“Indeed, if we 
look at the Constitution as a whole, we see that it is a clause-by-clause rejection of the 
parliamentary system.” (emphasis added) (citing, absent any pin-point cite, Calabresi & 
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Larsen, supra)), Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-
Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1238 (1995) (“The 
type of congressional power thereby created, in which the legislative branch directly 
supervised the execution of the law, was akin to the parliamentary form of government that 
the Framers repudiated.” (emphasis added)), and Vikram David Amar, The TV Drama 
“Commander in Chief” and the Constitution: Is the Federal Presidential Succession Statute 
Unconstitutional? (Part II), FINDLAW (Dec. 8, 2005), 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/amar/20051208.html (“When the Constitution’s framers 
reflected on the process of presidential selection, they consciously rejected a Parliamentarian 
model in which the Chief Executive (a Prime Minister) is chosen by the legislature and its 
dominant party.” (emphasis added)), with AMAR, supra note 9, at 153 (noting, in a sentence 
somewhat obscured by surrounding parentheses, that in 1787, “[t]he modern Westminster 
model, in which Parliament picks its own leader with minimal monarchical involvement, still 
lay in the future” (emphasis added)), MICHAEL STOKES PAULSEN ET AL., THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE UNITED STATES: TEXT, STRUCTURE, HISTORY, AND PRECEDENT 285 (2010) (“The 
Incompatibility Clause was adopted as an eighteenth century ethics rule to prevent the 
president from bribing members of Congress to support his policies by dangling federal 
offices in front of them the way British monarchs were thought to have bribed members of 
Parliament to build up a Court Party. . . .  This ethics rule produced the American system of 
separation of personnel, as well as separation of powers.  But, that was all an unintended 
consequence.” (emphasis added) (citing Calabresi & Larsen, supra)), Steven G. Calabresi, 
Political Parties as Mediating Institutions, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1479, 1496 (1994) (“Without 
realizing or intending to do so, the Framers wrote a Constitution that absolutely forecloses the 
possibility of parliamentary English-style party government in this country.” (emphasis 
added)); Calabresi & Larsen, supra at 1095 (explaining that “the debates on incompatibility 
do not reveal a self-conscious attempt on the part of the Framers to set in motion a radical 
departure from the British system of parliamentary government” (emphasis added)), and Jack 
N. Rakove, Statement on the Background and History of Impeachment, 67 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 682, 688 (1999) (“[I]n fact, a full-blown model of parliamentary government was not yet 
available for the Framers to reject.” (emphasis added)). 
So powerful is the separation of powers cult that otherwise sober scholars stray into 
hyperbole.  Compare, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Rebuttal, Does the Incompatibility Clause 
Apply to the President?, in Tillman & Calabresi, supra note 10, at 143-44 (“Likewise, colonial 
governors, although advised by executive councils, did not sit as members of colonial 
legislatures.  The office of governor was distinct and separate from, for example, the office of 
a member of the House of Burgesses.”), id. at 145 (asserting “that there is an eight-hundred-
year-long Anglo-American practice of Kings and Presidents never ever sitting simultaneously 
as members of Parliament or Congress” (emphasis in the original)), and Steven G. Calabresi, 
Closing Statement, A Term of Art or the Artful Reading of Terms?, in Tillman & Calabresi, 
supra note 10, at 154 (“[My interlocutor’s] position is that Presidents can serve 
simultaneously as members of Congress even though in eight hundred years of English and 
American history no King, Queen, colonial governor, or President has ever served 
simultaneously in the legislature.” (emphasis added)), with JOHN F. BURNS, CONTROVERSIES 
BETWEEN ROYAL GOVERNORS AND THEIR ASSEMBLIES IN THE NORTHERN AMERICAN COLONIES 
320 (1923) (“[Prior to 1733, Governor] Cosby [of New York] took part in the deliberations of 
the Council while acting in a legislative capacity.  Thus as a member [!] of the Council he had 
one vote, as executive he had final veto power, and in case of tie he cast the deciding ballot. 
Always two, and sometimes three, votes were at his command.” (emphasis added)), MARY 
PATTERSON CLARKE, PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES 232 (Leonard 
W. Levy ed., Da Capo Press 1971) (1943) (explaining that “in some colonies, the governor 
frequently sat with the council, and there was some difference of opinion as to whether he was 
or was not a member of it” (emphasis added)), LEONARD WOODS LABAREE, ROYAL 
GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA: A STUDY OF THE BRITISH COLONIAL SYSTEM BEFORE 1783, at 160 
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(N.Y., Frederick Ungar Pub. Co. 1958) (1930) (noting that royal governors “not only often 
attended the legislative council but presided there”), id. (noting that “less commonly” royal 
governors asserted the right to vote in the legislative council, “either as a regular member, or 
as the presiding officer in case of a tie”), id. at 164-65 (noting that the law officers of the 
Board of Trade opposed the claim of New York’s Governor Cosby to a vote in the legislative 
council, but their advice and recommendation was not put into force by the Privy Council), 
and WILLIAM SMITH, A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE SEVERAL STATES 
WITH EACH OTHER AND WITH THAT OF THE UNITED STATES tbl.1 & n.n (Philadelphia, John 
Thompson 1796) (“Connecticut. [Governed under the] Old Colonial Charter of Charles II 
[of 1662]. unaltered, except where necessary to adapt it to the Independence of the United 
States. . . .  Governor, as Presid[ent] of the council, and the Speaker of the House, have each a 
vote, besides a casting vote.” (emphasis omitted)).  As I hope Professor Calabresi will come to 
agree: there is no sound historical basis for Professor Calabresi’s “eight hundred year[]” 
claim: a claim he made absent any citation to any authority of any kind.  During the one-
hundred fifty year period prior to the American Revolution, royal and proprietary governors 
frequently sat in the upper house of bicameral colonial parliaments, even when the upper 
house acted in a legislative (as opposed to an executive) capacity.  This was a contested 
practice, but a practice it was.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander Hamilton), supra 
note 4, at 372 n.* (“[I]t is always justifiable to reason from the practice of government till its 
propriety has been constitutionally questioned.”).  But see PATRICIA U. BONOMI, A FACTIOUS 
PEOPLE: POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN COLONIAL NEW YORK 134 (1971) (explaining that in 1736, 
an order from the Board of Trade directed Governor Cosby “to absent himself when the 
Council was considering legislation”); BURNS, supra at 320 (apparently referring to the same 
order discussed by Bonomi, supra, and suggesting that it was issued in 1733). 
Moreover, in the absence of colonial governors, the senior member of the upper house 
frequently took on the role of acting governor, and similar practices prevailed in the States 
after independence.  See 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1903 (Joseph Gales, Sr. ed., Washington, Gales 
& Seaton 1834) (recording January 10, 1791 debate on a proposed bill on presidential 
succession, including statement by Congressman Sherman, who said: “In case of the death of 
a Governor and Lieutenant Governor, it is common in the several States for the oldest 
counselor to preside [Tillman adding—over the administration].”); EVARTS BOUTELL GREENE, 
THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR IN THE ENGLISH COLONIES OF NORTH AMERICA 56 & 233 n.26 
(Cambridge, Harvard University Press 1898) (reproducing Queen Anne’s 1707 instruction 
“providing that thereafter the senior councillor should execute the [royal governor’s] 
commission in the governor’s absence” and further noting that this policy was “universally 
enforced [by] the reign of George III” (emphasis added)); M. EUGENE SIRMANS, COLONIAL 
SOUTH CAROLINA: A POLITICAL HISTORY 1663-1763, at 76 (1966) (noting that in 1700, in 
South Carolina, then a proprietary colony, after Governor Blake’s death, “the council met . . . 
to select one of themselves as governor”); see also LABAREE, supra at 160-61 (noting that 
councillor Van Dam presided over the legislative council while he was acting governor); cf. 
FEERICK, FROM FAILING HANDS, supra note 9, at 38 (describing pre-1787 state constitutional 
practice in Delaware and North Carolina providing for legislative officer succession in regard 
to the governorship); id. at 37-38 (describing pre-1787 state constitutional practice in New 
York running the line of succession to legislative officers after the lieutenant governor); id. 
at 35 (noting that Benjamin Franklin’s Albany Plan of 1754 provided for legislative officer 
succession in the case of the death of the “President General”); John D. Feerick, Response to 
Akhil Reed Amar’s Address on Applications and Implications of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 
47 HOUS. L. REV. 41, 62 (2010) (describing New York, Delaware, and North Carolina 
practices, and noting that “[t]he succession arrangements in the thirteen original colonies, as 
well as provisions of the early state constitutions, indicate that legislative [officer] succession 
was sometimes contemplated to fill a vacancy in the office of the governor.” (emphasis 
added)). 
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doctrine is understood in the United States today.79  But that begs the question of 
whether our modern legal sensibilities (burdened by the weight of centuries of 
                                                           
For the reader interested in assessing the primary documents on the Cosby-Van Dam dispute, 
which was the genesis of the celebrated John Peter Zenger trial, see 6 DOCUMENTS RELATIVE 
TO THE COLONIAL HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 39-45 (E.B. O’Callaghan ed., Albany, 
Weed, Parsons and Co. 1855).  Issues connected to colonial-era legislative officer succession 
were at the heart of the Zenger trial.  Zenger was if not the most famous, at least, one of the 
most significant pre-1763 trials in the British New World colonies.  Thus it seems likely that 
lawyers and the educated lay public would have been aware of the common practice of 
legislative officer succession.  See also 2 HERBERT L. OSGOOD, THE AMERICAN COLONIES IN 
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 158 (Mass., Peter Smith 1958) (1924) (describing contested efforts 
by the senior member of the Massachusetts council, acting with the council, in 1715, to 
assume the government six months after the death of Queen Anne); id. at 441-42 (explaining 
that from July 1731 to August 1732, Lewis Morris, as “eldest councillor” administered the 
New Jersey government between the death of Governor Montgomerie and the arrival of his 
successor, Governor Cosby); id. at 443 (noting that Rip Van Dam, “as president of the council 
and its oldest member,” “head[ed]” New York’s government in 1731 after the death of 
Governor Montgomerie, prior to the arrival of Governor Cosby); id. at 161 (noting that from 
1706 to 1710, Edward Jennings, president of the council, administered the Virginia 
government in the absence of an appointed governor).  Jennings was Governor Edmund 
Jennings Randolph’s great-grandfather.  Thus it is more than likely that this particular Framer 
and Ratifier knew the relevant colonial history surrounding legislative officer succession, as it 
was his family’s history. 
One must ask: what is the historical basis for the modern consensus? 
 78 See generally Richard Albert, The Cult of Constitutionalism, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 373 
(2012). 
 79 See Gerhard Casper, An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions and 
Practices, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 224 (1989) (“No consensus existed as to the precise 
institutional arrangements that would satisfy the requirements of the doctrine [of separation of 
powers].”); Keith Werhan, Normalizing the Separation of Powers, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2681, 2684 
(1996) (“The constitutional text usually is indeterminate with respect to important separation-
of-powers disputes.  Notwithstanding (or perhaps, because of) the multiple meanings of the 
separation-of-powers extant during the founding era, the Framers made no attempt to adopt a 
fixed, constitutional definition of the concept.” (footnote omitted)); cf. Douglas W. Vick, The 
Human Rights Act and the British Constitution, 37 TEX. INT’L L.J. 329, 341 n.88 (2002) 
(noting that “there is no consensus among British legal scholars concerning the purpose served 
by the separation of powers”).  See generally William B. Gwyn, The Separation of Powers 
and Modern Forms of Democratic Government, in SEPARATION OF POWERS—DOES IT STILL 
WORK? 65, 76 (Robert A. Goldwin & Art Kaufman eds., 1986) (concluding “[t]here is . . . 
some separation of legislative and executive power in the parliamentary type of representative 
government”); id. at 78 (concluding that the view that “[t]he separation of powers is not part 
of [the British] constitution” is an “erroneous opinion”); ADAM TOMKINS, PUBLIC LAW 47-54 
(2003) (describing separation of powers in the British Constitution as grounded in the 
supremacy of [a]cts of Parliament, independence of the Crown subject to ministerial 
responsibility, and courts subject to certain parliamentary controls); M.J.C. VILE, 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 321-24 (1967); Richard Albert, 
Presidential Values in Parliamentary Democracies, 8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 207, 220 (2010) 
(concluding “that the separation of powers exists [in the United Kingdom] between Parliament 
and the Crown and not among government branches, as is otherwise the case in the American 
presidential model” (emphasis added) (citing Tomkins, supra, approvingly)); Richard Albert, 
The Fusion of Presidentialism and Parliamentarism, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 531, 534 (2009) 
(arguing that “[t]he separation of powers between Crown and Parliament emerged as part of 
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Supreme Court and other federal court jurisprudence) are consistent with the world-
views of the Framers and Ratifiers of 1787–1789.  It is a conceit to believe that we 
think (today) as they did (then) on all points.  
IV.  THE DANGER OF CHAFETZ’S WRONG METAPHOR 
The difference between Professor Chafetz’s view and my own is no mere object 
of historical curiosity.  It has substantial practical implications with regard to 
concrete problems that confront our legal system.  For example, Professor Chafetz 
states: 
A proper appreciation for the virtues of American impeachment procedure 
might also lead us to be suspicious of other legal rules that have the effect 
of incentivizing assassination.  The current presidential succession 
regime, in which the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore 
of the Senate are third and fourth in line to the presidency, 3 U.S.C. § 19 
(2006), does create such perverse incentives when the Speaker or 
President pro tempore is from a different party than the President.  
Cabinet officer succession, which would ensure party continuity, would 
thus both eliminate constitutional problems with the succession 
regime . . . .80 
Professor Chafetz’s position—although unfortunately widely shared—is plainly 
incorrect.  Strict cabinet succession fails to preserve party continuity in the event that 
                                                           
the Revolution Settlement, statutorily enshrined in the Act of Settlement of 1700 . . . .” 
(footnote omitted)); William B. Gwyn, The Indeterminacy of the Separation of Powers in the 
Age of the Framers, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 263, 265 (1989) (“As in the days of the 
framers . . . lawyers and judges today continue to invoke the doctrine without indicating . . . 
the range of institutional arrangements that might satisfy the doctrine.”); William B. Gwyn, 
The Indeterminacy of the Separation of Powers and the Federal Courts, 57 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 474 (1989); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Shot (Not) Heard ‘Round The World: 
Reconsidering the Perplexing U.S. Preoccupation with the Separation of Legislative and 
Executive Powers, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1, 22 (2010) (“The question that demands to be asked and 
answered, obviously enough, is: why do other nations find the conflation of legislative and 
executive policy making power [as in British-type cabinet government] to be entirely 
unproblematic?”). 
 80 Chafetz, supra note 1, at 421 n.567 (emphasis added) (citing Amar & Amar, supra 
note 9, at 123, 126, 135 n.134); see also Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Is the Vice Presidency 
Necessary?, THE ATLANTIC, May 1974 (“[The Presidential Succession Act of 1886] . . . put 
the line of descent through the Cabinet, thereby . . . preventing the mechanics of succession 
from transferring the presidency from one party to the other without an election.”).  It is 
cabinet officer succession, as proposed by the Amars and Chafetz, which “incentivizes” 
wiping out the entire statutory line of succession.  See 3 U.S.C. § 19(d) (2006).  Cabinet 
officer succession might be some protection against the occasional assassin, but it risks 
turning a catastrophic attack on the United States into a calamity from which recovery by 
regular, legal, constitutional, and timely means may be an impossibility.  In other words, 
cabinet succession provides for party continuity (in some circumstances) at the risk of 
introducing short term chaos and long term political disunion.  It bears noting that our current 
legal framework providing for legislative officer succession was the brainchild of President 
Truman, the only President to order a nuclear attack on an enemy nation.  Is the risk we face 
today not John Wilkes Booth, but a dirty nuclear bomb the size of a suitcase?  Incentivizing? 
Are not Chafetz and the Amars fighting the last war? 
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the incoming President and Vice President are killed (or otherwise unable to qualify 
for any reason) any time between the date of the general popular election until the 
new President’s first cabinet officer is confirmed.  That is more than several months. 
In such a situation, the acting presidency will fall to the first cabinet officer in the 
line of succession from the outgoing administration.81  Such an officer may be part 
of an administration that has been thoroughly rejected at the polls (in primaries or in 
the general election) and/or of a party different from the President-elect.  
                                                           
 81 See, e.g., Act of Jan. 19, 1886, ch. 4, § 1, 24 Stat. 1 (repealed by Presidential Succession 
Act, 3 U.S.C. § 19 (1947)).  There is no complexity here.  In a regime of strict cabinet 
succession, if the new administration has not yet installed any officers in the line of 
succession, then in the event of a double vacancy, the acting presidency falls to lame duck 
officers from the out-going administration (if we are lucky) or to no one at all. Cf. John C. 
Fortier & Norman J. Ornstein, Presidential Succession and Congressional Leaders, 53 CATH. 
U. L. REV. 993, 1006 (2004) (“Finally, one should consider the case of a terrorist attack that 
kills the President-elect and Vice President-elect shortly before they take office.  In all of 
these cases, Cabinet succession is impossible, because the new Cabinet (that of the President-
elect) is officially nominated and confirmed only after the new President takes office.” 
(emphasis added)); Joel K. Goldstein, Akhil Reed Amar and Presidential Continuity, 47 HOUS. 
L. REV. 67, 90 (2010) (“If there is no President-elect or Vice President-elect, there is no 
incoming Cabinet.  The only Cabinet is the outgoing one, which may be associated with an 
administration just rejected at the polls.  It would make no sense to designate an outgoing 
Cabinet officer as acting President.”); Goldstein, supra note 42, at 1024 (same).  But cf. Akhil 
Reed Amar, Presidents, Vice Presidents, and Death: Closing the Constitution’s Succession 
Gap, 48 ARK. L. REV. 215, 225 (1994) (noting that if after the inauguration, both the President 
and Vice President “die together, then congressional legislation—the Presidential Succession 
Act—kicks in and provides the rules of succession, pursuant to the explicit invitation of 
Article II”); id. at 226 (same, but discussing the period between Congress’s counting the 
electoral votes and the inauguration); id. at 228 (same, but discussing the period between the 
meeting of the electors and prior to Congress’s counting the electoral votes, and, further, 
making the analysis subject to proposed statutory reforms); id. at 233 (same, but discussing 
the period after the popular election but prior to the electors’ meeting).  Professor Amar is 
correct, but only under a regime permitting legislative officer succession (as does the current 
succession statute) or something akin to it.  Professor Amar fails to clearly flag to the reader 
the inherent structural defects associated with Cabinet succession—a reform which he has 
supported throughout his many publications.  See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Applications and 
Implications of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 23 (2010) (“This rule of 
Cabinet succession (which was in place for sixty years before Congress changed the law in 
1947) helps maximize the policy continuity between the President that Americans voted for on 
Election Day and the statutory successor who ends up taking his place.” (emphasis added)); 
id. at 29 (“If Americans elect a President of one party, why should we get stuck with a 
President of the opposite party [under our current system of legislative officer succession]—
perhaps (as in the fictional The West Wing) a sworn foe of the person we chose? Cabinet 
succession would avoid this oddity.” (emphasis added)).  But see Presidential Succession Act: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th 
Cong. 52 (2004) (statement of Akhil Amar: “And I do think in very, very highly unusual 
situations where you really try to have Cabinet succession, officer succession, and everyone’s 
gone, I think only a real constitutional zealot, maybe without good judgment, would say you 
can’t have congressional leaders in that circumstance because the Constitution really isn’t a 
suicide pact, and so I think I appreciate sort of the prudence involved there.”).  Has Professor 
Amar said anything like this in any of his journal articles or books, including even those 
published after his 2004 testimony? 
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But wait, it gets worse.  Much worse.  If the President and Vice President are 
killed any time between inauguration day and prior to the confirmation of the new 
administration’s first cabinet officer, then there are no officers in the line of 
succession because the officers in the line of succession from the prior 
administration will either have resigned or have been removed (by the outgoing 
President) prior to inauguration day.82  In these circumstances, the continuity of the 
Executive Branch of the government of the United States would be at an end.  Strict 
cabinet succession risks the end of legitimate constitutional government.83 
The chief purpose of legislative officer succession is to enlist the surviving 
institutions of government—the House and the Senate—in recreating those 
                                                           
 82 See L. ELAINE HALCHIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34722, PRESIDENTIAL 
TRANSITIONS: ISSUES INVOLVING OUTGOING AND INCOMING ADMINISTRATIONS 27 (2008) (“By 
tradition, appointees to these positions usually step down when the appointing President 
leaves office, unless asked to stay by the President-elect.”); cf. JOHN P. BURKE, PRESIDENTIAL 
TRANSITIONS: FROM POLITICS TO PRACTICE 395 (2000) (“[E]very new President encounters a 
‘corporate headquarters’ in which the top positions are vacant and most offices empty.”).  See 
generally Anne Joseph O’Connell, Vacant Offices: Delays in Staffing Top Agency Positions, 
82 S. CAL. L. REV. 913 (2009).  As a matter of law, cabinet members of a prior administration 
do not retain their offices until their successors take office.  Each officer’s hold on his office is 
at the discretion of the out-going President (if there is one) until the new administration 
begins, and, thereafter, at the discretion of the new President (if there is one).  See HALCHIN, 
supra at 27.  The modern tradition is that such officers resign prior to the start of a new 
administration.  A President might leave an officer in office when requested by the incoming 
administration, particularly where the two Presidents (i.e., the incumbent and the President-
elect) are of the same party.  If an officer refuses to resign, a President may threaten to remove 
the officer in order to elicit the expected response.  The continuity problem is not solved by 
leaving a few holdover cabinet members in office during the transition.  Should the holdovers 
die (or be impeached, or otherwise become disabled), there is no way to appoint other officers 
into the line of succession absent a President or acting President.  The problem inheres in 
cabinet succession itself: would-be successors must be appointed by a President, who ex 
hypothesi no longer exists. 
 83 See supra note 81 (collecting authority); 2 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 77, at 1914 
(recording January 13, 1791 debate on a proposed bill on presidential succession, including 
statement by Congressman Giles, who stated: “[I]t was the duty of the House to make 
provision for the accident [of a double vacancy] before it occurred.  If it was left till the case 
actually took place, it would then be too late to think of remedying the evil; for it was to be 
provided by a Legislative act . . . and could therefore not be obtained when the chair was 
vacant.  Then, if the event should happen before it was provided for, there would be, he 
conceived, an end to this Government.” (emphasis added)); Silva, supra note 9, at 452 (“If 
calamity had befallen [President] Arthur [after the death of President Garfield, who Arthur 
succeeded] or [President] Cleveland [after the death of Vice President Hendricks] before the 
organization of Congress, there would have been no successor and no constitutional means of 
selecting one [at least until the House and/or Senate assembled, organized, and chose a 
presiding officer].”); cf. WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA 48 (Philadelphia, H.C. Carey & I. Lea 1825) (“[O]ne difficulty not 
provided for, may possibly some day occur.  If more than three [candidates] of those highest 
in [electoral] votes for president, or [more] than two of those voted for as vice president 
should be equal in number of [electoral] votes, it is not directed [by Article II or the Twelfth 
Amendment] how the selection [of President and/or Vice President] shall be made.”). 
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institutions which have failed (e.g., the presidency).84  And even if the House and 
Senate chambers were destroyed and all the members killed in a natural catastrophe 
or act of war, the membership could be replaced in relatively short order under well-
established procedures.85  This is not so for the cabinet line of succession: once it and 
the President and Vice President are gone, it is beyond our ability to effect timely 
and legally valid repair (at least until the next regularly scheduled presidential 
election).86 
Burke, as usual, put it best:  
The two principles of conservation and correction operated strongly at the 
two critical periods of the Restoration and Revolution, when England 
found itself without a king.  At both those periods the nation had lost the 
bond of union in their ancient edifice; they did not, however, dissolve the 
                                                           
 84 The problems associated with strict cabinet succession cannot be reliably ameliorated 
by ad hoc presidential elections, which, assuming that they are carried off without a hitch, 
might fill out the remainder of the presidential term.  During the interregnum, the nation is 
still left rudderless. 
Nor can the problems associated with strict cabinet succession be resolved through the 
intermediary of ad hoc presidential designees added to the line of succession.  First, the 
President can only make those appointments after he takes office, not before.  Second, even if 
the President-elect were granted such a power (via constitutional amendment or statute), this 
leaves a gap between final action by the electors (or by the House should the election fall to 
the House) and action by the President-elect (or President should the decision fall to the House 
and the House delays making a decision until past January 20—when the new administration 
should have come into office).  To put it another way, any system of succession based on 
fixed lists (e.g., cabinet succession) can fail—assuming a big enough war or series of 
accidents or both.  If everyone on the list of successors is dead (or fails to qualify), legitimate 
constitutional government in the Executive Branch is at an end.  Likewise presentment of bills 
must entirely cease.  The benefit of legislative officer succession is that at some point the 
House or Senate can reconstitute itself (if needs be) and one of those bodies can anoint a 
successor acting-President.  The choice of the (reconstituted) House or Senate may not be of 
the same party as the President-elect, but our legal institutions will go on in a recognizably 
constitutionally valid way. 
 85 See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Comment, Assuring Continuity of Government, 4 PIERCE L. 
REV. 201, 201-02 (2006), 4 U.N.H. L. REV. 201, 201-02 (2006) (explaining that, under the 
Seventeenth Amendment, Senate vacancies, from “catastrophic disaster” or otherwise, can be 
filled by state governors, and concluding that “the Senate could be back up to its full 
strength . . . within a very few days”).  A state governor may only fill Senate vacancies if 
authorized to do so by his state legislature.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, § 2.  
Unfortunately, several state legislatures have not granted their governor statutory authority to 
fill Senate vacancies.  See Zachary D. Clopton & Steven E. Art, The Meaning of the 
Seventeenth Amendment and a Century of State Defiance, 107 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 
July 2013) (manuscript at 55 n.173) (on file with author), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=1915673 (“Oregon, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin have 
clear laws prohibiting appointments, and Alaska . . . appears to have repealed its law 
governing appointments, though the issue is not yet resolved.”).  In the House, the prevailing 
view is that vacancies may only be filled via election.  See Levinson, supra at 203 & n.13 
(citing Article I, Section 2, Clause 4, i.e., the Writs of Election Clause).  However, such House 
elections could be held on an expedited basis; they need not wait for the regularly scheduled 
biennial election. 
 86 See supra note 84. 
56https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol61/iss2/4
2013] INTERPRETING PRECISE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT 341 
 
whole fabric.  On the contrary, in both cases they regenerated the 
deficient part of the old constitution through the parts which were not 
impaired.  They kept these old parts exactly as they were, that the part 
recovered might be suited to them.  They acted by the ancient organized 
[assemblies] in the shape of their old organization . . . .87 
Thus, interpreting the word Officer (standing alone) as used in the Succession 
Clause88 (as opposed to Officers . . . under the United States as used elsewhere in the 
Constitution) to include the Speaker and President pro tem facilitates orderly 
succession, with some (albeit less than perfect) democratic credentials. 
V.  A TURN OF THE TIDE 
As a textual matter, each of these five formulations seemingly describes 
the same stations (apart from the civil/military distinction)—the 
modifying terms ‘of,’ ‘under,’ and ‘under the Authority of’ are essentially 
synonymous. 
—Akhil R. Amar and Vikram D. Amar, Presidential Succession (1995)89 
[Professor Dionisopoulos’] reading, however, is sloppy . . .  [As] the 
disqualification of any person “holding any Office under the United 
States” makes clear, the Constitution uses the phrase “Office . . . under 
the United States”—and its textual cousins, “Officers of the United 
States,” “civil Officers of the United States,” and “Office of Trust or 
Profit under the United States,”—as a term of art to refer to executive and 
judicial positions only. 
—Josh Chafetz, Democracy’s Privileged Few (2007)90 
                                                           
 87 BURKE, supra note 69, at 29-30 (emphasis added). 
 88 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 (“In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or 
of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, 
the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the 
Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, 
declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until 
the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.” (emphasis added)). 
 89 See Amar & Amar, supra note 9, at 114-15; see also PRESERVING OUR INSTITUTIONS: 
THE CONTINUITY OF THE PRESIDENCY 39 (Second Report of the Continuity of Government 
Comm’n June 2009) (“The Constitution allows Congress to specify which ‘Officers’ shall be 
in the line of succession, a term that almost certainly refers to executive branch officials.” 
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted)).  But see Schatz, supra note 13, at 157-58 (“The obvious 
distinction between ‘Office’ and ‘Office of Profit or Trust’ implies strongly that the framers 
did not intend to bring all U.S. Government employment within the [Emolument] [C]lause’s 
coverage.” (emphasis added)). 
 90 CHAFETZ, supra note 13, at 280 n.68 (second set of ellipses in the original) (emphasis 
added) (emphasis in the original omitted) (citations omitted) (citing Dionisopoulos, supra 
note 23, at 108 n.16, 111); see also id. at 171 (rejecting Dionisopoulos’ position as 
“unpersuasive”).  Compare Amar & Amar, supra note 9, at 134 (“Several members of 
Congress argued against the constitutionality of the 1947 [succession] law during the 
legislative debates, but the bill’s supporters relied on an opinion by Acting Attorney General 
Douglas McGregor, who concluded that congressmen were ‘Officers’ within the meaning of 
the Succession Clause.  McGregor’s reasoning is—not to mince words—shoddy.” (emphasis 
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added) (footnote omitted)), and id. at 134 n.131 (“Correct interpretation [of the Constitution] 
requires careful examination of the Constitution itself, and this McGregor failed to offer.”), 
with id. at 114-15 (affirming that officers of the United States and officers under the United 
States and officers under the Authority of the United States are “essentially synonymous”).  
For some reason, issues touching on succession and impeachment seem to elicit unusually 
strong language.  See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 9, at 568 n.53 (“Berger’s argument [with regard 
to the impeachability of Senators] made a hash of constitutional text, structure, and 
precedent.” (emphasis added)); id. at 545 n.45 (denominating Berger’s view as only 
“somewhat cranky” (emphasis added)); Vikram Amar, supra note 42, at 406 n.7 (“[L]et me set 
the record straight on a non-truth [!] Ms. Coulter asserts about the impeachability of 
Congresspersons.  Notwithstanding her suggestions . . . House members and Senators are not 
‘officers’ within the meaning of the impeachment clauses of the Constitution and are thus not 
impeachable.” (citing, somewhat unhelpfully, Amar & Amar, supra note 9, at 115-16)); 
Steven G. Calabresi, Rebuttal, Does the Incompatibility Clause Apply to the President?, in 
Tillman & Calabresi, supra note 10, at 141 (affirming that a position with which he disagrees 
is “utterly implausible” (emphasis added)); Robert H. Bork, Read the Constitution: It’s 
Removal or Nothing, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 1999, at 21A (describing views on impeachment 
with which he disagrees as “grotesque” and “preposterous,” and further describing Professor 
Isenbergh’s position as “fanciful”). Like Chafetz, I too look to English literature for 
understanding. Cf. 7 J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE DEATHLY HALLOWS 497 (2007) 
(“Whether it needs to pass by murder, I do not know. Its history is bloody, but that may be 
simply due to the fact that it is such a desirable object, and arouses such passions . . . .” 
(emphasis added) (emphasis in the original omitted)); 2 J.R.R. TOLKIEN, THE LORD OF THE 
RINGS: THE TWO TOWERS 669 (50th ann. ed. 2004) (1954) (“[I]t is a mighty heirloom of some 
sort, and such things do not breed peace among confederates, not if aught may be learned 
from ancient tales.”). 
For example, recently, Professor Saikrishna Prakash objected to my asserting that historically 
Presidents and Vice Presidents are not issued commissions under the Commissions Clause. 
Prakash wrote: “That no physical evidence [Tillman adding—as opposed to?] of such a 
commission [granted to a President or Vice President] exists, however, certainly does not 
prove that the President never issued one.”  Prakash, supra note 45, at 148 (emphasis added). 
Does not the burden of proof lie with Professor Prakash to show that such artifacts exist, as 
opposed to my showing that they do not?  Cf. Gary Lawson, Optimal Specificity in the Law of 
Separation of Powers: The Numerous Clauses Principle, 124 HARV. L. REV. F. 42, 47 (2011) 
(“It is a basic principle of epistemology that he who asserts the existence of something bears 
the burden of proof.” (emphasis added)); id. at 47 n.20 (“There is good warrant for this 
principle.  The existence of any entity has consequences, and one can look for those 
consequences as evidence of the entity’s existence.  Nonexistence, however, does not always 
have consequences, so the absence of evidence is prima facie proof of nonexistence.”).  Is 
Professor Prakash’s attempt to shift the burden of proof reasonable? 
Hermione Granger: “Well, how can that be real”? 
Xenophilius Lovegood: “Prove that it is not . . . .” 
Granger: [She] looked outraged. “But that’s—I’m sorry, but that’s completely 
ridiculous! How can I possibly prove it doesn’t exist? . . .  I mean, you could claim 
that anything’s real if the only basis for believing in it is that nobody’s proved it 
doesn’t exist!” 
Lovegood: “Yes, you could . . . .  I am glad to see that you are opening your mind a 
little.” 
7 ROWLING, supra at 411-12 (emphasis in the original).  But see supra note 52 (collecting 
authority tending to establish, but not proving, that such commissions do not and have never 
existed).  Albeit, historically, strong language is no stranger to law journals.  See, e.g., Edward 
W. Bailey, Dean Pound and Administrative Law—Another View, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 781, 802 
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In England, ‘office of profit from the Crown’ was understood to be 
narrower than ‘office of profit under the Crown’ . . . . 
—John Waugh, Disqualification of Members (2005)91 
Essentially, the distinction between Chafetz’s (and the Amars’) views and my 
own position comes down to this.  Those in the academic consensus believe the 
Constitution embodies a hard “textual” distinction between “officers” and members 
of Congress.  I agree with that position.  But with this caveat. The distinction put 
forward by those in the consensus is merely an exemplar of the higher order 
structural division embodied in the constitutional text between: on the one hand, 
constitutionally mandated officials (i.e., elected positions, members of Congress, 
Speaker of the House, Senate President pro tem, Vice President, and President—i.e., 
those individually or collectively presiding over departments or branches of the 
government of the United States, persons also colloquially known as magistrates or 
                                                           
(1942) (“The extent of [Professor Kenneth Culp Davis’s] accomplishment in that 
enterprise . . . is to demonstrate his own agility in avoiding contact with unpleasant facts.” 
(emphasis added)); Raoul Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness—A Reply to Professor Davis, 
114 U. PA. L. REV. 783, 808 (1996) (“Professor Davis assumes that bare restatement of his 
position suffices to still criticism, and he stubbornly avoids the uncomfortable issues.  But 
assertion ex cathedra cannot take the place of reasoned refutation, even when it comes from 
Professor Davis.” (footnote omitted) (citing Bailey, supra)). 
 91 John Waugh, Disqualification of Members of Parliament in Victoria, 31 MONASH U. L. 
REV. 288, 297 (2005) (“In England, ‘office of profit from the Crown’ was understood to be 
narrower than ‘office of profit under the Crown’; appointment to an office from the Crown 
was made personally by the monarch [Tillman adding—or by the monarch’s constitutional 
representative acting under delegated authority, the latter method having particular salience 
in the colonies].” (emphasis in the original)); see also CASES OF CONTROVERTED ELECTIONS, 
DETERMINED IN COMMITTEES OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, supra note 65, at 591-92 
(reproducing committee debate from disputed Galway election of 1838, where Mr. Austin 
(counsel for the sitting member who prevailed) distinguished offices “from the Crown” from 
offices “under the Crown” and cited statutes from the reign of Queen Anne, William IV, and 
George III (emphasis added)); cf. Orders of the Day: Report from Select Committee on the 
Clare County Writ considered (House of Commons Debate Apr. 25, 1879), available at 
http://yourdemocracy.newstatesman.com/parliament/orders-of-the-day/HAN814899. 
Compare ANNE TWOMEY, THE CONSTITUTION OF NEW SOUTH WALES 437 (2004) (suggesting 
that officers under the Crown encompasses, inter alia, positions subject to some “degree of 
supervisory power by the Crown over the office”), id. at 438 (suggesting that an officer under 
the Crown is one “appointed by” or “removable by” a “representative of the Crown,” and 
“accountable to the Crown and subject to the supervision of an officer appointed by the 
Crown”), id. (“[O]ne would assume that [an elective office] is not . . . held ‘under the 
Crown’.”), and THE FEDERALIST NO. 72 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 4, at 386 (arguing 
that “[t]he persons, therefore, to whose immediate management these different 
[administrative] matters are committed . . . ought to be subject to [the President’s] 
superintendence”), with THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 4, at 379 
(“[E]very magistrate [Tillman adding—as opposed to officer] ought to be personally 
responsible for his behaviour in office . . . .” (emphasis added)), and THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 
(Alexander Hamilton), supra note 4, at 376 (“If it be a public trust or office in which they are 
clothed with equal dignity and authority, there is peculiar danger of personal emulation and 
even animosity.” (emphasis added)). 
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holders of a public trust92), and, on the other hand, appointed or statutory offices 
(i.e., offices created or regularized by Congress, or offices which Congress could 
terminate,93 including both officers of the United States and legislative officers 
chosen by either house of Congress, such as the Secretary of the Senate and the 
Clerk of the House, collectively the Officers . . . under the United States).94  I would 
                                                           
 92 See BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 540 (2d ed. 2001) 
(defining “magistrate” and noting “the word . . . once referred to the official first in rank in a 
branch of government” (citing Justice Cardozo) (emphasis added)); supra note 48 (discussing 
magistrates and departments) and infra note 94 (discussing magistrates and holders of public 
trusts) and accompanying text; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), supra 
note 4, at 379 (“[E]very magistrate ought to be personally responsible for his behaviour in 
office . . . .” (emphasis added)); AMAR, supra note 9, at 558 n.10 (“Note the use of the juristic 
word ‘Magistracy’ to describe the executive, a common mode of expression and thought in 
1787.”); id. at 572 n.21 (noting that the “eighteenth-century world [was] sensitive to fine 
gradations of formal title”); cf., e.g., TENCH COXE (nom de plume AN AMERICAN CITIZEN), AN 
EXAMINATION OF THE CONSTITUTION FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NO. 2 (1788), 
reprinted in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, PUBLISHED DURING ITS 
DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE, 1787-1788, at 140, 146 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., Brooklyn, no 
publisher 1888) (“The office of the President, a Senator, and a Representative, and every other 
place of power or profit, are therefore open to the whole body of the people.”).  Notice how 
Coxe gives priority to the elected officials. 
 93 The intuition here is that although a first-in-time federal statute may terminate a non-
member legislative office, a next-in-time single-house order, rule, resolution, or vote can 
recreate the office and appoint a person to that office.  Notwithstanding the subsequent 
appointment, the statute still may implement the rule of recognition by which third-parties 
(e.g., the other House, the other branches, state governments, and private persons) will 
recognize such a legislative office and the scope of the appointee’s powers.  Thus, if a federal 
statute has the potential to reduce a non-member legislative office to a nullity vis-à-vis the 
world beyond that officer’s house, its members, employees, and property, then the office is an 
office under the United States.  Compare Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 225-32 (1821) 
(recognizing, based on practical and historical considerations, despite the lack of any express 
constitutional grant of authority, that the House of Representatives possesses an inherent 
power (while the House remains in session) to imprison a third-party or citizen for contempt), 
with THOMAS JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE FOR THE USE OF THE 
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES § 3.5—Privilege, at 8 (Government Printing Office 1993) 
(Washington City, Samuel Harrison Smith 1801) (suggesting that a federal statute could 
regularize each house of Congress’s purported inherent contempt power).  On the other hand, 
if the Constitution vests powers in an office, and those powers are not defeasible by federal 
statute, then the office is a public trust under the United States.  Looked at this way, one could 
argue that both federal electors and the Chief Justice of the United States hold public trusts 
under the United States. 
 94 If as Chafetz and the Amars argue officers of the United States is coextensive with 
officers . . . under the United States, then the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the 
House (and other non-member non-presiding congressional officers chosen by either house of 
Congress) are eligible to be chosen presidential electors.  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 
(Elector Incompatibility Clause: “[N]o Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office 
of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.” (emphasis added)). 
This would render the selection of the president both dependent on Congress, and on officers 
who lack independence.  See AMAR, supra note 9, at 143 (“If . . . a president were allowed to 
stand for reelection, he needed to be allowed to make his case to a body of electors 
independent of Congress.” (emphasis added)); Kesavan, supra note 48, at 130 (“The purpose 
of the Elector Incompatibility Clause is to ensure the independence of Electors from the 
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Federal Government.” (emphasis added)).  Compare JAMES BAYARD, A BRIEF EXPOSITION OF 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 92 (Philadelphia, Hogan & Thompson 1833) 
(noting that the purpose of the Elector Incompatibility Clause is “[t]o prevent any improper 
influence from being exerted, by the [President] in office”), with 1 JAMES KENT, 
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 276 (N.Y., O. Halsted 2d ed. 1832) (noting that the 
purpose of the Elector Incompatibility Clause is “to prevent the [President] in office, at the 
time of the election, from having any improper influence on his re-election, by his ordinary 
agency in the government” (emphasis added)).  The focus of the exclusion relates to the 
President’s ability to sway (other) electors through his control over other their positions in the 
government.  Once those dependent or affiliated with the President are excluded (i.e., officers 
of the United States), also excluding the President serves no purpose traditionally associated 
with the clause.  See also JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 745, at 532 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, and Co. abridged ed. 1833) (noting that 
the purpose of the Elector Incompatibility Clause is to exclude those who “might be suspected 
of too great a devotion to the president”—again the exclusion would not seem to incorporate 
the President).  An interpretation of the Constitution—such as Chafetz’s and the Amars’—
permitting presidential election to be dependent on congressional officers strikes me as 
particularly troubling.  See Vikram Amar, supra note 77 (“[T]he framers wanted the President 
ordinarily to have a power base independent of Congress, so he could stand up to the 
legislature; that is why Congresspersons cannot serve as presidential electors in the so-called 
‘electoral college.’” (emphasis added)); see also NOTES OF ROBERT YATES, reprinted in 1 
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 64, at 380 (recording George Mason’s June 22, 1787 
contribution to debate on the then-evolving predecessor to Article 1, Section 6, Clause 2: “It 
seems as if it was taken for granted, that all offices will be filled by the executive, while I 
think many will remain in the gift of the legislature.  In either case, it is necessary to shut the 
door against corruption.” (emphasis added)); cf. JOHN A. SCHUTZ, LEGISLATORS OF THE 
MASSACHUSETTS GENERAL COURT, 1691-1780: A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 65 (1997) 
(“Roland Cotton was a clerk for many years—sometimes as a member . . . . From 1766, 
Samuel Adams was both a member and clerk of the House . . . .”); WILLIAM TUDOR, LIFE OF 
JAMES OTIS 271 (1823) (“[Otis] grew conspicuous after his admission to the [Massachusetts 
lower house], of which he was chosen clerk; it being the practice to take that officer from 
among the members.”). 
Whether or not the Chief Justice of the United States should be characterized as a holder of a 
public trust under the United States or as an officer under the United States is a peculiar and 
complex question, full development of which will have to wait a wholly separate article.  My 
tentative view is that the office of Chief Justice of the United States, the constitutional office, 
sits atop or presides over the Judicial Branch, and, is, therefore, a holder of a public trust 
under the United States.  See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl. 6 (“The Senate shall have the sole 
Power to try all Impeachments.  When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or 
Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice [Tillman 
adding—not Chief Judge] shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the 
Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present.” (emphasis added)).  By contrast, the 
office of Chief Judge of the Supreme Court of the United States is a statutory office, and, is, 
hence, an officer under the United States and an officer of the United States.  See U.S. CONST. 
art. 2, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of 
the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges [Tillman 
adding—not Justices] of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose 
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by 
Law . . . .” (emphasis added)); Todd E. Pettys, Choosing a Chief Justice: Presidential 
Prerogative or a Job for the Court, 22 J.L. & POL. 231, 233 (2006) (noting that “[t]he 
Constitution says nothing about how the Chief Justice is to be chosen”—which might imply 
that the Chief Justice is not an “officer of the United States”); Edward T. Swaine, Hail, No: 
Changing the Chief, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1709 passim (2006) (same).  The confusion between 
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further argue that it is precisely because Officers . . . under the United States 
language does not reach the President and Vice President and members of Congress 
that it was necessary to add language within the Religious Test Clause speaking to 
public Trust[s] under the United States—the latter public trust language 
accommodated the presidency, vice presidency, and members of Congress (and, 
perhaps, federal electors).95 
                                                           
Chief Justice (of the United States) and Chief Judge (of the Supreme Court of the United 
States) arises, in part, because the same person has always held both offices. See also Mary E. 
Crock, Note, Abebe v. Commonwealth Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v. 
Eshetu, 24 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 190, 195 (2000) (“The phrase ‘officer of the 
Commonwealth’ has been read broadly to include everyone from Ministers of the Crown (and 
their delegates) to judges of lower federal courts.”); cf. Luke Beck, The Constitutional 
Prohibition on Religious Tests, 35 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 323, 347 & n.172 (2011) (peer 
reviewed) (explaining, with respect to a provision of the Australian Constitution granting 
judicial review jurisdiction to the High Court with respect to decisions made by “officers of 
the Commonwealth,” that “High Court judges are not officers of the Commonwealth” and 
therefore the jurisdiction does not extend to decisions made by members of the High Court in 
their individual or collective capacity (citing Federated Engine Drivers’ & Firemen’s Ass’n of 
Australasia v Colonial Sugar Ref. Co. (1916) 22 CLR 103, 109 (Austl.) (Griffith, C.J.); id. 
at 117 (Isaacs, Gavan Duffy, and Rich, JJ.))).  It is worth noting that Beck also affirms that “it 
could hardly be doubted that . . . [each member of the High Court] hold[s] an office under the 
Commonwealth.”  Beck, supra at 24.  See generally Luke Beck, Note, Williams v 
Commonwealth, School Chaplains and the Religious Tests Clause of the Constitution, 38 
MONASH U. L. REV. 271, 290 & n.130 (2012); Plaintiff’s Submissions in Reply to the 
Submissions of the Interveners, Williams v Commonwealth, No. S307 of 2010 (Austl. July 
28, 2011), available http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/cases/s307-2010/Williams_Plf_Repy-
int.pdf (collecting sources discussing officers of and under the Commonwealth). 
 95 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (“[N]o religious Test shall ever be required as a 
Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.” (emphasis added)); THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 4, at 376 (“If it be a public trust or 
office in which they are clothed with equal dignity and authority, there is peculiar danger of 
personal emulation and even animosity.” (emphasis added)); see also Letter from George 
Washington to Eléonor François Élie, Comte de Moustier (May 25, 1789), in 30 THE 
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 333, 334 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939) (“The 
impossibility that one man should be able to perform all the great business of State, I take to 
have been the reason for instituting the great Departments, and appointing officers therein, to 
assist the supreme Magistrate in discharging the duties of his trust.” (emphasis added)).  The 
Washington–Élie letter is widely cited in legal materials.  See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. 
Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3146 (2010) (Roberts, C.J.) (quoting from the 
same passage of the Washington-to-Élie letter); AMAR, supra note 9, at 193 (same); Akhil 
Reed Amar, Some Opinions on the Opinions Clause, 82 VA. L. REV. 647, 658-59 (1996) 
(same); Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 48, at 637 (same); Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher 
S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the First Half-Century, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1451, 
1475-76 (1997) (same); cf. 9 STATE OF NEW YORK: MESSAGES FROM THE GOVERNORS, 1892-
1898, at 515 (Charles Z. Lincoln ed., Albany, J.B. Lyon Co. 1909) (reproducing May 23, 1894 
veto message of Governor Roswell P. Flower, which stated: “That one who holds the power to 
appoint a public officer, to remove him at will and appoint his successor, to fix his salary and 
to change it from time to time, holds a public trust will not be disputed . . . .”—placing the 
officers below the holders of public trusts (emphasis added)); Kesavan, supra note 48, at 133 
(noting that the public trust language of the Religious Test Clause is unique to that clause, and 
opining that the Constitution’s public trust language in that clause was intended to 
accommodate federal electors, as well as members of Congress).  On one occasion James 
Madison intimated that officer and officer of the United States extended only to statutory 
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officers. See, e.g., 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 64, at 344-45 (recording Madison’s 
Philadelphia Convention entry for August 20, 1787: “‘And to make all laws necessary and 
proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested, by this 
Constitution, in the Government of the U.S. or any department or officer thereof.’ Mr. 
Madison and Mr. Pinkney [sic] moved to insert between ‘laws’ and ‘necessary’ ‘and establish 
all offices.’  [I]t appearing to them liable to cavil that the latter was not included in the former. 
Mr. Govr. Morris[,] Mr. Wilson, Mr[.] Rutlidge [sic] and Mr. Elseworth [sic] urged that the 
amendment could not be necessary.  On the motion for inserting ‘and establish all 
offices’ . . . . [Ayes -- 2; noes 9.]” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)). 
  
For what appears to be a period document distinguishing officials at the apex of (state or 
federal) government authority (i.e., magistrates) from mere officers see Sabbath Prayer for the 
Government, The Congregation Mikveh Israel, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (founded 1740): 
 
May he who granteth deliverance unto nations and understanding unto their leaders, 
whose kingdom is an everlasting kingdom, who delivered His servant David from the 
destructive sword, who maketh a way in the sea and a path in its mighty waters, bless, 
preserve, guard and assist the President and Vice-President of the United States, the 
Senate and House of Representatives [in Congress assembled],* the Governor of this 
Commonwealth, the members of the Legislature, the Mayor and other constituted 
authorities in this City. 
 
May the Supreme King of kings in His infinite mercy preserve them, grant them life, 
and deliver them from all manner of trouble and danger.  May the Supreme King of 
kings in His infinite mercy inspire them and all their counselors and officers with 
good towards us and all Israel, our brethren. 
*This phrase is recited only when Congress is actually in session.  See Letter Insert from Rev. 
Albert E. Gabbai of Mikveh Israel to Seth Barrett Tillman (circa Nov. 25, 2008) (emphasis 
added), available at http://works.bepress.com/seth_barrett_tillman/164/ (click, in Related 
Files, “letter_insert_mikveh_israel.pdf”). 
For a period British example, distinguishing those at the apex of political authority from mere 
subordinate officers, compare 3 MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW, Offices 
and Officers 718, 719 (London, J. Worrall et al. 3d ed. 1768) (“The King is the universal 
Officer and Disposer of Justice within this Realm, from whom all others are said to be 
derived . . . .” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)), with 4 JOHN COMYNS, A DIGEST OF THE 
LAWS OF ENGLAND, Officer 239 (London, H. Woodfall & W. Strahan 1766) (“The King is the 
Fountain of all Power and Authority, and by his prerogative has the Nomination of all 
Officers originally.” (emphasis added)), and 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, BLACKSTONE’S 
COMMENTARIES 271 (St. George Tucker ed., Philadelphia, W.Y. Birch & A. Small 1803) 
(circa 1765) (“The king is likewise the fountain of honour, of office, and of privilege: and this 
in a different sense from that wherein he is stiled the fountain of justice; for here he is really 
the parent of them.”); see also GARNER, supra note 92, at 540 (defining “magistrate” and 
noting “the word . . . once referred to the official first in rank in a branch of government” 
(citing Justice Cardozo) (emphasis added)); cf. The Useless Electors, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 
1905, available at http://works.bepress.com/seth_barrett_ tillman/164/ (click, in Related Files, 
“USELESS_ELECTORS_NYT.pdf”) (“In every [p]residential campaign it happens, as it 
happened in this State last Fall, that Directors or officers of [n]ational banks are placed upon 
the list of Electors.  It is of course absurd to suppose that a bank Director holds an office of 
profit or trust under the Government, but it is the uniform practice of party committees to 
avoid all doubt and danger by substituting other names as soon as the supposed 
disqualification is discovered.” (emphasis added)).  The same ambiguity of language appears 
in modern American legal literature. Compare Calabresi, Reply to Professor Ackerman, supra 
note 67, at 480 (noting that “the Constitution of 1787 created a unitary executive, provided for 
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Here, I should like to pose a question to the reader and to those in the academic 
consensus.  The Religious Test Clause provides: “[N]o religious Test shall ever be 
required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.”96  
There is very little scholarship discussing the Religious Test Clause, much less the 
meaning or scope of “public trust under the United States.”97  Given that nearly 
                                                           
no executive council, and gave the president the power to nominate all officers of the United 
States and the power to make recess appointments” (emphasis added)), with Calabresi, 
Response, Political Question, supra note 1, at 160 (“The [‘executive and judicial Officers . . . 
of the United States’ language within the Oaths and Affirmations] Clause is clearly referring 
to the President . . . .” (emphasis added)).  And the same ambiguity of language appears in 
ancient legal systems too. Compare Deuteronomy 16:18 (The Jerusalem Bible 232) (Harold 
Fisch ed., 1989) (translating Deuteronomy 16:18 as: “Judges and officers shalt thou make thee 
in all thy gates . . . .” (emphasis added)), and Deuteronomy 16:18 (The New Oxford 
Annotated Bible 236) (Herbert G. May & Bruce M. Metzger, eds., rev. std. vers. 1973) 
(translating Deuteronomy 16:18 as: “You shall appoint judges and officers in all your 
towns . . . .” (emphasis and bold added)), with 5 R. ABRAHAM BEN ISAIAH & R. BENJAMIN 
SHARFMAN, THE PENTATEUTCH AND RASHI’S COMMENTARY: A LINEAR TRANSLATION INTO 
ENGLISH 157 (1977) (recording Rashi’s commentary explaining Deuteronomy 16:18 as: 
“[J]udges who decide the law; and officers are those who govern the people after their 
command (i.e., of the judges) . . . .”); compare 1 TRACTATE SANHEDRIN 2a3 (Rabbi Hersh 
Goldwin et al. eds., 1993) (“The original Great Sanhedrin was composed of seventy Elders 
with Moses over them.  This totals seventy-one judges. R’Yehudah says: The Great Sanhedrin 
was composed of seventy judges.” (emphasis added) (emphasis and Hebrew omitted) 
(footnote omitted)), with id. at 16b4 (“The dispute is based on the question of whether Moses 
was a member of the original Great Sanhedrin together with the seventy Elders.”), and id. at 
16b4 n.36 (noting that “[p]erhaps Moses was not an actual member of the court, and merely 
presided over them . . . .” (emphasis in the original) (citing Yad Ramah, and Chamra 
VeChayei)).  I am not suggesting that any Framers believed this material, but only that it was a 
literary tradition that they would have comprehended.  See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 9, at 572 
n.21 (noting that the “eighteenth-century world [was] sensitive to fine gradations of formal 
title”); cf. CONFUCIUS, THE ANALECTS (circa 500 B.C.E.), available at 
http://classics.mit.edu/Confucius/analects.4.4.html (“Confucius said, ‘When good government 
prevails in the empire, ceremonies, music, and punitive military expeditions proceed from the 
[Emperor].  When bad government prevails in the empire, ceremonies, music, and punitive 
military expeditions proceed from the princes.  When these things proceed from the princes, 
as a rule, the cases will be few in which they do not lose their power in ten generations.  When 
they proceed from the great officers of the princes, as a rule, the case will be few in which 
they do not lose their power in five generations.  When the subsidiary ministers of the great 
officers hold in their grasp the orders of the state, as a rule the cases will be few in which they 
do not lose their power in three generations.’”). 
 96 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. 
 97 There is some scholarship discussing the Article VI Religious Test Clause, but no 
substantial discussion, Professor Destro and Mr. Kesavan excepted, discussing the scope of 
the clause’s public trust language.  See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 489 n.1 (1961) 
(Black, J.) (applying the First and Fourteenth Amendment, and finding it “unnecessary to 
consider [the] contention that [the Religious Test Clause] applies to state as well as federal 
offices”); Newdow v. Eagen, 309 F. Supp. 2d 29, 37-38 & n.5 (D.D.C.) (Kennedy, J.) 
(discussing standing requirements to assert a claim under the Religious Test Clause), appeal 
dismissed, No. 04-5195, 2004 WL 1701043 (D.C. Cir. July 29, 2004) (per curiam); Idaho v. 
Freeman, 507 F. Supp. 706, 729 (D. Idaho 1981) (Callister, J.) (“This [A]rticle VI religious 
test clause has received little, if any, attention from the courts . . . .” (citing Torcaso, supra)); 
MORTON BORDEN, JEWS, TURKS, AND INFIDELS 44 (1984); Gerard V. Bradley, The No 
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Religious Test Clause and the Constitution of Religious Liberty: A Machine That Has Gone of 
Itself, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 674, 718-20 (1987); Daniel L. Dreisbach, The Constitution’s 
Forgotten Religion Clause: Reflections on the Article VI Religious Test Ban, 38 J. OF CHURCH 
& STATE 261 (1996); Note, An Originalist Analysis of the Religious Test Clause, 120 HARV. 
L. REV. 1649 (2007); cf. Francis J. Beckwith, The Court of Disbelief: The Constitution’s 
Article VI Religious Test Prohibition and the Judiciary’s Religious Motive Analysis, 33 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 337 (2006); Winston E. Calvert, Judicial Selection and the Religious 
Test Clause, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1129 (2004); Paul Horwitz, Religious Tests in the Mirror: The 
Constitutional Law and Constitutional Etiquette of Religion in Judicial Nominations, 15 WM. 
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 75 (2006); Bryan H. Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of Rights: 
Scholarship and Commentary on the Fourteenth Amendment in 1867-1873, 18 J. CONTEMP. 
LEGAL ISSUES 153, 190 n.117, 236 n.257 (2009) (discussing scholarship opining on whether 
the Religious Test Clause was incorporated against the States by the Fourteenth Amendment). 
Compare Silverman v. Campbell, 486 S.E.2d 1, 2 (S.C. 1997) (Finney, C.J.) (affirming 
challenge under the Religious Test Clause to a state constitutional provision), and Bradley, 
supra at 718 (explaining that the Supreme Court’s opinion in “Torcaso, if it is to be grasped at 
all, affects an ‘incorporation’ of [A]rticle VI . . . .”), with Torcaso v. Watkins, 162 A.2d 438, 
442 (Md. 1960) (Henderson, J.) (holding that the Religious Test Clause is “plainly 
inapplicable” to the States), rev’d on other grounds, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). 
A few authorities discuss the Religious Test Clause’s public trust language in some detail.  
See Memorandum for William P. Marshall, Deputy Counsel to the President, from Randolph 
D. Moss, Asst. Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Application of the Coreligionists 
Exemption in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, at *22 n.46 (Oct. 12, 2000), available at 
http://works.bepress.com/seth_barrett_tillman/164/ (click, in Related Files, “MOSS_DOJ_ 
MEMORANDUM.pdf”) (noting that “[t]here is virtually no federal case law discussing what 
constitutes a ‘public trust’ for purposes of [A]rticle VI’s religious test ban,” and hypothesizing 
that it extends either to “Senators and Representatives” and/or to “any position or function the 
performance of which is subject to a duty of loyalty to the United States” (emphasis added)); 
Robert A. Destro, The Structure of the Religious Liberty Guarantee, 11 J.L. & RELIGION 355, 
369 n.59 (1995) (arguing that public trust under the United States extends to elective 
positions); Kesavan, supra note 48 passim (hypothesizing that public trust under the United 
States extends to members of Congress and to federal electors).  Notice how Assistant 
Attorney General Moss makes use of a concept well-developed in private law—the fiduciary 
duty of loyalty—to understand a public law concept, i.e., the meaning of public trust under the 
United States.  See Geoffrey P. Miller, The Corporate Law Background of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, in THE ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE 144 (Gary Lawson et 
al. eds., 2010); Eric Enlow, The Corporate Conception of the State and the Origins of Limited 
Constitutional Government, 6 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 1 (2001); Robert G. Natelson, The 
Constitution and the Public Trust, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1077 (2004); see also Evan J. Criddle, 
Fiduciary Foundations of Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 117 (2006); Robert G. 
Natelson, The Agency Law Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 55 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 243 (2004); cf. Mary Sarah Bilder, The Corporate Origins of Judicial Review, 116 YALE 
L.J. 502 (2006).  Compare Prakash, supra note 45, at 144 (objecting to using evidence from 
corporate law field in order to understand public law terms), with Prakash & Smith, supra 
note 9, at 107 (using evidence from trust law in order to understand public law terminology). 
See generally R. v Boston (1923) 33 CLR 386, 412 (Austl.) (Higgins, J.) (“He is a member of 
Parliament, holding a fiduciary relation towards the public, and that is enough.”); Paul D. 
Finn, The Forgotten “Trust”: The People and the State, in EQUITY: ISSUES AND TRENDS 131, 
133 (Malcolm Cope ed., 1995) (noting that English judges brought public officials “into a 
fiduciary relationship with the public” (citing R. v. Bembridge, (1783) 99 Eng. Rep. 679 
(K.B.), 22 St. Tr. 1)); Robert French, Chief Justice of the High Court of Austl., Seventh 
Annual St. Thomas More Forum Lecture: Public Office and Public Trust (Canberra June 22, 
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every article, section, clause, and word of the Constitution has been examined in 
detail, the absence of commentary on the scope of the public trust language in the 
Religious Test Clause is surprising.  This is particularly true in light of our society’s 
deep fascination with church-state issues and the First Amendment.  Some authors 
simply punt in regard to the scope of the public trust language.98  The majority view 
posits that the public trust language extends to Members of Congress.99  Recently, 
Vasan Kesavan suggested that it extends to Members of Congress and to federal 
electors.100  Either one of these interpretations poses an existential threat to those in 
the academic consensus with regard to the Constitution’s language related to office 
and officer.  If the Amars, Chafetz, and Kesavan are correct—if officers of the 
United States is coextensive with officers under the United States and the President 
and Vice President are embraced by these two categories which (according to the 
consensus) extend only to executive and judicial officers—then no language in the 
Constitution extends the force of the Religious Test Clause to non-member non-
presiding congressional officers, e.g., the Clerk of the House, the Secretary of the 
Senate, etc.  That is a startling and deeply counter-intuitive result.  One wonders if 
Professor Chafetz, Professor Akhil Amar, Professor Vikram Amar, or any of the 
other promoters of the academic consensus will own up to the difficulty in their 
position.  Should not those in the consensus come forward with some theory as to the 
scope of the Religious Test Clause’s public trust language?  Is not this a minimal 
requirement for any structuralist or intratextual account of the Constitution’s 
meaning as a whole?101  
                                                           
2011), available at http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/publications/speeches/currentjustices/ 
frenchcj/frenchcj22jun11.pdf. 
 98 See AMAR, supra note 9, at 301 (“As a further gesture of religious inclusiveness and 
tolerance, Article VI forbade any ‘religious Test’ for any federal office or post . . . .” 
(emphasis added)).  What is an office?  What is a post?  See also GOLD, supra note 9, at 163 
(using the phrase “offices of public trust under the United States”—a phrase nowhere 
appearing in the Constitution); HUGH HEWITT, A MORMON IN THE WHITEHOUSE 237 (2007) 
(“Because the First Amendment’s breadth is as wide as all government activity, questions 
about the precise meaning of ‘office of public trust’ [Tillman adding—a phrase nowhere 
appearing in the Constitution] are also moot.  Whether the Religious Test Clause by itself 
extends to members of Congress or all the way down to postal workers no longer matters—
save perhaps to historians.”); cf. AMAR, supra note 14, at 74 (interpreting the Religious Test 
Clause to mean that “no federal public servant may ever be forced to pass a religious test”). 
 99 Cf. U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 903 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(“But the only reason for extending the [Religious Test] Clause to the States would be to 
protect Senators and Representatives from state-imposed religious qualifications; I know of no 
one else who holds a ‘public Trust under the United States’ yet who might be subject to state 
disqualifications.”). 
 100 Kesavan, supra note 48 passim. 
 101 See Amar & Amar, supra note 9, at 136 n.143 (“The Constitution must mean 
something—the best reading of the document either permits or bars legislative succession.”).  
To which I would add: The Constitution must mean something—the best reading of the 
Constitution (prior to passage of the First Amendment) either permitted imposition of 
religious tests on non-member non-presiding legislative officers or it did not.  See generally 
Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 761 (1999) (“[T]he same (or very 
similar) words in the same document should, at least presumptively, be construed in the same 
(or a very similar) way.  But the flip side of the intratextual coin is that when two (or more) 
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By contrast, the position I put forward here clears up this difficulty.  Office . . . 
under the United States embraces statutory and appointed officers (including non-
member non-presiding legislative officers such as the Clerk and Secretary); public 
trust under the United States embraces elected or constitutionally mandated 
positions.102  Thus, the language of the Religious Test Clause covers, just as one 
might suspect, all positions expressly created by the Constitution and all offices that 
were to be created in the future, i.e., post-1789, under delegated or statutory 
authority.103 
                                                           
clauses feature different wording, this difference may also be a clue to meaning, and invite 
different construction of the different words.” (emphasis added)).  
 102 Compare Motions Sys. Corp. v. Bush, 437 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(Gajarsa, J., concurring in part and concurring in the en banc judgment) (“[T]he President of 
the United States [is] a constitutional official who is plainly not an ‘officer of the United 
States’ for Appointments Clause purposes but whose office is [instead] created by the 
Constitution itself.” (emphasis added) (emphasis in the original omitted)), KALT, supra 
note 14, at 89 n.16 (“[A] good case [can be made] that officers ‘under the authority of the 
United States’ in the Emoluments Clause are not the same set as officers ‘under’ or ‘of’ the 
United States, and that people should be careful about treating these different phrasings as 
though they are necessarily identical.” (emphasis added)), and PETER K. ROFES, THE RELIGION 
GUARANTEES: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 12 (2005) (noting 
that the Religious Test Clause originally extended to “any office or public trust under the 
Authority of the United States,” but “the Authority of”-language was dropped by the 
Committee of Style), with David J. Shaw, Note, An Officer and a Congressman: The 
Unconstitutionality of Congressmen in the Armed Forces Reserves, 97 GEO. L.J. 1739, 1743 & 
nn.19, 20 (2009) (arguing that one may infer from the Constitution’s text that the presidency is 
an “office of the United States,” and that the differences between “office” and “office of the 
United States” and “office under the United States” and other such similar office-related 
categories are “minor textual differences without any meaningful distinction[]”), and Schatz, 
supra note 13, at 146 (“The Constitution’s usage regarding public officials is inconsistent and 
reflects no evident intent to establish terms of art in this regard.” (footnote omitted)).  See 
generally Alexander B. Haskell, Deference, Defiance, and the Language of Office in 
Seventeenth-Century Virginia, in EARLY MODERN VIRGINIA: RECONSIDERING THE OLD 
DOMINION 161 (Douglas Bradburn & John C. Coombs eds., 2011) (“[Professor Conal] 
Condren has argued that, in England, the language of office was just that, a vocabulary for 
moral discourse rather than a particular ideology or even a singular concept.  Particular shared 
presuppositions arose from the vocabulary, making it far more than simply random talk; 
indeed, because it was almost universally accepted the language effectively gave rise to the 
world of offices that it described.” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)); Karen Orren, 
Officers’ Rights: Towards a Unified Field Theory of American Constitutional Development, 
34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 873 (2000); Karen Orren, The Work of Government: Recovering the 
Discourse of Office in Marbury v. Madison, 8 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 60 (1994). 
 103 See Destro, supra note 97, at 369 n.59 (“There are only a few sources which shed light 
on the content of the phrase ‘any Office or public Trust under the United States.’  The first 
part–‘office under the United States’—is relatively clear given the language of Article I, § 6 
(Incompatibility Clause) and Art. II, §§ 1, 2.  It is arguable, though not by any means settled, 
that all persons who hold elective offices, federal appointments, or who perform a federal 
function of any sort, including members of the Armed Services and presidential Electors, are 
protected by the Test Clause. . . . The more interesting question is what constitutes a ‘public 
Trust under the United States.’” (emphasis added)); supra note 64 (quoting the Incompatibility 
Clause); see also supra note 97 (collecting authority other than Destro).  See generally 
MICHAEL S. ARIENS & ROBERT A. DESTRO, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY 711-
12 (2d ed. 2002) (suggesting that the Religious Test Clause’s public trust language is 
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VI.  AFTERWARD 
There is, or at least was, an apocryphal story told at the University of Chicago.  It 
went something like this: In the time before time, Aaron Director invited Ronald 
Coase to present a paper at the Law & Economics Colloquium.  Coase presented a 
paper titled The Problem of Social Cost.104  After presenting his paper to a room full 
of luminaries, he asked for a vote to get the sense of the audience.  Not one person 
bought into his new view, and, all who voted, voted against it.  He recast his 
argument.  The vote was the same.  He did it a third time—and low and behold, one 
vote broke from the pack, but all others still stood opposed.  He presented it again, 
and some three persons supported the new view.  By the end of the evening, he had 
brought around the largest part of the audience.  In years past, I heard this story from 
both Milton Friedman and George Stigler, o.b.m.  The only difference in the telling 
                                                           
“broader” than the Clause’s officer language and may extend to federal contractors, grantees 
of federal funds, and holders of “broadcast license[s]”); JOHN LOUIS LACAITES, FLEXIBILITY 
AND CONSTITUENCY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ANGLO-WHIGGISM: A CASE STUDY OF THE 
RHETORICAL DIMENSIONS OF LEGITIMACY (1984).  Professor Destro suggests as one 
possibility, among others, that non-member non-presiding legislative staff might hold a public 
trust under the United States.  Destro, supra note 97, at 366 n.45.  He suggests that “their close 
identification with the individual [member] who employs them makes them administrators of 
the public Trust held by that individual.”  Id.  By contrast, I think the more linguistically 
“true” reading is that officers work for trustees.  See, e.g., Letter from George Washington to 
Eléonor François Élie, Comte de Moustier (May 25, 1789), supra note 95, at 334 (“The 
impossibility that one man should be able to perform all the great business of State, I take to 
have been the reason for instituting the great Departments, and appointing officers therein, to 
assist the supreme Magistrate in discharging the duties of his trust.” (emphasis added)); 9 
STATE OF NEW YORK: MESSAGES FROM THE GOVERNORS, supra note 95, at 515 (reproducing 
May 23, 1894 veto message of Governor Roswell P. Flower, which stated: “That one who 
holds the power to appoint a public officer, to remove him at will and appoint his successor, to 
fix his salary and to change it from time to time, holds a public trust will not be 
disputed . . . .”—placing the officers below the holders of public trusts (emphasis added)); 
Victoria F. Nourse, Law’s Constitution: A Relational Critique, 17 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 23 
(2002) (“[A]ny real life relation will do—it need not be the relation between men and women 
or women and children, it need not be a sexual or an intimate relation, but may be the relation 
between contracting parties, between the members of a board of directors and the company’s 
officers, or between voters and their public agents.” (emphasis added)); Eric Lichtblau, 
Conflict of Interest is Raised in Eavesdropping Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2006, at A19 
(“The federal judge who ruled last week that President Bush’s eavesdropping program was 
unconstitutional is a trustee and an officer of a group that has given . . . to the American Civil 
Liberties Union . . . .”). 
Professor Akhil Amar agrees that the Religious Test Clause covers the gamut or all federal 
positions.  See AMAR, supra note 14, at 74 (interpreting the Religious Test Clause to mean that 
“no federal public servant may ever be forced to pass a religious test”).  But, it is difficult to 
see how his conclusion in regard to the Religious Test Clause squares with his other 
publications touching on the meaning of office and officer.  Further clarity on this point will 
have to come from Professor Amar.   
 
 104 See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); see also R.H. 
Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1959). 
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was that when Friedman told it, he was the first to agree with Coase, and when 
Stigler told it . . . well you get the idea.105 
I believe that there are already some signs in the literature that the modern 
consensus is falling.106  The Executive Branch has, on occasion, broken from that 
                                                           
 105 This passage is my personal recollection of the story as I heard it some years ago.  I 
have no source for it.  Cf. Edmund W. Kitch, The Fire of Truth: A Remembrance of Law and 
Economics at Chicago, 1932-1970, 26 J.L. & ECON. 163, 220-21 (1983) (recounting what 
appears to be basically the same tale); id. at 233 (“A striking aspect of the whole discussion 
[and conference which gave awards to Coase and Director] is the repeated emphasis on the 
importance of oral communication.”). 
 106 See, e.g., supra note 64 (quoting the text of the Incompatibility Clause and Ineligibility 
Clause); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3155 
(2010) (Roberts, C.J.) (“The diffusion of power carries with it a diffusion of accountability.  
The people do not vote for the ‘Officers of the United States.’ Art. II, § 2, cl. 2.  They instead 
look to the President [Tillman adding—who is elected] to guide the ‘assistants or deputies . . . 
subject to his superintendence.’  The Federalist No. 72, p.487 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A. 
Hamilton). . . .  That is why the Framers sought to ensure that ‘those who are employed in the 
execution of the law will be in their proper situation, and the chain of dependence be 
preserved; the lowest officers, the middle grade [officers], and the highest [officers], will 
depend, as they ought, on the President, and the President on the community.’ 1 Annals of 
Cong., at 499 (J. Madison).” (emphasis added)); Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 904 (1991) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“The Framers’ experience with postrevolutionary self-government 
had taught them that combining the power to create offices with the power to appoint [Tillman 
adding—not elect] officers was a recipe for legislative corruption.  The foremost danger was 
that legislators would create offices with the expectancy of occupying them themselves.  This 
was guarded against by the Incompatibility and Ineligibility Clauses, Article I, § 6, cl. 2.”); 
KALT, supra note 14, at 89 n.16 (“[A] good case [can be made] that officers ‘under the 
authority of the United States’ in the Emoluments Clause are not the same set as officers 
‘under’ or ‘of’ the United States, and that people should be careful about treating these 
different phrasings as though they are necessarily identical.” (emphasis added)); Richard 
Albert, The Constitutional Politics of Presidential Succession, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 497, 508 
(2011) (“But with respect to the founding era, the evidence from the first succession act 
indicates the contrary: joint interbranch service [between Congress and the Presidency] may 
well have been constitutional.” (emphasis added)); Steven G. Calabresi, Closing Statement, A 
Term of Art or the Artful Reading of Terms?, in Tillman & Calabresi, supra note 10, at 156 
(recognizing the possibility that officer under the United States may be “potentially broader” 
than officer of the United States, although arguing that the President is in the former category, 
even if not in the latter); Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 95, at 1496 n.163 (“The Incompatibility 
Clause was added to the Constitution to prevent the President from inducing Members of 
Congress to vote for his legislative program by offering to appoint them to high executive and 
judicial offices.” (emphasis added)); Feerick, supra note 77, at 62 (“I am not entirely 
convinced that it is unconstitutional to place legislators in the line of presidential 
succession . . . .”); James Fleming, Presidential Succession: The Art of the Possible, 79 
FORDHAM L. REV. 951, 954 (2010) (“I see no constitutional infirmity in legislative 
succession. . . . [T]he better originalist arguments are in favor of the constitutionality of 
legislative succession.”); Goldstein, Akhil Reed Amar and Presidential Continuity, supra 
note 81, at 83-95 (collecting authority and argument distinguishing “officer” from “officer of 
the United States”); Michael B. Rappaport, The Selective Nondelegation Doctrine and the 
Line Item Veto, 76 TULANE L. REV. 265, 331 (2001) (noting that the “Framers prohibited 
members of Congress from also serving as U.S. officers and assigned to Congress the power 
to establish such offices”—which would seem to exclude the President and Vice President 
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (citing the Incompatibility Clause)); Hanah Metchis 
Volokh, The Two Appointments Clauses: Statutory Qualifications for Federal Officers, 10 U. 
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PA. J. CONST. L. 745, 779 (2008) (“The Incompatibility Clause sets a limit both on 
membership in Congress and on holding an appointed [Tillman adding—not elected] office—
namely, that the same person cannot do both at the same time.” (emphasis added)); Howard 
M. Wasserman, The Trouble with Shadow Government, 52 EMORY L.J. 281, 289 (2003) (“The 
counterargument is that the unmodified term ‘Officers’ [as used in the Succession Clause] is 
broader than ‘Officers of the United States’ and also may include legislative officers, such as 
the Speaker and President Pro Tempore.” (citing Manning, supra note 45, at 143-44 (arguing 
that the failure to use in the Succession Clause the otherwise frequently-used phrase Officers 
of the United States suggests that the use of Officer, standing alone and unmodified, in the 
Succession Clause, refers to a broader class of actors than does Officers of the United 
States))); Adam J. White, Will the Real VP Please Step Forward?, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 27, 
2008, at 36, 37 (“But ultimately, Article I, Section 3’s internal tension is a red herring. No 
matter which constitutional branch the vice president is ‘in’—or whether he is ‘in’ both 
branches or neither branch—his office’s constitutional powers are exclusively legislative.”); 
Steven G. Calabresi, Abstract to Does the Incompatibility Clause Apply to the President?, 
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK (Nov. 4, 2008), http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1294671 (describing “office under the United States” as “an arguably murky term”); 
Richard Heald, Separation of Powers (or is it?), CONSTI WEBLOG: WHAT’S HOT AND WHAT’S 
NOT (Jan. 6, 2009, 5:23:11 AM), http://khei.etouch.net/cm/blog/rheald/posts/post_ 
1231248220160.html (taking the view that “one could say that the text [of the Constitution] 
doesn’t require [a senator to resign before assuming the presidency] ([which seems allowable] 
perhaps by oversight), but that a convention requires it”).  But cf. Memorandum to Hugh M. 
Durham, Chief, Legislative & Legal Section, Office of Legislative Affairs, from Antonin 
Scalia, Asst. Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Proposed Bill to Increase the Salary of 
the Attorney General, at *6 (Nov. 22, 1974), available at http://works.bepress.com/ 
seth_barrett_tillman/164/ (denominating the Ineligibility Clause as “essential[ly] 
incohesiv[e]”).  However, in a recent student note, Mr. David Shaw restated and reaffirmed 
the modern academic consensus view: that although the Constitution uses a variety of terms 
relating to “office” and “officer,” the different terminology is without “meaningful 
distinction.”  Shaw, supra note 102, at 1743 n.20.  The lone eighteenth century source Shaw 
puts forward in support of his position is debate from the North Carolina ratifying convention 
purporting to illustrate that “office of Authority under” was used interchangeably with other 
variants—but neither Shaw’s “office of Authority under” (a phrase nowhere appearing in the 
Constitution) nor the phrase “Office under the Authority of the United States” (apparently the 
phrase Shaw intended) appears anywhere in the debate cited by Shaw.  Id. at 1746 n.47 (citing 
three days’ debate in the North Carolina ratifying convention, a convention which failed to 
ratify the Constitution).  One is (again) left wondering upon what facts the modern consensus 
is based.  See supra note 64. 
Likewise, in a recent book, Professor Jay Wexler uses carefully chosen language leaving it 
unclear whether he believes the (elected) President and/or Vice President are officers of the 
United States.  See JAY WEXLER, THE ODD CLAUSES: UNDERSTANDING THE CONSTITUTION 
THROUGH TEN OF ITS MOST CURIOUS PROVISIONS 43-44 (2011) (“What the Constitution is 
saying here [in the Appointments Clause] . . . is that the US government has two kinds of 
officers when it comes to appointments: ‘principal officers’ . . . and ‘inferior officers’ . . . .” 
(emphasis added) (commas omitted)).  In other words, Wexler leaves unclear if there are 
other federal actors properly denominated officers of the United States who are not subject to 
appointment, (i.e., elected positions).  Cf. id. at 8-9, 52-54, 221 (discussing Tillman’s 
publications).  Wexler’s unwillingness to directly address this obscure point may very well 
reflect the fact that he believes the question is an open one, i.e., one which reasonable minds 
have and may continue to disagree about.  His open-mindedness is a view not universally 
shared. See Steven G. Calabresi, Rebuttal, Does the Incompatibility Clause Apply to the 
President?, in Tillman & Calabresi, supra note 10, at 141 (responding, to the position that 
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consensus.107  I believe that when that time comes, the view I put forward in 2007, or 
something like it, will become the new view.  When that time comes, I sincerely 
                                                           
joint presidential-senate office-holding is constitutional, by opining that such a view is “utterly 
implausible”). 
 107 See Application of the [Foreign] Emoluments Clause of the Constitution and the 
Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act, 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 156, 157, 1982 WL 170682, 
at *2, 1982 OLC LEXIS 46, at *4-5 (Feb. 24, 1982) (Shanks, Dep’y Asst. Att’y Gen.) 
(affirming that different “language” relating to office in different constitutional clauses relates 
to different “purpose[s]”); see also Authority of Foreign Law Enforcement Agents to Carry 
Weapons in the United States, 12 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 67, 68, 1988 WL 391002, at *2, 
1988 OLC LEXIS 41, at *5 (Apr. 12, 1988) (McGinnis, Dep’y Asst. Att’y Gen.) (“The 
[Foreign] Emoluments Clause must be read broadly in order to fulfill that purpose. 
Accordingly, the Clause applies to all persons holding an office of profit or trust under the 
United States, and not merely to that smaller group of persons who are deemed to be ‘officers 
of the United States’ for purposes of Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution.” (emphasis 
added) (citing 1986 Opinion, infra)); Application of the [Foreign] Emoluments Clause to Part-
Time Consultant for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 10 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 96, 98, 
1986 WL 213241, at *2, 1986 OLC LEXIS 66, at *5 (June 3, 1986) (Cooper, Asst. Att’y 
Gen.) (“Prior opinions of this Office have assumed without discussion that the persons 
covered by the [Foreign] Emoluments Clause were ‘officers of the United States’ in the sense 
used in the Appointments Clause, U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.  Nevertheless, in [the] 1982 
[Opinion, supra], we did advise that a person may hold an ‘office of profit or trust’ under the 
[Foreign] Emoluments Clause without necessarily being an ‘officer of the United States’ for 
purposes of the Appointments Clause.” (footnote omitted)); cf. Brief for Petitioners, 
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) (No. 72-1188), 1973 
WL 173884, at *52 (“Various statutes impose limitations and prohibitions upon officers of the 
United States.  Because there is a close relationship between such officers and offices under 
the United States—in most, and perhaps all instances, the concepts are co-extensive—the 
cases defining ‘officer’ of the United States are relevant in determining what constitutes an 
‘office’ under the United States.” (emphasis added)) (filed by Solicitor General Robert H. 
Bork et al.); cf. SILVA, supra note 10, at 149 (“‘Officers of the United States’ are not 
appointed by electoral colleges.  They are appointed by the President and Senate, by the 
President alone, by the department heads, or by the courts of law.”); Silva, supra note 9, 
at 475 (“[T]he only election by presidential electors known in the Constitution is the election 
of the President and Vice President. ‘Officers of the United States’ are appointed by the 
President and the Senate, by the President alone, by the department heads, or by the courts.” 
(emphasis added)).  In its most recent opinions touching on the subject, the Office of Legal 
Counsel (OLC) has impliedly rejected the position put forward in the Cooper, McGinnis, and 
Shanks opinions.  See Applicability of the [Foreign] Emoluments Clause and the Foreign Gifts 
and Decorations Act to the President’s Receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize, 33 Op. Off. Legal 
Counsel (slip op. at 4), 2009 WL 6365082, at *4, 2009 OLC LEXIS 18, at *10 (Dec. 7, 2009) 
(Barron, Acting Asst. Att’y Gen.) (announcing in ipse dixit that “[t]he President surely 
‘hold[s] an[] Office of Profit or Trust[] [under the United States]’ . . . .” (emphasis added) 
(quoting Article I, Section 9, Clause 8)); cf. Applicability of the [Foreign] Emoluments Clause 
to Nongovernmental Members of ACUs, 34 Op. Off. Legal Counsel (slip op. at 4), 2010 WL 
2516024, at *4, 2010 OLC LEXIS 2, at *12-13 (June 3, 2010) (Barron, Acting Asst. Att’y 
Gen.) (“Our [2005] Bioethics Council and [our 2007] FBI Advisory Board opinions go further 
than our [1996] IEP opinion and indicate that only those persons considered officers within 
the meaning of the Appointments Clause . . . may be subject to the [Foreign] Emoluments 
Clause . . . .”).  Puzzlingly, however, the Barron opinions neither distinguish nor cite to the 
counter-authority in the earlier OLC opinions.  See generally Trevor W. Morrison, Stare 
Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1448, 1448 (2010) (“The data 
show that OLC rarely openly departs from its prior opinions, but that an express request for 
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hope that Professor Chafetz can play the role of Stigler or Friedman, rather than that 
of the many others (good people no doubt) who waited in the wings. 
 
 
                                                           
overruling from the executive entity most affected by the opinion is a good predictor of such a 
departure.”). 
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